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LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AFTER MCCUTCHEON, 
CITIZENS UNITED, AND SPEECHNOW 
Albert W. Alschuler* 
Abstract 
There was something unreal about the opinions in McCutcheon v. 
FEC. These opinions examined a series of strategies for circumventing 
the limits on contributions to candidates imposed by federal election 
law, but they failed to notice that the limits were no longer breathing. 
The D.C. Circuit’s decision in SpeechNow.org v. FEC had created a far 
easier way to evade the limits than any of those the Supreme Court 
discussed. SpeechNow held all limits on contributions to super PACs 
unconstitutional. 
This Article argues that the D.C. Circuit erred; Citizens United v. 
FEC did not require unleashing super PAC contributions. The Article 
also considers what can be said for and against a bumper sticker’s 
declarations that “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH!” and 
“CORPORATIONS ARE NOT PEOPLE!” It proposes a framework for 
evaluating the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations that 
differs from the one currently employed by the Supreme Court. And it 
proposes a legislative scheme of campaign-finance regulation that 
would effectively limit contributions while respecting the Supreme 
Court’s campaign-finance decisions.  
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INTRODUCTION: THE ELEPHANT (OR SUPER PACHYDERM) IN THE 
ROOM 
Both the plurality and the dissenting opinions in McCutcheon v. 
FEC1 seem unreal. At issue in McCutcheon was the validity of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA’s) “aggregate” contribution 
limits—its limits on the total amounts a person may contribute to all 
candidates and political committees during a single election cycle. The 
principal issue dividing the U.S. Supreme Court was whether, in the 
absence of these limits, donors could evade the BCRA’s “base” limits—
its limits on the amount a person may contribute to an individual 
candidate. 
The Court held the aggregate limits unconstitutional by a vote of 
five-to-four.2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that limits 
on campaign contributions and expenditures should be subject to strict 
scrutiny—a standard that apparently would invalidate them all.3 The 
most significant aspect of the McCutcheon decision, however, may be 
the willingness of the other eight Justices to assume the validity of the 
base limits and of measures truly necessary to prevent their 
circumvention.4 
The four dissenting Justices described a series of circumvention 
strategies they feared might follow invalidation of the aggregate limits. 
These strategies involved multiple political action committees (PACs),5 
party committees, joint fundraising committees, and contributions from 
one campaign to another.6 The dissenters and the four Justices of the 
plurality debated at length whether the hypothesized scenarios were 
realistic and whether they would violate existing laws (a tangle of 
statutes and regulations described by Justice Scalia at argument as “so 
intricate that I can’t figure [them] out”7). The dissenters and the 
plurality also considered whether, if the circumvention strategies were 
not already prohibited, legislation less restrictive than the aggregate 
contribution limits could block them. A reader of the principal opinions 
                                                                                                                     
 1. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 2. See id. at 1440 (plurality opinion); id. at 1462 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1465 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 3. See id. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring).  
 4. See id. at 1442 (plurality opinion) (noting that “[t]his case does not involve any 
challenge to the base limits, which we have previously upheld as serving the permissible 
objective of combatting corruption” but then concluding that the aggregate limits “do little, if 
anything” to prevent circumvention of the base limits); id. at 1468–69, 1472–73 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (citing the Court’s earlier approval of the base limits and arguing that donors would 
evade these limits in the absence of aggregate limits). 
 5. Conventional PACs, not super PACs. The difference will be explained shortly. 
 6. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1472–75 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 7. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (No. 12-536), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/12-536_21o2.pdf.  
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was likely to end up full of admiration for judicial patience that outran 
his own. 
The plurality and dissenting opinions assumed contributors would 
employ the circumvention strategies if only they could and that it would 
matter whether they did. Both opinions contrived not to notice that the 
base limits were no longer breathing. Contributors had a far easier way 
to evade them than any of those the Supreme Court discussed. The 
corpse lay at the Justices’ feet, and the Court itself was widely accused 
of homicide. But the Justices averted their eyes.  
A super PAC is a political action committee that does not contribute 
to the official campaigns of candidates for office but instead prepares 
and places its own advertisements supporting candidates and/or 
disparaging their opponents.8 Two months after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC9 in 2010, the en banc D.C. Circuit 
held all limits on donations to super PACs unconstitutional in 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC.10 The court offered no defense of the merits of 
its ruling. It simply said that one broad statement in the Citizens United 
opinion compelled its result.11 Citizens United’s critical statement was: 
“[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures . . . do not give rise 
to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”12 
Before SpeechNow, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) 
enforced a statute limiting a person’s contributions to a PAC of any sort 
to $5000 per year.13 On June 14, 2012, however, Sheldon Adelson and 
his wife Miriam exercised the newly recognized right of all Americans 
to contribute $10 million to the super PAC of their choice.14 They gave 
these funds to Restore Our Future, a super PAC supporting Mitt 
Romney’s presidential campaign.15 At the time of this contribution, 
Sheldon Adelson told friends that he planned to spend at least $100 
million supporting causes and candidates during the 2012 election 
cycle.16  
But Adelson’s estimate was too low. Although the Adelsons’ 
contributions to official campaigns and super PACs roughly matched 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 n.2 (plurality opinion).  
 9. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 10. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 11. Id. at 694–95.  
 12. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 13. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (West 2014). 
 14. See Adelson, Sheldon G. & Miriam O: Donor Detail, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www 
.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detail.php?cycle=2012&id=U0000000310&type=I&super=
N&name=Adelson%2C+Sheldon+G.+%26+Miriam+O (last visited Apr. 3, 2015).  
 15. Alicia Mundy & Sara Murray, Adelson Gives $10 Million to Pro-Romney Super PAC, 
WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/06/13/adelson-
gives-10-million-to-pro-romney-super-pac/. 
 16. Id. 
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the estimate ($98 million—including an additional $20 million to 
Restore Our Future), two Republican fundraisers told the press that the 
Adelsons contributed at least $45 million more to groups that were not 
required to identify their contributors.17 The amount of their 2012 
donations exceeded the entire amount that John McCain, the 2008 
Republican presidential nominee, spent during his general election 
campaign.18 The Adelsons led a list of ninety-five individuals or couples 
and fifty-six organizations that each contributed $1 million or more to 
outside spending groups in 2012.19  
An independent expenditure group like Restore Our Future may not 
coordinate its expenditures with those of an official election 
campaign.20 Like many other “candidate-specific” or “alter ego” super 
PACs, however, Restore Our Future was managed by people close to 
the candidate it supported.21 They included Carl Forti, the political 
director of Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign; Charles Spies, 
counsel and chief financial officer of the 2008 campaign; and Larry 
McCarthy, another prominent veteran of Romney’s 2008 effort.22 These 
managers might have known without coordination or palaver what 
expenditures would please Governor Romney.23  
                                                                                                                     
 17. See Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 
2012?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-
did-sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012.  
 18. See News Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, 2008 Presidential Campaign Financial 
Activity Summarized: Receipts Nearly Double 2004 Total (June 8, 2009), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2009/20090608PresStat.shtml. Because Senator McCain 
accepted public funding for his campaign, the amount he could spend was limited. See Public 
Funding of Presidential Elections Brochure, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, http://www.fec.gov/
pages/brochures/pubfund.shtml (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). His opponent, Senator Obama, did 
not accept public funding, News Release, supra, and no future nominee is likely to accept it 
either.  
 19. See 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups: Top Individuals, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V&superonly=
N (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 2012 Top Individual Donors]; 2012 Top Donors to 
Outside Spending Groups: Top Organizations, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsi 
despending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) 
[hereinafter 2012 Top Organizational Donors]. 
 20. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20–.23 (2009).  
 21. See Mike McIntire & Michael Luo, Fine Line Between “Super PACs” and 
Campaigns, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/us/politics/loose-
border-of-super-pac-and-romney-campaign.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 22. Rachael Marcus, PAC Profile: Restore Our Future, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 30, 
2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/node/7977/. McCarthy’s chief claim to fame was that he 
devised the Willie Horton ad that helped elect President George H. W. Bush in 1988. Id.  
 23. Priorities USA Action, President Obama’s alter ego super PAC, was similarly directed 
by people close to him. See Aaron Mehta, PAC Profile: Priorities USA Action, CTR. FOR PUB. 
INTEGRITY (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/30/8025/pac-profile-
priorities-usa-action/. 
6
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 395 
 
Candidates may, within limits, raise money for super PACs and may 
address super PAC gatherings.24 In the month before the Adelsons’ 
initial $10 million contribution, Sheldon Adelson met with Governor 
Romney and reportedly sought “assurance that Romney would support 
Israel more strongly than President Obama has.”25  
Adelson, a Las Vegas casino owner,26 has an agenda. It includes 
opposition to a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and 
positions on a number of issues that directly affect Adelson’s business 
interests. An appendix to this Article describes some of these interests.27 
Without prearrangement or coordination, the managers of a super 
PAC may recognize an effective division of labor. Their job is to attack 
an opponent while the favored candidate takes a higher road. 
Independent expenditure groups have been called “the attack dogs and 
provocateurs of modern politics.”28 A report shortly before the 2012 
election declared: 
Republican super PACs have spent three times as much 
opposing Obama as they have backing Romney, $46 
million to $14 million. The gap is even larger on the 
Democratic side (though the absolute numbers are much 
smaller), where there’s been nearly $28 million in attacks 
on Romney and only a little more than $3 million in favor 
of Obama. . . . Republican super PACs spent more trying to 
sink Mitt Romney during the Republican primaries than the 
president’s Democratic allies have spent in favor of [the 
                                                                                                                     
 24. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2011–12 (June 30, 2011), 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202011-12.pdf. Although, after SpeechNow, an individual may 
give unlimited amounts to a super PAC, a candidate may not request a donation exceeding the 
amount this individual could give to a conventional PAC. See id. For a useful description of the 
very strange law on this subject, see Larry Norton, Ron Jacobs & Margaret Rohlfing, Candidates 
and Super PACs: A Complicated Relationship, POL. L. BRIEFING (Feb. 13, 2013), 
http://www.politicallawbriefing.com/my-blog/2013/02/candidates-and-super-pacs-a-complicated-
relationship/.  
 25. Callum Borchers, Adelson Reportedly Gives $10m to Pro-Romney Super PAC, 
BOSTON GLOBE (June 13, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2012/06/13/ sheldon-
adelson-donates-million-super-pac-backing-mitt-romney/kmYCnXf8qOMDbglsUYi1PL/story.html.  
 26. See Mundy & Murray, supra note 15. 
 27. Infra app. C, “The Effect of Campaign Dollars II: The Generosity of Sheldon 
Adelson.”  
 28. Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative “Super PACs” Synchronize Their Messages, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/conservative-super-
pacs-sharpen-their-synchronized-message.html (“Independent groups have long been the attack 
dogs and provocateurs of modern politics. The ads they produce—about a convict on furlough 
named Willie Horton or Swift Boat veterans—have become synonymous with dirty politics.”).  
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President] during the entire campaign, $4.7 million to $3.2 
million.29 
Once SpeechNow unleashed super PAC contributions, the pretense 
that the BCRA’s base and aggregate limits served a useful purpose 
became absurd. These limits do more harm than good. Restricting 
contributions to official election campaigns while permitting unlimited 
contributions to super PACs does not limit the amount an individual 
may contribute to an electoral effort; it merely channels funds to less 
responsible and more destructive speakers. Contributions to a 
candidate’s official campaign currently are capped at $2700 per 
election30 ($5400 total for both primary and general elections),31 while 
an unleashed satellite campaign may accept $10,000, $100,000, $1 
million, and $10 million contributions. 
To consumers of commercials on couches, super PACs are faceless 
groups with noble names like Restore Our Future, Priorities USA 
Action, and Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow.32 When one 
of these groups goes too far (for example by telling demonstrable 
falsehoods), a candidate can deplore its misconduct and accurately deny 
responsibility. Unlike the candidates they support, super PACs typically 
vanish once an election is over.33 
SpeechNow has degraded rather than enhanced the quality of 
electoral advocacy. The flood of attack ads has contributed to the 
nation’s cynicism about politics, a cynicism that runs deep among 
young people.34 Even without the SpeechNow decision, running for 
                                                                                                                     
 29. David A. Graham, The Incredible Negative Spending of Super PACs—in 1 Chart, THE 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 15, 2012, 5:16 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/10/the-
incredible-negative-spending-of-super-pacs-in-1-chart/263643/. 
 30. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(A) (West 2014); Price Index Adjustments for 
Contribution and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 8530, 8532 (Feb. 6, 2013); Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, 
http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/contrib.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (providing the 
inflation-adjusted limits for 2015–16).  
 31. See Contributions, FED. ELECTION COMM’N, http://www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/ 
contrib.shtml (last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (citing 11 C.F.R. § 100.2(a) (2014)) (“Primaries, 
runoffs and general elections are considered separate elections, with separate contribution 
limits.”). 
 32. These names are not fictitious. In 2012, the first super PAC supported Mitt Romney; 
the second, Barack Obama; and the third, Steven Colbert. Tom Murse, 5 Big Super PACs to 
Watch, ABOUT NEWS, http://uspolitics.about.com/od/presidency/tp/5-Big-Super-Pacs-To-
Watch.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
 33. Jake Harper, After Election, Dozens of Super PACs Shut Down, SUNLIGHT FOUND. 
(Nov. 16, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2012/11/16/super-pacs-shut-
down/. 
 34. See INST. OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIV., SURVEY OF YOUNG AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES 
TOWARD POLITICS AND PUBLIC SERVICE 19 (23d ed. 2013), http://www.iop.harvard.edu/sites/
default/files_new/spring_poll_13_Exec_Summary.pdf (“At no time since President Obama was 
8
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office would mean entering a world of sharpened knives, but 
SpeechNow has made the warfare worse.35 Michael McConnell 
                                                                                                                     
elected in 2008 have we reported less trust, more cynicism and more partisanship among our 
nation’s youngest voters.”). 
 35. New Jersey’s elections for state offices in 2013 provide an illustration. These elections 
followed a consent decree that, echoing SpeechNow, forbade the enforcement of state limits on 
super PAC contributions. See Consent Order for Permanent Injunction at 2, Fund for Jobs, 
Growth, & Sec. v. N.J. Election Law Enforcement Comm’n, No. 3:13-CV-02177-MAS-LHG 
(D.N.J. July 11, 2013). Outside spending then reached $35 million, twice what it had been in the 
year of the immediately preceding gubernatorial election. See Nicholas Confessore, Big Money 
Flows in New Jersey Races to Thwart Christie Agenda, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.nytim 
es.com/2013/11/05/nyregion/in-new-jersey-big-money-flows-to-foil-christie.html. One super PAC 
spent $2 million to influence a single state senate race, all of it apparently devoted to broadcasting an 
advertisement in which an ominous voice declared that a candidate “had been prohibited from 
practicing law in [New Jersey].” See id. The voice did not mention that the candidate’s 
“prohibit[ion]” was brief and rested on his failure to pay an annual registration fee on time. See 
id.  
The 2014 campaign to defeat Justice Robin Hudson of the North Carolina Supreme Court 
also illustrates the political discourse SpeechNow has fostered. In 2010, over her dissent and that 
of two other justices, Justice Hudson’s court held that retroactively requiring people convicted 
of sex offenses to wear large ankle-bracelet transmitters and visible GPS tracking devices, to 
spend six hours per day recharging these devices, and to submit to electronic monitoring of their 
movements, in some cases for the rest of their lives, was nonpunitive and did not violate the ex 
post facto clause. See State v. Bowdich, 700 S.E.2d 1, 2–4 (N.C. 2010). When Justice Hudson 
ran for reelection four years later, a group called Justice for All NC sponsored television 
advertisements accusing her of “sid[ing] with child molesters.” Mark Binker, Big Business Spends 
to Unseat NC Supreme Court Justice Hudson, WRAL.COM (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.wral.com/big 
-business-spends-to-unseat-nc-supreme-court-justice-hudson/13603252/. This group, which listed a 
mailbox in a UPS store as its headquarters, received $650,000 from the Republican State 
Leadership Committee, a Washington, D.C. super PAC. See Duncan McFadyen, A Closer Look 
at “Child Molester” Attack Ad and Where Money Funding It Comes from, WFAE.ORG (May 1, 
2014, 12:10 AM), http://wfae.org/post/closer-look-child-molester-attack-ad-and-where-money-
funding-it-comes. The super PAC in turn received funds primarily from businesses like Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield, Koch Industries, and the Las Vegas Sands Corporation. Republican State 
Leadership Cmte: Top Contributors, 2014 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
527s/527cmtedetail_contribs.php?ein=050532 524&cycle=2014 (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
Six former justices of the North Carolina Supreme Court called the attack on Justice 
Hudson disgusting, and the justice’s principal opponent disavowed it, saying, “I will always run 
a positive effort.” Erik Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 5, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/outside-spending-transforms-
supreme-court-election-in-north-carolina.html. A commentator observed, “[S]pecial interest 
money . . . often goes toward ads attacking judges’ criminal records, even when the interest 
group is focused on business interests or other unrelated issues.” Id. The amount Justice Hudson 
was able to raise to respond to the advertisement fell far short of the amount spent broadcasting 
it, see id., but she won reelection with 42.5% of the primary vote and 52.5% of the general 
election vote. See Robin Hudson, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Robin_Hudson (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2015).  
Television viewers have seen innumerable advertisements like the ones just described. As 
both McCutcheon and Citizens United observed, “[T]he First Amendment ‘has its fullest and 
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office.’” 
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comments, “I am skeptical of any governmental effort to police 
campaign speech to make it less negative, vitriolic, or immoderate, but 
there is little to be said for laws that exacerbate these vices.”36 
Allowing unlimited contributions to feral attack dogs while limiting 
contributions to candidates themselves is schizophrenic. No sane 
legislator would vote in favor of this regime, and no legislator ever has. 
The United States has this topsy-turvy regime because the D.C. Circuit 
(or the Supreme Court or the two courts together) held that the First 
Amendment requires it. 
The thought that the Constitution requires this regime however, 
looks crazy too. Just as only a loopy legislator could vote in favor of 
America’s current system of campaign finance, only a cracked court 
could confront the question afresh and conclude that a $3000 
contribution to Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign may be prohibited 
because it is corrupting while a $10 million contribution to Restore Our 
Future is protected because it “do[es] not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”37 No single court has taken full 
responsibility for the constitutional decision that produced America’s 
Dickensian system of campaign finance. 
As best I can tell, no supporter of the BCRA has said out loud that it 
would be better to strike down the statute’s base limits than to retain 
them as a device for channeling funds to super PACs. But I just said it. 
Rather than keep the BCRA on life support, the Supreme Court would 
do better to pull the plug, overrule its long line of precedents upholding 
contribution limits, and afford the statute a decent burial. Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion in McCutcheon referred to Buckley v. 
Valeo,38 the 1976 decision that first upheld base and aggregate 
contribution limits,39 and said, “[W]hat remains of Buckley is a rule 
without a rationale.”40 
SpeechNow left no way to go but up. McCutcheon, in fact, improved 
federal campaign financing slightly by permitting major contributors to 
channel a larger portion of their donations to candidates and political 
parties rather than super PACs.41 Rather than acknowledge that the 
                                                                                                                     
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion) (quoting Monitor Patriot 
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 339 (2010).  
 36. Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 
YALE L.J. 412, 455 (2013). 
 37. Citizens United used the quoted language to describe super PAC expenditures, see 558 
U.S. at 357, but SpeechNow concluded that this language applies to super PAC contributions as 
well. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 38. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 39. Id. at 58.  
 40. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1464 (Thomas, J., concurring).   
 41. See Nathaniel Persily, Bringing Big Money out of the Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/opinion/bringing-big-money-out-of-the-shadows.html.  
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 399 
 
BCRA’s contribution limits died in 2010 with SpeechNow, however, the 
supporters of regulating campaign contributions sounded the customary 
trumpets. “[T]oday’s decision eviscerates our Nation’s campaign 
finance laws,” the McCutcheon dissenters cried.42 An orchestra of 
journalists, commentators, and fundraisers for politicians denouncing 
the decision echoed this theme.43  
The dissent in McCutcheon did not give super PAC contributions 
and expenditures even a glance, and the plurality referred to them only 
in a footnote—one that might have led an uninitiated reader to the 
erroneous conclusion that circumvention by super PACs is part of the 
statutory scheme rather than the result of dubious constitutional rulings:  
A PAC is a business, labor, or interest group that raises or 
spends money in connection with a federal election, in 
some cases by contributing to candidates. A so-called 
“Super PAC” is a PAC that makes only independent 
expenditures and cannot contribute to candidates. The base 
and aggregate limits govern contributions to traditional 
PACs, but not to independent expenditure PACs.44 
During oral argument in McCutcheon, however, four Supreme Court 
Justices—Scalia, Breyer, Kennedy, and Ginsburg—pointed to the 
elephant in the room. Each of these Justices asked whether super PAC 
contributions and expenditures hadn’t made the BCRA’s contribution 
limits pointless or worse.45 Justice Scalia, for example, asked Solicitor 
                                                                                                                     
 42. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
 43. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, An Indecent Burial, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/17/opinion/an-indecent-burial.html (declaring that McCutcheon 
“toss[ed] out the window . . . the post-Watergate system of campaign finance regulation”); Robert 
B. Reich, McCutcheon, and the Vicious Cycle of Concentrated Wealth and Political Power, 
ROBERTREICH.ORG (Apr. 3, 2014), http://robertreich.org/post/81598620368 (declaring that the 
“shameful” McCutcheon decision “effectively eviscerat[es] campaign finance laws”).  
 44. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1442 n.2 (plurality opinion). 
 45. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 20 (Scalia, J.) (noting that “much of the 
money that used to go to [political parties] now goes to [super] PACs” and that “the 
consequence . . . has been very severe with respect to national political parties”); id. at 30 
(Scalia, J.) (suggesting that if donating the entire $3.2 million an individual could give to all 
federal candidates, parties, and conventional PACs in the absence of the aggregate limits poses 
“the evil of big money,” so does giving the same amount to an independent PAC); id. at 31 
(Scalia, J.) (“[B]ig money can be in politics. The thing is you can’t give it to the Republican 
Party or the Democratic Party, but you can start your own PAC. That’s perfectly good. I’m not 
sure that that’s a benefit to our political system”); id. at 33 (Breyer, J.) (“And now you say the 
person can do the same thing anyway; just call it independent. And what independent does, he 
can spend 40 million. He can spend 50 million. And all that does is sort of mix up the messages 
because the parties can’t control it. Now, that’s, I think, the question that’s being asked. And I 
think that that is a very serious question . . . . Is it true? So what? What are we supposed to 
do?”); id. at 33 (Kennedy, J.) (following Justice Breyer’s question with the statement, “And I 
have the same question. You have two—two persons. One person gives an amount to a 
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General Verrilli, “[I]sn’t the consequence of—of this particular 
provision to sap the vitality of political parties and to 
encourage . . . drive-by PACs for each election?”46 Verrilli managed 
almost to complete a sentence—one that included the words “I think the 
answer is we don’t know one way or another”—before Justice Scalia 
interjected, “I think we do.”47  
There seemed to be no good answer to the Justices’ queries. The 
Solicitor General said things like, “I’m not here to debate the question 
of whether the Court’s jurisprudence is correct with respect to the risks 
of corruption from independent expenditures,”48 and “we take the 
constitutional First Amendment framework of this Court’s decisions as 
a given. The Court has—the Court has determined that independent 
expenditures do not present a risk of quid pro quo corruption.”49 
Translated into English, these responses seemed to say, “Weren’t you 
guys the ones who started this charade?” 
One commentator noted Justice Scalia’s questions to the Solicitor 
General and accused the Justice of chutzpah—“that quality enshrined in 
a man who, having killed his mother and father, throws himself upon 
the mercy of the court because he is an orphan.”50 Justice Scalia and the 
other Justices of the Citizens United majority had created the super 
PAC, and to point to this PACman’s gobbling up of the BCRA as a 
reason for dismantling the statute further took nerve. It was as though, 
five or ten years after McCutcheon, in 2019 or 2024, the dissenters’ 
predictions of circumvention of the BCRA’s base limits had proven 
accurate and the plurality’s contrary predictions had proven incorrect—
and the plurality then pointed to the ease of circumvention as a reason 
                                                                                                                     
candidate that’s limited. The other takes out ads, uncoordinated, just all on his own, costing 
$500,000. Don’t you think that second person has more access to the candidate who’s—when 
the candidate is successful, than the first?”); id. at 42–43 (Ginsburg, J.) (suggesting that an 
aggregate limit “drives contributions toward the PACs and away from the parties, that money—
without these limits, the money would flow to the candidate, to the party organization, but now, 
instead, it’s going to the PACs”); id. at 43 (Scalia, J.) (initiating the dialogue with the Solicitor 
General that is described in text immediately following this footnote)); id. at 51–52 (Scalia, J.) 
(calling it “fanciful to think that the sense of gratitude that an individual Senator or 
Congressman is going to feel because of a substantial contribution to the Republican National 
Committee or Democratic National Committee is any greater than the sense of gratitude that that 
Senator or Congressman will feel to a PAC which is spending [an] enormous amount of money 
in his district”). 
 46. Id. at 43.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 52. 
 49. Id. at 43. 
 50. Garrett Epps, How Close Will the Supreme Court Get to Ending Campaign Finance 
Laws?, ATLANTIC (Oct. 8, 2013, 4:43 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/10/how-
close-will-the-supreme-court-get-to-ending-campaign-finance-laws/280401/ (quoting Leo Rosten’s 
definition of “chutzpah”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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for striking down the base limits.51 The comedian Jon Stewart played 
portions of the McCutcheon argument on The Daily Show and made the 
same point.52 As the argument played, the screen showed what appeared 
to be a courtroom sketch of the Justices on the bench smoking from a 
hookah.53  
Perhaps the opinions in McCutcheon ignored the super PAC 
elephant because pointing to it as the Justices had at argument would 
have brought further accusations of chutzpah. But pretending the 
elephant was not there did not make either the plurality opinion or the 
dissenting opinion stronger. Rather than plead for mercy as an orphan, 
the killer seemed to be insisting that his parents were alive and in need 
of his care. When Solicitor General Verrilli indicated that super PAC 
circumvention was a product of the Court’s campaign-finance 
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia had an accurate, if somewhat chilling, 
response: “It is what it is, though.”54  
Some observers predict that the Supreme Court will end the 
irrationality of limiting contributions to candidates while permitting 
unlimited contributions to super PACs by striking down the limits on 
contributions to candidates.55 This Article, however, argues for the 
opposite resolution—rejecting the SpeechNow decision and upholding 
the BCRA’s limits on contributions to super PACs. 
Until now, SpeechNow seems to have escaped criticism. Even 
commentators who deplore unlimited super PAC contributions accept 
the D.C. Circuit’s judgment that this consequence flows inescapably 
from Citizens United.56 Michael Kang, for example, declares that 
Citizens United “utterly removed room for argument about Super 
PACs”57 and “made SpeechNow an easy case with only one possible 
outcome.”58  
                                                                                                                     
 51. See, e.g., Joe Patrice, McCutcheon Oral Argument: Or, Justice Scalia Explains How $3.5 
Million Isn’t That Much Money, ABOVE THE LAW (Oct. 9, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/201 
3/10/mccutcheon-oral-argument-or-justice-scalia-explains-how-3-5-million-isnt-that-much-money/.  
 52. Donors Unchained, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/74yxyf/donors-unchained. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 7, at 52. 
 55. See, e.g., Paul Blumenthal & Ryan Grim, After Today’s Supreme Court Ruling, Here’s How 
All This Will End, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 2, 2014, 3:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
2014/04/02/supreme-court-mccutcheon-decision_n_5077549.html.  
 56. Hostility towards the Citizens United decision may have contributed to the willingness 
of some commentators to give the D.C. Circuit a pass. 
 57. Michael S. Kang, Essay, The Year of the Super PAC, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1902, 
1912 (2013). 
 58. Id. at 1911. 
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All nine members of the en banc D.C. Circuit (including the three 
appointed by Democrats) joined the SpeechNow opinion.59 Five other 
federal courts of appeals have since endorsed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling,60 
and one court of appeals had made a similar decision prior to 
SpeechNow.61 The Supreme Court declined to review SpeechNow,62 and 
the FEC acquiesced in the D.C. Circuit’s ruling.63 This Article will 
swim against the tide and fill a large gap in the literature.  
The quiet acceptance of SpeechNow, however, is perplexing. For 
thirty-nine years, the Supreme Court has distinguished contributions to 
groups making electoral expenditures from the expenditures made by 
these groups. It has said that statutory limits on expenditures are subject 
to “strict” scrutiny. These limits must not only “further[] a compelling 
interest” but must also be “narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”64 
The Court has treated limits on contributions to candidates and political 
groups differently. It has said that “speech by proxy” is not “entitled to 
full First Amendment protection”65 and that contribution limits are not 
subject to “strict” scrutiny. They must merely be “closely drawn” to 
match a “sufficiently important interest.”66 In its opening paragraph, its 
closing paragraph, and many places in between, the opinion in Citizens 
United described the issue before the Court as one of the validity of 
expenditure limits.67 The Court noted that “contribution 
limits, . . . unlike limits on independent expenditures, have been an 
accepted means to prevent quid pro quo corruption.”68  
 
                                                                                                                     
 59. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 688 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 60. See Republican Party of N.M. v. King, 741 F.3d 1089, 1095–96, 1103 (10th Cir. 
2013); N.Y. Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 487, 489 (2d Cir. 2013) (approving 
a preliminary injunction but formally reserving judgment on the merits); Texans for Free Enter. 
v. Tex. Ethics Comm’n, 732 F.3d 535, 537–38, 538 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013); Wis. Right to Life State 
Political Action Comm. v. Barland, 664 F.3d 139, 154–55 (7th Cir. 2011); Long Beach Area 
Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 696–99 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 61. See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 308 (4th Cir. 2008); 
see also EMILY’s List v. FEC, 581 F.3d 1, 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Richard Briffault, Super 
PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1657–61 (2011). 
 62. Keating v. FEC, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010) (denying a writ of certiorari to review 
SpeechNow, 599 F.3d 686).  
 63. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-11, http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO% 
202010-11.pdf (Commonsense Ten); FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-09, 
http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf (Club for Growth). 
 64. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 340 (2010) (quoting FEC v. Wis. 
Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 65. Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 196 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
 66. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam). 
 67. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19, 356–57, 372.  
 68. Id. at 359; see id. at 356 (again stressing Buckley’s distinction between expenditures 
and contributions).  
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Contributions to super PACs are in fact contributions. Like 
contributions to candidates, they appear to be a form of “speech by 
proxy” entitled to only limited protection. As the Court acknowledged, 
the validity of limiting contributions of any sort was not before it.69 The 
claim that Citizens United resolved an issue the Court said it was not 
considering rests on a single sentence: “[W]e now conclude that 
independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”70 SpeechNow reasoned that if independent 
expenditures do not corrupt, the contributions that make these 
expenditures possible cannot corrupt either.71  
As this Article will show, the sentence upon which the D.C. Circuit 
relied was dictum. Moreover, if read literally, this sentence would be 
incompatible with Buckley and other precedents on which the Court 
purported to rely, with a very recent decision the Court certainly did not 
mean to disturb (Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Company72), and with a 
later statement by the plurality in McCutcheon.  
What the Court apparently meant, and indeed the only thing it 
properly could have decided, was that independent expenditures are 
insufficiently corrupting to warrant any limitation. Under the Court’s 
two-tiered standard of review, an interest can be strong enough to 
justify a limitation of contributions even when it is insufficient to justify 
a restriction of expenditures. Reading the crucial sentence to mean only 
what the Citizens United Court probably did mean would have left the 
validity of Congress’s limitation of super PAC contributions 
unresolved.  
In resolving this issue, the D.C. Circuit should have treated as central 
a question it ignored entirely—whether limits on contributions to super 
PACs can sensibly be treated differently from the limits on 
contributions to official campaigns that Buckley v. Valeo upheld. The 
answer to that question would have been no. Although Citizens United 
not only left Buckley undisturbed but also relied on it heavily, the D.C. 
Circuit ignored the bearing of Buckley on the issue before it.  
This Article examines Citizens United’s distinction between 
preventing quid pro quo corruption (an interest the Court has held can 
justify Congressional restrictions on speech) and limiting ingratiation 
and access (an interest that Citizens United says cannot justify any 
restriction on speech). It considers four behaviors that proponents of 
campaign- finance regulation might call corrupt: (1) the explicit 
exchange of favorable governmental action for campaign contributions; 
                                                                                                                     
 69. Id. at 359.  
 70. Id. at 357. 
 71. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 72. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
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(2) the implicit understanding that favorable action will follow 
contributions; (3) the conscious taking of favorable action in response to 
contributions without any prior agreement or understanding; and (4) the 
affording of gratitude and access to contributors without consciously 
favoring them in making more substantial decisions. The Article 
concludes that, despite some signals pointing the other way, the Court 
probably meant to distinguish only between the third and fourth 
categories. The Court did not mean to deny that deliberately using 
public dollars to repay private favors is corrupt and that Congress may 
prohibit contributions large enough to make conscious favoritism of this 
sort likely. Under this standard, large super PAC contributions qualify 
as corrupting.   
This Article also emphasizes a related governmental interest that 
neither Citizens United nor SpeechNow mentioned—the anti-
circumvention interest that became the primary focus of the principal 
opinions in McCutcheon. The most obvious objection to unlimited super 
PAC contributions is that they provide a way around statutory limits on 
contributions to candidates. As the Supreme Court’s focus on 
expenditures in Citizens United turned into the D.C. Circuit’s focus on 
contributions in SpeechNow, however, neither court addressed this 
issue. Citizens United should not be read as resolving an issue the Court 
did not consider. 
This Article proposes a legislative scheme for restricting electoral 
contributions and expenditures grounded on the anti-circumvention 
principle. This scheme would impose no limits on independent 
expenditures by either individuals or groups. Subject to some 
exemptions, however, every group making electoral expenditures would 
be required to provide an accounting of which individuals had provided 
the funds it spent and how the funds each individual supplied had been 
allocated to the support of particular candidacies. Individuals and 
groups would be responsible for ensuring that no more of any 
individual’s contributions were used to influence a single election than 
the law allowed. Groups that for practical reasons could not make the 
required accounting could establish separate political action committees 
to receive, spend, and account for individual contributions. A legislative 
scheme of this sort would meet the requirements of Buckley, Citizens 
United, McCutcheon, and the First Amendment. 
This Article also proposes a framework for analyzing campaign-
finance restrictions that differs from the one the Supreme Court now 
employs. The Court has treated electoral contributions and expenditures 
simply as speech and has considered whether the interest in preventing 
quid pro quo corruption can justify restricting this speech. Contributions 
and expenditures would better be viewed as hybrids of protected speech 
and unprotected conduct. These contributions and expenditures affect 
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two different audiences in two different ways. From the perspective of 
one audience—the public—political contributions and expenditures 
look like speech. Their goal is to persuade members of the public to 
vote a certain way. But from the perspective of a second audience—the 
favored candidate—these contributions and expenditures look like other 
corrupting gifts. Campaign dollars can persuade a candidate to favor a 
contributor in the same way that an expense-paid trip to the Super Bowl 
might.  
The Court’s leading decision on hybrids of protected speech and 
unprotected conduct is United States v. O’Brien,73 which upheld 
convictions of war protestors for destroying their draft cards. Although 
Buckley v. Valeo concluded that the standard articulated in O’Brien did 
not apply to campaign-finance regulation,74 it did not consider the sort 
of argument offered in this Article. Whether one uses the Supreme 
Court’s current framework for analyzing campaign-finance issues or the 
structure proposed by this Article, SpeechNow was wrongly decided.  
Some observers may believe that the train has left the station and 
that to argue against the SpeechNow ruling is to stand on the station’s 
deserted platform and whistle. They have no doubt that the Supreme 
Court would approve SpeechNow, and they would not be surprised if 
the Court were to strike down all limits on campaign contributions as 
well.  
I have five comments:  
First, Citizens United and McCutcheon were five-to-four decisions 
with the same five Justices in the majority in both cases. If even one of 
these Justices were to vote to uphold limits on contributions to super 
PACs, these limits would be likely to stand.  
Second, only a Court that wished to preserve a façade of campaign-
finance regulation while gutting its core would be likely to strike down 
limits on super PAC contributions while upholding limits on 
contributions to candidates. A split judgment of this sort could happen, 
but I am reluctant to attribute disingenuous posturing to any of the 
Justices. The limits on super PAC contributions and the limits on 
contributions to candidates seem likely to stand or fall together, as they 
should.  
Third, if Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas were to confront the 
issue afresh, they apparently would hold all limits on campaign 
contributions unconstitutional. The other two members of the majority, 
however, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, have not indicated 
that they share this position. In the arguments and opinions in 
McCutcheon and Citizens United, these Justices seemed genuinely 
                                                                                                                     
 73. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
 74. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam).  
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concerned about the overbreadth of the challenged statutes. As the 
McCutcheon plurality argued, forbidding an individual who has 
contributed the maximum amount to each of nine candidates from 
contributing to a tenth is a peculiar way of keeping him from 
contributing too much to any one candidate.75 Moreover, as this Article 
will explain, Citizens United was correct to strike down a statute that 
blocked a group from preparing and disseminating campaign material 
simply because that group had organized as a corporation. 
Fourth, even Justices who would strike down all limits on campaign 
contributions if they were to consider the issue afresh might hesitate to 
overrule a line of Supreme Court decisions upholding these limits over 
the course of almost four decades.76  
Finally, the Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United sparked 
widespread indignation. One week after the decision, President Obama 
denounced it in his State of the Union address.77 Obama’s opponent in 
the 2008 presidential election, Senator McCain, called it “the worst 
decision ever.”78 Fourteen resolutions in Congress proposed correcting 
it by constitutional amendment.79 A public opinion poll reported 80% 
opposition.80 A decision striking down all remaining limits on electoral 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448–49.  
 76. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 853 
(1992) (emphasizing “the force of stare decisis” when reaffirming Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113 
(1973), nineteen years after that decision). In a concurring opinion in Citizens United joined by 
Justice Alito, Chief Justice Roberts offered an exceptionally thoughtful analysis of the principle 
of stare decisis. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S 310, 377–79 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring).  
 77. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Gets a Rare Rebuke, in Front of a Nation, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010), http://nytimes.com/2010/01/29/us/politics/29scotus.html?_r=0. 
 78. See Alice Robb, McCain Addresses Oxford, OXONIAN GLOBALIST (Oct. 11, 2012), 
http://toglobalist.org/2012/10/mccain-addresses-oxford/. 
 79. See, e.g., League of Women Voters of the U.S. Campaign Fin. Task Force, 
Review of Constitutional Amendments Proposed in Response to Citizens United, LEAGUE 
WOMEN VOTERS, http://www.lwv.org/content/review-constitutional-amendments-proposed-response-
citizens-united (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 80. See, e.g., Dan Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on 
Campaign Financing, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/02/17/AR2010021701151.html. 
In political terms, it seemed that five Supreme Court Justices pushed elected officials from 
the path of an onrushing bus and stood in the path themselves. Citizens United enabled 
legislators to divert attention from the porousness of their own limitations on political 
contributions and expenditures and to cast themselves as reformers committed to revoking the 
license the Supreme Court had issued to buy and sell influence. A five-to-four ruling in which 
every Justice in the majority had been appointed by Republican Presidents and three of the four 
dissenters had been appointed by Democrats made the Court seem responsible for what some 
have called a system of legalized bribery. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY 
CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT 8 (2011) (quoting Jack Abramoff: “I was 
participating in a system of legalized bribery. All of it is bribery, every bit of it.”); Ray Henry, 
Jimmy Carter: Unchecked Political Contributions Are “Legal Bribery,” HUFFINGTON POST (July 
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contributions could provoke similar outrage—especially if this decision 
were by a five-to-four vote and if every Justice appointed by a 
Republican president were in the majority and every Justice appointed 
by a Democratic president in dissent. A constitutional amendment 
repudiating the Court’s position might follow.81 The damage that 
decimating the last remnants of federal election law would do to the 
Court’s reputation could give some Justices pause.  
I.  AN OVERVIEW OF THIS ARTICLE 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II describes the Citizens 
United and SpeechNow rulings and how they changed federal election 
law. It explains why the Supreme Court’s statement that independent 
expenditures do not corrupt was dictum and perhaps double dictum.  
Part III examines how Citizens United and SpeechNow changed the 
financing of election campaigns. Contrary to widespread perception, 
these decisions do not appear to have produced a significant increase in 
political spending by large corporations. Instead, they led to an 
explosion of large individual contributions.  
Part IV takes as its text a bumper sticker displayed by opponents of 
Citizens United: “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH! Corporations are not 
People!” Both of this bumper sticker’s assertions appear to be flawed. 
Although money is not speech, the First Amendment protects the 
expenditures needed to bring speech to audiences; and although 
corporate entities are not people, the government may not deny the use 
of a common and beneficial form of organization to speakers alone.  
The bumper sticker nevertheless suggests appropriate concerns. 
Campaign contributions are not simply funds used to bring speech to 
audiences; they are also cash gifts likely to influence recipients and 
beneficiaries in ways the First Amendment does not protect. And 
                                                                                                                     
17, 2013, 1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-carter-bribery_n_3611882.html; 
Bruno J. Navarro, Jesse Ventura Likens Politics to Bribery, CNBC (June 19, 2012, 10:23 PM), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/47883494.  
One suspects that Chief Justice Roberts’ decisive vote to uphold most of the Affordable 
Care Act in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 
was influenced partly by his desire to avoid another five-to-four, Republican vs. Democrat 
decision invalidating major legislation—a decision that would have made a seemingly partisan Court 
responsible for America’s inability to repair its defective health-care system as well as its defective 
campaign-finance system. Cf. Greg Stohr, Can Roberts Save His Supreme Court from Partisanship?, 
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 1, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2014-12-
01/roberts-on-pivot-again-as-high-court-weighs-obamacare. The indignation engendered by Citizens 
United may not prompt the Supreme Court to reconsider that decision anytime soon, but it might have 
saved Obamacare. 
 81. In retirement, Justice Stevens has joined the call for such an amendment. See JOHN 
PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 79 
(2014). 
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although people have a right to use the corporate form of organization 
when they speak, they have no right to use this form to evade 
appropriate restrictions on individual speech, including limits on 
campaign contributions. 
Part V draws on the analysis of Part IV and argues that campaign 
contributions and expenditures should be viewed as hybrids of protected 
speech and unprotected gifts. When the harms produced by speech do 
not depend on the message the speech conveys, an all but 
insurmountable presumption against legislative regulation is 
inappropriate.  
Part VI proposes a legislative scheme for enforcing statutory limits 
on individual contributions—one in which, with some exceptions, every 
organization making electoral expenditures would be required to 
account for which individuals had supplied the funds it used to 
influence particular elections. 
Citizens United declared that campaign contributions and 
expenditures may be limited only to prevent “quid pro quo corruption.” 
Part VII considers several possible meanings of this term and which of 
them the Supreme Court had in mind.  
Part VIII explains why SpeechNow erred by striking down the 
BCRA’s limits on contributions to super PACs. Not only was the 
statement in the Citizens United opinion on which the D.C. Circuit 
relied dictum, but the Supreme Court gave several indications that it did 
not mean this statement quite the way it sounds. The central question in 
SpeechNow should have been whether limits on contributions to super 
PACs differ significantly from the limits on contributions to official 
election campaigns that the Supreme Court has upheld, and the answer 
to this question would have been no.  
Part IX considers whether the ability of a candidate’s supporters to 
establish multiple super PACs makes limiting contributions to an 
individual PAC pointless. It argues among other things that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in McCutcheon does not preclude aggregate limits on 
super PAC contributions.  
Part X ends the Article on a somewhat fanciful note. It explores the 
implications of SpeechNow by discussing a hypothetical case in which a 
lobbyist places a newspaper advertisement for a used car dealership 
owned by a powerful state legislator and also hires a political satirist to 
deliver a monologue at the legislator’s birthday party.  
Several appendices follow the Article. They address issues tangential 
to the Article, and they document at greater length than a footnote could 
some observations the Article offers along the way.  
Appendix A—“Have Citizens United and SpeechNow Ended the 
Game?”—considers whether, by halting the enforcement of the BCRA 
restrictions, Citizens United and SpeechNow have left no one with 
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standing to raise the issues presented by these cases again.  
Appendix B—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars I: Statistical and 
Non-Statistical Evidence”—examines the efforts of social science 
researchers to determine whether campaign contributions have 
influenced the decisions of elected officials.  
Appendix C—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars II: The Generosity 
of Sheldon Adelson”—considers what motivates one of the largest 
political donors of all time and what effect his contributions might have 
had. 
Appendix D—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars III: Executive 
Clemency”—focuses on one kind of official decision that has 
unmistakably been influenced by campaign contributions.  
Appendix E—“The Effect of Campaign Dollars IV: The 
Appointment of Ambassadors”—focuses on another kind of decision 
that clearly has been influenced by campaign cash. 
Appendix F—“Partisan Advantage and Incumbent Protection”—
considers how much the self-interest of legislators is likely to shape 
campaign-finance legislation and how ready courts should be to strike 
down legislation that might have been prompted in part by the 
legislators’ own interests. 
II.  CITIZENS UNITED, SPEECHNOW, AND HOW THESE DECISIONS 
CHANGED ELECTION LAW 
For more than 100 years prior to Citizens United, federal law had 
prohibited corporations from contributing to the campaigns of 
candidates for federal office,82 and labor unions had been subject to the 
same prohibition for sixty-seven years.83 For sixty-three years, 
corporations and unions also had been prohibited from using funds from 
their general treasuries to advocate expressly the election or defeat of 
particular candidates.84 These entities, however, could support 
candidates in several other ways. 
First, corporations and unions could use their general funds to 
establish and pay the administrative expenses of PACs, and they could 
direct the actions of these PACs.85 The PACs could collect contributions 
                                                                                                                     
 82. See Tillman Act of 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65. President Roosevelt urged 
Congress to enact this prohibition, saying, “Let individuals contribute as they desire; but let us 
prohibit in effective fashion all corporations from making contributions for any political 
purpose, directly or indirectly.” 5 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE 
PAPERS 898–99 (1910). 
 83. See War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167–68 (1943); see also Labor 
Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159–60. 
 84. See § 304, 61 Stat. at 159; see also 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118(a) (West 2014) (codifying 
the prohibition of corporate and labor union contributions and expenditures).  
 85. SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, FED. ELECTION COMM’N (May 2008), http://www.fec.g 
ov/pages/brochures/ssfvnonconnected.shtml. 
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in limited amounts from individuals associated with their creators.86 
They could then make contributions in limited amounts to candidates 
for federal office and make unlimited expenditures of their own to 
advocate the election of favored candidates.87  
Second, without using PACs, corporations and unions could place 
advertisements concerning political issues, and these advertisements 
could imply support for or opposition to particular candidates.88 
Finally, unions and corporations could support candidates in 
communications circulated only within these organizations, and they 
could engage in “nonpartisan activity designed to encourage individuals 
to vote or to register to vote.”89 “Nonpartisan” get-out-the-vote efforts 
typically focused on voters likely to support favored candidates.90  
In Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation sought to make available 
on cable TV a documentary it had produced disparaging Hillary 
Clinton, who was then a candidate for the Democratic presidential 
nomination.91 Funding and promoting the broadcast might have violated 
two provisions of the BCRA—one prohibiting the use of corporate 
funds to advocate expressly the election or defeat of a candidate for 
federal office92 and another prohibiting the use of corporate funds in the 
period just before an election to produce any “broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication” that even “refers to a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office.”93 The Supreme Court had held that the 
First Amendment allowed application of the second provision only to 
communications that were the “functional equivalent” of express 
advocacy.94 
Citizens United was argued twice. Three months after the initial 
argument, the Supreme Court restored the case to the docket and 
ordered the parties to address a question they had not addressed 
previously—whether Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce95 
and a portion of McConnell v. FEC96 should be overruled.97 As the first 
                                                                                                                     
 86. Id. 
 87. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118(b)(2)(C) (West 2014); SSFs and Nonconnected PACs, supra 
note 85. 
 88. See 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 30118(b)(2), (c)(1)(2) (West 2014); 52 U.S.C.A § 30104(f)(3)(A)(ii) 
(West 2014). 
 89. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(9)(B)(ii)–(iii) (West 2014). 
 90. See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance 
After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 647 (2011). 
 91. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319–20 (2010). 
 92. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118(a) (West 2014). 
 93. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30118(b)(2) (West 2014) (prohibiting “electioneering 
communication[s]”); id. § 30104(f)(3)(A)) (defining “electioneering communication[s]”). 
 94. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 456–57 (2007). 
 95. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
 96. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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paragraph of Citizens United explained, “Austin had held that political 
speech may be banned based on the speaker’s corporate identity,”98 and 
a portion of McConnell had reiterated that holding.99 
                                                                                                                     
 97. Order of June 29, 2009, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/08-205.htm (docket 
entry).  
 98. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 318–19. 
 99. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145, 153–54.  
Jeffrey Toobin offers a fascinating but somewhat baffling account of the deliberations that 
followed the initial argument in Citizens United. See Jeffrey Toobin, Money Unlimited: How Chief 
Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2012), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/05/21/money-unlimited. 
Citizens United’s counsel, Theodore Olson, maintained that the statutory restrictions did not 
apply to the group’s proposed distribution of its film, and Toobin reports that a majority of the 
Supreme Court voted at conference to accept Olson’s argument. Chief Justice Roberts initially 
assigned the majority opinion to himself.  
 
According to Toobin: 
[Justice Kennedy then prepared] a concurrence which said the Court should 
have gone much further. Kennedy’s opinion said the Court should declare [the 
statutory] restrictions unconstitutional, overturn an earlier Supreme Court 
decision from 1990[, Austin], and gut long-standing prohibitions on corporate 
giving. But after the Roberts and Kennedy drafts circulated, the conservative 
Justices began rallying to Kennedy’s more expansive resolution of the case. In 
light of this, Roberts withdrew his own opinion and let Kennedy write for the 
majority. . . . 
The new majority opinion transformed Citizens United into a vehicle for 
rewriting decades of constitutional law in a case where the lawyer had not even 
raised those issues. Roberts’s approach to Citizens United conflicted with the 
position he had taken earlier in the term. At the argument of a death-penalty 
case known as Cone v. Bell[, 556 U.S. 449 (2009)], Roberts had berated at 
length the defendant’s lawyer, Thomas Goldstein, for his temerity in raising an 
issue that had not been addressed in the petition. Now Roberts was doing nearly 
the same thing . . . . 
. . . . [Justice] Souter wrote a dissent that aired some of the Court’s dirty 
laundry. . . . [He] accused the Chief Justice of violating the Court’s own 
procedures to engineer the result he wanted. 
Id. The Court then ordered reargument, affording the government an opportunity to persuade it 
not to do what it would have done without hearing argument if Justice Souter had not threatened 
to make a stink. 
What’s baffling about Toobin’s report is its failure to explain how every member of a 
majority that initially voted to accept Olson’s statutory argument ultimately came to join the 
Citizens United dissenters in rejecting this argument. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion began 
by rejecting all of Olson’s statutory claims. It concluded that the case could not “be resolved on 
other, narrower grounds” than those the Court ultimately approved. See Citizens United, 558 
U.S. at 322–29. 
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Following reargument, Citizens United did overrule Austin and 
McConnell.100 The Court’s holding (at least its principal holding) was 
that “the Government cannot restrict political speech based on the 
speaker’s corporate identity.”101 The Court declared that the First 
Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different 
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others.”102 It found “no basis 
for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the 
Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers.”103 
“Speech restrictions based on the identity of the speaker are all too often 
simply a means to control content,”104 the Court commented. Congress 
might have prohibited corporate speech simply because it disliked what 
many corporations have to say. The judgment that Congress may not 
                                                                                                                     
Unless one of the dissenters in Citizens United initially voted to accept Olson’s statutory 
claims, Justice Kennedy must have been a part of the majority that Toobin says voted to accept 
these claims. Did Justice Kennedy vote at conference to accept Olson’s statutory argument and 
then think better of it? Or might Toobin’s sources (an untrustworthy law clerk or two?) have 
erred in reporting that a majority of the Court voted to reverse on statutory grounds? 
How were Chief Justice Roberts and the other Justices who initially voted to accept Olson’s 
statutory claims persuaded to join an opinion rejecting them? At some point, the five Justices 
who agreed that Citizens United should win its case apparently differed among themselves. 
Some of them apparently favored ruling for Citizens United on statutory grounds while others 
rejected these grounds but concluded that the group should prevail on the basis of a 
constitutional argument it had not made. If the case had remained in this posture, Citizens 
United would have secured a reversal of the lower court’s judgment despite the fact that a 
majority of the Court had expressly rejected its statutory claims and only a minority had 
concluded that it should win on the basis of a constitutional claim. Two unsuccessful arguments 
(one of which Citizens United had never offered) would have made the group a winner. 
With the Court divided into three minorities (one for reversing on statutory grounds, one for 
reversing on constitutional grounds, and one for affirming), its decision would have stood for 
nothing. The Court, however, could not have resolved the difficulty by dismissing certiorari as 
improvidently granted, for Citizens United had come to the Court on appeal, not certiorari. 
Summarily affirming a case on appeal leaves the lower court opinion in place (although the 
Supreme Court does not approve this opinion). Summarily reversing without an opinion or with 
an opinion noting a hopeless division leaves the case in a lawless limbo. 
Might the Chief Justice and others have changed their minds about the merits of Olson’s 
statutory argument simply to avoid an awkward situation? Were these Justices willing to reverse 
their position on a legal question just to move things along? Or did the force of Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis persuade them in a way the government’s argument had not and lead them 
to repudiate an argument they earlier had approved?  
The choice for the majority was not simply between a narrower and a broader ground of 
decision. It was between a narrower ground and an incompatible broader ground. All members 
of the Court agreed that they could not properly address the broader ground if the narrower 
ground sufficed, as some or all members of the majority once might have voted to say that it did. 
 100. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66.   
 101. Id. at 346; see also id. at 347 (“[T]he First Amendment does not allow political speech 
restrictions based on a speaker’s corporate identity.”). 
 102. Id. at 340. 
 103. Id. at 341. 
 104. Id. at 340. 
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forbid corporations from speaking or from making political 
expenditures fully resolved the case before the Court—yet the Court did 
not stop.  
Citizens United mentioned the two prongs of the “strict” scrutiny 
standard the Court previously had applied to expenditure restrictions—
requiring both a “compelling interest” and “narrow[] tailor[ing]”105—
but its analysis did not clearly separate these prongs. The Court’s 
principal holding apparently concerned “tailoring,” or the means 
Congress had chosen to achieve its goals. However important 
Congress’s objectives might have been, it could not achieve them 
through prohibiting speech by corporations alone. Once the Court had 
explained this holding,106 it had little reason to discuss the strength of 
the government’s regulatory interests, but it discussed them anyway.107  
The Court noted that Buckley v. Valeo had regarded only one interest 
as “sufficiently important” to justify limiting campaign contributions—
“the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption.”108 
Austin had held that Congress also could prevent “immense aggregations 
of [corporate] wealth” from distorting election results,109 but Citizens 
United returned to Buckley’s position. It noted, “When Buckley 
identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to 
quid pro quo corruption.”110 The Court said that “[t]he practices Buckley 
noted would be covered by bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement 
were proved.”111 It added, “Ingratiation and access . . . are not 
corruption.”112 After offering its narrow view of corruption, the Court 
concluded, “The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to displace the 
speech here in question.”113 This statement fully resolved the case before 
the Court a second time. 
The familiar principle that a court should not decide constitutional 
issues in advance of necessity114 means, among other things, that it 
should not make two constitutional rulings when one will do. As Chief 
Justice Roberts observed before becoming Chief Justice, “[I]f it is not 
                                                                                                                     
 105. Id. (quoting FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 (2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 106. See id. at 336–49. 
 107. See id. at 349–62. 
 108. See id. at 345 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1975)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 109. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990). 
 110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
 111. Id. at 356 (citation to 18 U.S.C. § 201, a federal bribery statute, omitted). 
 112. Id. at 360.  
 113. Id. at 357.  
 114. See, e.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–47 (1936) (Brandeis, 
J., concurring).   
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necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.”115 Either 
branch of the Citizens United opinion would have sufficed without the 
other. Once the Court held that the government may not restrict 
independent expenditures on the basis of corporate identity, there was no 
reason for it to consider whether the government may not restrict these 
expenditures at all. And if the Court had said initially that independent 
expenditures are insufficiently corrupting for Congress ever to restrict 
them, there would have been no reason to consider whether this speech-
related activity may be restricted on the basis of corporate identity. 
Even after resolving the case before it twice, the Court did not stop. 
Three sentences after it declared that “[t]he anticorruption interest is not 
sufficient to displace the speech here in question,” it went farther by 
offering the sentence that drove the D.C. Circuit’s decision in 
SpeechNow: “[W]e now conclude that independent expenditures, including 
those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”116 The Court’s first formulation declared the 
anticorruption interest insufficient to support any restriction of political 
expenditures. The second declared this interest nonexistent. A 
declaration that independent expenditures do not corrupt at all went far, 
far, far beyond the necessities of the case. 
The Court slipped easily from one formulation to the other, but the 
difference between them is great. If the Court had merely declared the 
anticorruption interest insufficient, Citizens United would have said 
nothing about the validity of Congress’s limitation of contributions to 
super PACs. Under the Court’s two-tiered standard of review, an interest 
can be strong enough to justify a limitation of contributions even when it 
is not strong enough to justify a limitation of expenditures.  
Since Buckley in 1976, the Court has struck down every expenditure 
limitation to come before it, but it has upheld most contribution limits.117 
                                                                                                                     
 115. PDK Labs., Inc. v. U.S. DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (Roberts, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 116. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.  
 117. The Court struck down expenditure limits in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 
357–58 (2010); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 608 
(1996) (Colorado I); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 241 (1986); 
FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, 470 U.S. 480, 482–83 (1985); First 
National Bank of Boston v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978); and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
51 (1976) (per curiam).  
The Court upheld contribution limits in FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003); Nixon 
v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000); California Medical Association v. 
FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 184–85 (1981); and Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. It struck down contribution 
limits in Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 236–37 (2006) (invalidating Vermont’s extremely 
low limits); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 
290 (1981) (declaring limits on contributions to groups supporting or opposing referendums 
unconstitutional because these contributions pose no risk of corrupting public officials); and 
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If, in Citizens United, the Court had decided the case before it only twice 
and then stopped, one might have anticipated a repetition of the pattern: 
Although Congress could not limit super PAC expenditures, it could 
limit contributions to these groups. A nonexistent interest, however, 
cannot justify anything. The Court’s declaration that the government had 
no regulatory interest whatsoever was dictum or perhaps double dictum 
(a statement unnecessary to a discussion that itself was unnecessary).118  
The Court’s off-hand transition from labeling the government’s 
regulatory interest inadequate to labeling it nonexistent suggests the 
Justices might not have been attuned to the important difference 
between these formulations that Buckley’s two-tiered standard of review 
created. This Article will note other indications that the Court did not 
mean its broader declaration quite the way it sounds.  
Other broad formulations offered by the Citizens United opinion 
have not fared well. Although the Court announced that the First 
Amendment prohibits “restrictions distinguishing among different 
speakers, allowing speech by some but not others,”119 the majority 
opinion itself revealed that this declaration was not as unqualified as it 
seemed. The Court acknowledged that it had upheld limits on speech 
simply because the speaker was a student, a prisoner, a civil servant, or 
a member of the military.120 It explained that “these rulings were based 
on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their 
functions.”121 What the Court apparently meant was that limitations of 
speech may not distinguish among speakers unless these limitations 
enable the government to perform some function.122 
Two years after Citizens United, however, the Court abandoned even 
this narrower proposition. It summarily upheld a ban on campaign 
                                                                                                                     
McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1456 (2014) (invalidating the BCRA’s “aggregate” 
contribution limits).  
In FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commitee, 533 U.S. 431 (2001) 
(Colorado II), the Court held that when a group’s expenditures are not “independent” of a 
campaign, they must be treated as contributions to the campaign. Id. at 438. It said, “[W]e have 
routinely struck down limitations on independent expenditures by candidates, other individuals, 
and groups, while repeatedly upholding contribution limits.” Id. at 441 (citations omitted). 
 118. See OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american
_english/obiter-dictum (defining “obiter dictum” as “a judge’s incidental expression of opinion, 
not essential to the decision and not establishing precedent”). The dissenters in McCutcheon 
declared that Citizens United’s “statements . . . about the proper contours of the corruption 
rationale” should be regarded “as dictum, as . . . overstatement, or as limited to the context in 
which [they] appear[].” McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1471 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 119. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340.  
 120. See id. at 341.   
 121. Id. 
 122. The Court seemed to conclude that the government may distinguish among speakers 
only when it occupies a special supervisory role over the speakers it restricts. 
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contributions by noncitizens who were not permanent residents of the 
United States.123 The declaration that the government may not restrict 
speech on the basis of a speaker’s identity evidently had become 
inoperative.124   
The Supreme Court did not disavow its statement that “the 
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity”125—the statement that had appeared to be Citizens 
United’s principal holding. The federal courts of appeals, however, have 
not taken this statement seriously. The only four to rule on the question 
have held that Congress’s total prohibition of corporate contributions to 
election campaigns survives Citizens United, and the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in two of these cases.126  
Seven years before Citizens United, the Supreme Court had upheld 
the prohibition of corporate contributions to candidates,127 and the 
majority opinion in Citizens United did not expressly overrule this 
decision. The courts of appeals relied in part on the Court’s declarations 
that when one of its precedents applies directly, lower courts 
“should . . . leav[e] to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own 
decisions.”128 These courts also insisted, however, that Citizens United 
had no application to contribution limits. The Second Circuit declared, 
for example: 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held that the 
government cannot prohibit independent expenditures in 
support of a political candidate based on the source’s 
corporate identity. Contrary to Appellants’ exhortations, 
however, Citizens United applies only to independent 
corporate expenditures. . . . It therefore has no impact on 
                                                                                                                     
 123. See Bluman v. FEC, 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012), aff’g 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 282–83 
(D.D.C. 2011).   
 124. See WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S NEW POLITICAL DICTIONARY 346 (rev. 4th ed. 2008) 
(defining “inoperative” as “[a] correction without an apology, leaving the corrector in a deep 
hole”).  
Citizens United itself had said, “We need not reach the question whether the Government 
has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our 
Nation’s political process.” 558 U.S. at 362. Even leaving this question open indicated that, 
despite the Court’s broad language, it was not committed to the proposition that all distinctions 
among speakers are invalid. 
 125. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 346 (emphasis added). 
 126. See Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 877–79 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc); United States v. Danielczyk, 683 F.3d 611, 617 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 1459 (2013); Ognibene v. Parkes, 671 F.3d 174, 183–84, 184 n.10 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 28 (2012); Thalheimer v. City of San Diego, 645 F.3d 1109, 1126 (9th 
Cir. 2011); Green Party of Conn. v. Garfield, 616 F.3d 189, 199 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 127. FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
 128. E.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, 692 F.3d at 879 (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 
521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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the issues before us in this case.129  
The courts of appeals and the Supreme Court itself have deflated 
Citizens United’s declarations that legislatures may not restrict speech 
on the basis of the speaker’s identity. They have done so despite the fact 
that the Court’s declaration that government may not limit speech on the 
basis of corporate identity appeared to be its principal holding. 
Although Citizens United’s declaration that independent expenditures 
do not corrupt was dictum, and although the Court offered several 
indications that it did not mean this statement to be as sweeping as it 
seemed, the courts of appeals have not deflated it.130 To the contrary, 
following the lead of the D.C. Circuit, they have read it for all it might 
be worth.  
The D.C. Circuit said in SpeechNow that, if expenditures by super 
PACs do not corrupt, contributions to these groups cannot corrupt 
either.131 These contributions can influence public officials only through 
the expenditures that the Supreme Court has declared non-corrupting as 
a matter of law.132 Although contribution limits are judged by a less 
demanding standard than expenditure limits, the D.C. Circuit said that 
the standard of review did not matter. “[S]omething . . . outweighs 
nothing every time.”133 Acknowledging even a smidgen, soupçon, or 
scintilla of regulatory interest would have undercut the court’s analysis 
entirely.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Ognibene, 671 F.3d at 183 (internal citation omitted).   
 130. Describing a Supreme Court holding narrowly and refusing to consider its 
implications for other situations is bad judging. The courts of appeals, however, could have 
made this move to deflate the Supreme Court’s statement that independent expenditures do not 
corrupt at least as easily as they used it to deflate the Court’s statements that government may 
not restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity. In fact, the declaration that independent 
expenditures do not corrupt addressed only expenditures, while the declarations that government 
may not restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity apparently referred to both 
expenditures and contributions. By insisting that Citizens United concerned only expenditures, 
the courts of appeals disregarded more than the implications of the Supreme Court’s 
declarations that government may not restrict speech on the basis of corporate identity; they 
disregarded what these declarations said. Taking the Court’s language seriously, however, 
would have produced unfortunate consequences the Court probably did not intend. See infra 
Subsection IV.B.2.a.i.  
 131. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc).   
 132. See id. at 694–95. 
 133. Id. at 695 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court added, “All that matters is that 
the First Amendment cannot be encroached upon for naught.” Id.  
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III.  HOW CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW CHANGED ELECTION 
FINANCING 
On the day the Supreme Court decided Citizens United, President 
Obama described it as “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, 
health insurance companies and . . . other powerful interests.”134 Critics 
of the decision spoke of “corporate dominance of politics.”135 The 
practical significance of the Court’s judgment that large business 
organizations may themselves make independent expenditures on behalf 
of candidates for office, however, has been close to nonexistent. The 
creation of super PACs and the authorization of limitless contributions 
to these groups, however, transformed American politics.  
A stunning increase in outside spending in federal election 
campaigns followed Citizens United and SpeechNow.136 The first post-
Citizens United congressional elections came in 2010, ten months after 
the Supreme Court’s ruling. In the campaign leading up to the preceding 
nonpresidential federal election in 2006, outside spending totaled $69 
million.137 In 2010, it was $309 million.138 In 2014, at the time of the 
second non-presidential election following Citizens United and 
SpeechNow, it was $585 million.139 
The first presidential election following Citizens United and 
SpeechNow occurred in 2012. During the preceding 2008 campaign, 
outside groups spent $338 million on all federal races.140 In 2012, they 
spent nearly $1.04 billion.141 The 1310 super PACs that participated in 
the 2012 campaign accounted for more than half of the total outside 
spending—$609 million.142 They collected far more than that in 
                                                                                                                     
 134. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement from the President on 
Today’s Supreme Court Decision (Jan. 21, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-todays-supreme-court-decision-0. 
 135. See, e.g., Fran Korten, 10 Ways to Stop Corporate Dominance of Politics, YES! 
MAGAZINE (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.yesmagazine.org/people-power/10-ways-to-stop-
corporate-dominance-of-politics.  
 136. By outside spending, I mean spending controlled neither by candidates nor by party 
committees. 
 137. Total Outside Spending by Election Cycle, Excluding Party Committees, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/cycle_tots.php?cycle=2012&view=A&chart=N#viewpt 
(last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. For an argument that some of the “exponential leap in political spending” 
following Citizens United might have occurred anyway, see Matt Bai, How Much Has Citizens 
United Changed the Political Game?, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/07/22/magazine/how-much-has-citizens-united-changed-the-political-game.html.  
 142. See 2012 Outside Spending, by Super PAC, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets 
.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&chrt=V&type=S (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
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contributions—$828 million.143  
About 70% of all contributions to super PACs came from individuals 
rather than collective entities of any sort—corporations, labor unions, 
nonprofits, and political action committees.144 Only about 9% of the 
contributions came from corporations.145 More than 25% of these 
corporate contributions came, not from true business enterprises, but 
from “shell corporations used by individuals . . . to cloak their 
donations.”146 
In the 2012 election cycle, not a single Fortune 500 company made 
any independent expenditure to support or oppose a candidate for 
federal office.147 Only ten contributed to super PACs.148 Of these ten, 
only one contributed more than $1 million—Chevron Corporation, 
which donated $2.5 million to a super PAC close to House Speaker 
John Boehner.149 In other words, all 500 of the Fortune 500 companies 
declined the invitation offered by Citizens United to make independent 
expenditures, and 490 of the 500 declined the invitation offered by 
SpeechNow to contribute to super PACs.150  
                                                                                                                     
 143. See id.  
 144. See Anu Narayanswamy, Corporate, Union and Nonprofit Giving to Super PACs Tops 
$167 Million, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Oct. 22, 2012, 2:33 PM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/
2012/organizational-giving/. 
 145. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of 
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 1, app. A & tbl.1 (June 20, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2313232 [hereinafter Bonica 2014] (reporting 
that corporations gave a total of $75 million to independent expenditure groups during the 2012 
election cycle). 
 146. See id. app. A (noting that nearly $20 million of the $75 million contributed by 
corporations was attributable to these shells).   
 147. Wendy Hansen, Michael S. Rocca & Brittany Ortiz, The Effects of Citizens United on 
Corporate Contributions in the 2012 Presidential Election 20 (Aug. 22, 2013) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2300930. 
 148. See id. Although the cited paper reported that only nine Fortune 500 companies 
contributed to super PACs, id., its authors later discovered one additional contributor. E-mail 
from Michael S. Rocca to author (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:36 AM EST) (on file with author).   
 149. See Hansen et al., supra note 147, at 20, 36 tbl.3 (citing Dan Eggen, Chevron Donates 
$2.5 Million to GOP Super PAC, WASH. POST (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/post-politics/wp/2012/10/26/chevron-donates-2-5-million-to-gop-super-pac/).  
 150. Wendy Hansen and her co-authors comment, “Over 500 of the world’s largest and 
most powerful companies opted to stay away from donating to SuperPACs during an election 
where SuperPACs spent over $600 million . . . .” Hansen et al., supra note 147, at 21. The 
authors refer to “over” 500 corporations because they examined the expenditures of 545 
companies in order to include all that made the Fortune 500 list in either 2008 or 2012. Id. at 11.  
Some of the business corporations that neither made independent expenditures nor 
contributed to super PACs undoubtedly contributed to 501(c)(4) groups and 501(c)(6) trade 
associations—particularly the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In 2012, the Chamber began 
sponsoring ads expressly urging the election or defeat of particular candidates, and it spent 
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The misperception that corporations dominate political campaigns 
stems partly from media descriptions of the amounts contributed by 
“business interests” and by specified industries like “the energy 
industry” and “the financial services industry.” These statements are 
likely to convey the impression that the contributions were made by 
businesses. Almost invariably, however, the statements are traceable to 
the Center for Responsive Politics, which includes individual 
contributions in its compilations of interest-group donations.151 The 
Center attributes a contribution to a group by noting the occupation and 
employer listed by the individual contributor.152  
Excluding individual donations would be misleading; some 
individual donations are made for the purpose of advancing their 
donors’ business interests. As the following discussion will indicate, 
however, including these donations may be even more misleading.153  
Corporate executives have contributed a remarkable amount to 
political campaigns—well over $1 billion in each of the most recent 
election cycles.154 As Adam Bonica recently discovered, 83% of all 
Fortune 500 directors and CEOs have made political contributions at 
some point in their careers.155 Moreover, many of those who have not 
contributed are foreign nationals barred from doing so.156 The 
contribution rate of the nearly 4500 top-firm executives Bonica studied 
greatly exceeds that of doctors (15% to 20%) and lawyers (45% to 
50%).157 The average amount a contributing executive had given to 
                                                                                                                     
$35.7 million influencing federal elections. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Outside Spending 
Summary 2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.php?cycle=20 
12&cmte=US+Chamber+of+Commerce (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). Contributions to 501(c)(4) and 
501(c)(6) groups need not be reported publically. See Hansen et al., supra note 147, at 12.   
About two-thirds of the Fortune 500 companies have established conventional PACs. The 
electoral spending of these PACs increased 15% between 2008 and 2012. This amount was 
“about half the percentage increase over the same period of major non-corporate PACs.” Id. at 
15. Neither Citizens United nor Speech Now affected the ability of conventional PACs to make 
political donations.  
 151. See 2014 Overview: Business-Labor-Ideology Split in PAC & Individual Donations to 
Candidates, Parties, Super PACs, and Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/overview/blio.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) [hereinafter 2014 
Overview]. 
 152. See id. The Center for Responsive Politics is a respected nonpartisan group that, 
among other things, analyzes campaign-finance statistics and makes them readily accessible. 
See Our Mission, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/about/. 
 153. The Center itself clearly divides interest group contributions into those made by 
individuals and those made by PACs. See 2014 Overview, supra note 151. 
 154. Bonica 2014, supra note 145, at 11–12.  
 155. Id. at 11. 
 156. Id.  
 157. See Adam Bonica, Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of 
Corporations and Their Directors and Executives 32–33 (Aug. 20, 2013) (unpublished 
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campaigns over the years was $197,000.158 The median was $38,000.159 
These figures do not include the amounts given by spouses.160  
Despite a common perception of the corporate world as a fortress of 
conservatism, “the typical board [of a publically traded Fortune 500 
company] includes donors from across the ideological spectrum,”161 and 
“ideologically homogenous firms are quite rare.”162 The distribution of 
campaign contributions by Fortune 500 executives skews to the right 
and to the Republican Party but only moderately.163 This tilt could “as 
easily be explained as a function of [the] demographics [of a group 
disproportionately composed of white males over 50] as it could by the 
supposed link between the corporate interests and Republican 
policies.”164  
The contributions of business executives seem less strategic and 
more the product of ideology than those of their businesses’ PACs. 
Executives rarely hedge by contributing to both candidates in a single 
race.165 Executives are also less likely than corporate PACs to tilt their 
contributions toward the party in power.166 If the contributions of 
business executives are made to advance “business interests,” the 
donors have differing ideas of how best to advance these interests. 
Candidates and office holders may not assign individual contributions to 
interests in the same way the Center for Responsive Politics does. 
When a Fortune 500 company’s endorsement of a candidate would 
alienate many of its directors, executives, and shareholders, the 
company is unlikely to make an endorsement. The company may have 
other reasons for declining to contribute to super PACs as well. About 
half the customers of a business corporation that markets to the public 
would be likely to support the opponent of whichever candidate the 
corporation endorsed. Unlike lobbying on an issue affecting the 
corporation’s interests,167 participation in a general election campaign is 
                                                                                                                     
manuscript), available at http://www.princeton.edu/csdp/events/Bonica11072013/SSRN-
id2313232.pdf [hereinafter Bonica 2013]. 
 158. Bonica 2014, supra note 145, at 11. 
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 11 n.4. 
 161. Id. at 23. 
 162. Id. at 21. An exception is the energy industry, which “stands out for the conservatism 
of its management and work force.” Bonica 2013, supra note 157, at 35.   
 163. Bonica 2014, supra note 145, at 18, 32 fig.5. 
 164. Bonica 2013, supra note 157, at 29. 
 165. See Bonica 2014, supra note 145, app. B. Forty-three executives, however—3% of all 
contributors—did give to both presidential nominees in 2012, and 114 did so in 2008. Id. at app. 
B &. tbl.2. 
 166. Id. at 14. 
 167. “[C]orporate lobbying expenditures have historically eclipsed PAC contributions by 
ratios of more than ten to one.” Id. at 2.   
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often bad for business.168 Entities that do not market to the public (labor 
unions and trade associations in particular) are more likely to make 
large contributions. Richard Epstein calls electoral spending a 
constitutional right that large corporations do not want.169 
Ninety-five individuals or couples and fifty-six organizations 
contributed $1 million or more to outside spending groups in 2012.170 
Together they contributed almost 60% of the total amount collected by 
these groups.171 At the top of the list were Sheldon and Miriam 
Adelson, who together gave $92.8 million.172 Following them were one 
couple and two individuals (Harold and Annette Simons, who 
contributed $26.9 million; Robert Perry, who gave $23.9 million; and 
Fred Eychaner, who gave $14.1 million).173 Then came a labor union 
(the United Auto Workers, $14 million); an individual (Michael 
Bloomberg, $13.7 million); another union (Service Employees 
International, $13.3 million); another individual (Joe Ricketts, $13.1 
million); and another union (the National Educational Association, $13 
million).174  
The top corporate contributor finally appears at number ten on the 
list—Specialty Group Inc., a mysterious enterprise that filed its 
incorporation papers less than a week before contributing its first $5 
million and that ultimately contributed $10.6 million.175 One must go 
                                                                                                                     
 168. See, e.g., Jia Lynn Yang & Dan Eggen, Exercising New Ability to Spend on Campaigns, 
Target Finds Itself a Bull’s-Eye, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081806759.html (describing the national boycott that 
followed Target’s contribution to a gubernatorial candidate in Minnesota who opposed same-sex 
marriage). 
 169. Richard A. Epstein, Citizens United v. FEC: The Constitutional Right That Big 
Corporations Should Have but Do Not Want, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639, 640 (2011). 
Apart from the fact that a corporation’s participation in an election campaign may be bad 
for business, permitting corporate contributions exposes businesses to implicit extortion—the 
unspoken threat that rejecting a request for funds may lead to reduced access or less favorable 
treatment. See id. at 640, 658. 
 170. See 2012 Top Individual Donors, supra note 19; 2012 Top Organizational Donors, 
supra note 19. An OpenSecrets.org website menu enables a viewer to toggle from one of these 
lists to the other, and the discussion that follows draws from a merger of the two lists.  
 171. See Keenan Steiner & Jacob Fenton, The 2012 Super PAC Million Dollar Club, 
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Dec. 7, 2012, 2:00 PM), http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/2012/2012-
super-pac-million-dollar-club/ (using figures slightly different from those reported by the Center for 
Responsive Politics). 
 172. 2012 Top Individual Donors, supra note 19. 
 173. Id.  
 174. See id.; 2012 Top Organizational Donors, supra note 19.  
 175. See 2012 Top Organizational Donors, supra note 19; Jack Gillum, Specialty Group 
Inc., Mystery Firm, Formed Days Before $5 Million Campaign Gift, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 
2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/27/specialty-group-inc-donation_n_
2031207.html; see also Press Release, William Rose (Nov. 3, 2012), available at 
http://archive.wbir.com/pdf/11512_william_rose.pdf (statement by Knoxville resident William 
34
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 423 
 
past five more individuals and six more unions before encountering a 
second business corporation—Oxbow Corp.,176 an energy development 
holding company founded by Bill Koch,177 a brother of Charles and 
David Koch,178 which contributed $4.4 million.179  
The business corporations that contributed $1 million or more 
(twenty-two) slightly outnumbered the unions that did (twenty-one),180 
but the amount contributed by the twenty-one unions (about $100 
million) was more than double that contributed by the twenty-two 
corporations (about $50 million).181 Most of the corporations that gave 
$1 million or more appeared to be closely held by one or a few owners. 
Several in fact seemed to be straw companies created for the purpose of 
masking their owners’ contributions.182  
Wendy Hansen, Michael Rocca, and Brittany Ortiz, the authors of a 
study of political spending by Fortune 500 companies, concluded, 
“Corporate political spending changed very little following the Citizens 
United ruling.”183 Adam Bonica’s bottom line was similar: “In a careful 
accounting of corporate political expenditures, I find [little evidence] 
that the recent Supreme Court ruling in Citizens United has had any 
practical effect on how corporations spend on politics.”184 But large 
contributions by individuals have skyrocketed.  
  
                                                                                                                     
Rose declaring that he is “the CEO, President and General Counsel of Specialty Group,” that the 
company is developing land his family has owned for fifty years, and that “[o]ver the past 
several weeks, the failings of the Obama administration . . . have been hidden by the mainstream 
news media, with Fox News leading the lonely path towards the truth”).  
 176.  See 2012 Top Individual Donors, supra note 19; 2012 Top Organizational Donors, 
supra note 19. 
 177. See William Koch, OXBOW, http://www.oxbow.com/About_Us_Leadership_Founder_
&_Chief_Executive_Officer.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 178. See William Koch, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/profile/william-koch/ (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2015).  
 179. 2012 Top Organizational Donors, supra note 19.  
 180. See id. The organizations contributing $1 million or more that were neither labor 
unions nor business corporations were mostly political groups—for example, the Republican 
Governors Association and the League of Conservation Voters. See id.  
 181. See id.  
 182. See Corporations or People? Let’s Ask Romney About Eli Publishing, F8 LLC, Spann LLC 
and Paying Taxes, MN POL. ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 13, 2011), http://mnpoliticalroundtable.com/2011/0 
8/13/corporations-or-people-let’s-ask-romney-about-eli-publishing-f8-llc-spann-llc-and-paying-taxes/ 
(noting that W Spann LLC filed incorporation papers in March, contributed $1 million to 
Restore Our Future in April, and was dissolved in July); Michael Beckel & Reity O’Brien, Mystery 
Firm is Election’s Top Corporate Donor at $5.3 Million, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Nov. 5, 2012), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/11/mystery-firm-is-elections-top-corpo.html.  
 183. Hansen et al., supra note 147, at 18.   
 184. Bonica 2014, supra note 145, at 22.   
35
Alschuler: Limiting Political Contributions After <i> McCutcheon</i>, <i>Cit
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
424 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
IV.  REFLECTIONS ON A BUMPER STICKER  
A bumper sticker marketed to people offended by the Citizens United 
decision proclaims, “MONEY IS NOT SPEECH! Corporations are not 
People!”185 Justice Alito has called it “very frustrating” for a Supreme 
Court opinion to be “reduced to a slogan that you put on a bumper 
sticker.”186 The bumper sticker, however, provides a place to start. This 
Part assesses some basic campaign-finance issues by considering what’s 
wrong and what’s right about the sticker’s two assertions. 
A.  “Money Is Not Speech” 
1.  Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly): The First 
Amendment Protects the Use of Money to Bring Speech to an 
Audience 
The declaration that “money is not speech” appears not only on 
bumper stickers but also on refrigerator magnets, T-shirts,187 and a 
proposed constitutional amendment endorsed by more than 370,000 
petition signers.188 The city councils of Los Angeles, California and 
Portland, Oregon have passed resolutions declaring that money is not 
speech, and voters in Boulder, Colorado and Madison, Wisconsin have 
approved referenda saying the same thing.189 
It is true that money is not speech, but the First Amendment could 
not protect speech unless it also protected other things. As Geoffrey 
Stone has observed, a bus is not speech, but a law forbidding bus rides 
to political rallies would violate the First Amendment.190 Although 
money is not speech, Congress could not prohibit the use of money to 
buy a book. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. 
Circuit’s conclusion that contribution and expenditure limitations 
                                                                                                                     
 185. See Money Is Not Speech Bumper Sticker, CAFE PRESS, http://www.cafepress.com/
mf/70462926/money-is-not-speech_bumper-sticker?productId=758086923 (last visited Feb. 3, 
2015). 
 186. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: THE ROBERTS COURT AND 
THE CONSTITUTION 96 (2014); Michelle R. Smith, Alito Says Supreme Court Misunderstood by 
Media, DESERET NEWS (Sept. 14, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
765604212/Alito-says-Supreme-Court-misunderstood-by-media.html).   
 187. See Money Is Not Speech Bumper Sticker, ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/money_is_not_ 
speech_bumper_sticker-128314648852904232 (last visited Feb. 3, 2015); MoneySpeechCorpPerson 
Fridge Magnet, ZAZZLE, http://www.zazzle.com/moneyspeechcorpperson_fridge_magnet-
147993051250725513 (last visited Feb. 3, 2015); Money Not Equal to Speech T-Shirt, ZAZZLE, 
http://www.zazzle.com/money_not_equal_to_speech_t_shirt-235995578836445369 (last visited Feb. 
3, 2015).  
 188. See Motion to Amend the US Constitution—Sign the Petition, MOVE TO AMEND, 
http://movetoamend.nationbuilder.com/petition (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 189. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Is Money Speech?, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 5, 2012, 12:29 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/geoffrey-r-stone/is-money-speech_b_1255787.html. 
 190. Id.  
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“should be viewed as regulating conduct not speech.”191 As the Court 
observed, one cannot send a telegram or publish a newspaper without 
spending money.192 Unless critics of Citizens United would allow 
Congress to suppress newspapers by prohibiting the expenditures 
needed to publish them, they cannot resolve the First Amendment issues 
posed by campaign-finance regulations simply by proclaiming that 
money is not speech.  
2.  Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly): Unlike Other 
Funds Used to Bring Speech to an Audience, Campaign 
Contributions and Expenditures are Conflict-Creating Gifts to 
Candidates 
The Constitution protects the expenditures needed to bring speech to 
an audience, but that is not the only thing campaign contributions and 
expenditures do. These contributions and expenditures also have harmful 
effects not produced by the messages they deliver. They differ greatly 
from the spending necessary to publish a newspaper or send a telegram.  
Unlike the funds used to publish a newspaper or send a telegram, 
political contributions and expenditures are intended to influence, and do 
influence, two audiences. From the perspective of one of these 
audiences—the public—they look like speech. Their purpose is to 
persuade the audience of some proposition (“vote Obama”). American 
democracy could not function without them.  
From the perspective of a second audience, however—the favored 
candidate—political contributions and expenditures look like other 
corrupting gifts. They do not persuade the candidate to support his own 
candidacy. Instead, they may persuade him to provide favors to the 
contributors and the spenders. When they do, they persuade him in the 
same way that an expense-paid trip to an old golf course in Scotland 
might persuade him.193 Campaign cash is just as good as money.194  
The principal reason for restricting the receipt of political 
contributions and expenditures does not differ from the reason for 
restricting the receipt of golf outings, honoraria, tickets to sporting 
                                                                                                                     
 191. 424 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1976).  
 192. See id. at 16−17. Western Union sent its last telegram in 2006, thirty years after 
Buckley. See Dan Tynan, 10 Technologies That Should Be Extinct (but Aren’t), PC WORLD (July 4, 
2010, 6:40 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/200325/10_technologies_that_should_be_extinct.html. 
One can still send a telegram through iTelegram, which recommends using the service for, 
among other things, weddings, special occasions, sympathy, and fun and romance. See 
ITELEGRAM, http://www.itelegram.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2014).  
 193. See Massimo Calabresi, The Golf Junket That Haunts Abramoff and Friends, TIME 
(May 11, 2006), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1193223,00.html. 
 194. See Royalty Payments: “As Good as Money,” THE LEDGER (Sept. 30, 2009), 
http://www.theledger.com/article/20090930/NEWS/909305007 (noting Yogi Berra’s statement 
in an AFLAC commercial, “They give you cash, which is just as good as money”). 
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events, Christmas baskets, and private employment. Campaign 
contributions and expenditures corrupt just as much as these other valued 
benefits. Because providing these benefits serves an important public 
purpose, however, there is greater reason for tolerating the corruption.  
The codes of conduct that limit the ability of public officials to accept 
gifts are described as curbing conflicts of interest.195 The Supreme 
Court’s campaign-finance decisions consume more than 1000 pages of 
the reports, however, and the words “conflict of interest” do not appear. 
The Supreme Court speaks more obscurely of “the actuality and 
appearance of corruption.”196  
Speaking of conflicts of interest would be better.197 To be sure, this 
language would sound less grand. “Corruption” has an ominous ring, and 
curbing it sounds like a more compelling governmental interest. 
Speaking of conflicts of interest, however, would underscore the need to 
draw a line between permissible and impermissible conflicts. The 
Supreme Court sometimes has seemed hesitant to recognize this 
necessity. 
Attempting to eliminate all conflicts of interest would be a fool’s 
errand. Conflicts are ubiquitous. An effort to stamp all of them out 
would leave public officials without any social life, family life, religious 
life, or political life. This effort also would violate the First Amendment. 
Congress could not prohibit a $100 contribution simply because it might 
make its beneficiary somewhat more receptive to the contributor’s 
entreaties. 
Strong conflicts of interest, however, are appropriately forbidden. 
The interest in preventing them is both important and compelling.198 The 
Lincoln bedroom,199 the ambassadorship to Luxembourg,200 and pardons 
                                                                                                                     
 195. The United States Office of Government Ethics, for example, interprets and 
implements most federal ethics laws and regulations. It takes as its motto “Preventing Conflicts 
of Interest in the Executive Branch.” See U.S. OFFICE OF GOV’T ETHICS, 
http://www.oge.gov/home.aspx (last visited Apr. 27, 2015). 
 196. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.  
 197. More than twenty-five years ago, Daniel Lowenstein noted, “[T]he question of 
campaign finance is a question of conflict of interest.” See Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On 
Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil Is Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 
323 (1989). 
 198. When the Constitution is read to safeguard unlimited contributions to super PACs, 
laboring over a code of government conduct looks like rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. A 
code might prohibit a lobbyist from sending a legislator a $100 Christmas gift, but the restriction 
would hardly matter. The lobbyist would have a simpler and easier way to buy influence. 
 199. During the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate George W. Bush accused President 
Clinton of “virtually renting out the Lincoln bedroom to big campaign donors.” Helen Thomas, 
Selling Lincoln Bedroom Disrespectful, HEARST NEWSPAPERS (Sept. 28, 2002), 
http://www.seattlepi.com/news/article/Selling-Lincoln-bedroom-disrespectful-1097153.php. He 
condemned using this “hallowed” chamber for political purposes. Id. Later, however, Bush, like 
his predecessor, hosted many major contributors as overnight guests in the White House. Id. A 
presidential spokesman refused to say in which bedrooms they slept. Id.  
 200. See infra app. E, “The Appointment of Ambassadors.” 
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for the friends and families of major donors201 need not remain up for 
grabs. Small political contributions usually are motivated by a desire to 
persuade the public rather than buy influence, but large contributions 
often are motivated by both a desire to persuade the public and the hope 
of gaining clout.202 Forbidding some conflicts of interest is an excellent 
idea. 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court cited the impossibility of 
drawing a principled line between large and small conflicts of interest as 
its reason—its only reason—for excluding from its concept of corruption 
every conflict of interest except those created by bribes. Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court quoted an earlier opinion he authored, 
noting that this earlier opinion was a separate opinion but not that it was 
a dissent. He wrote, “Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in 
representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to 
favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters 
and contributors who support those policies.”203 Moreover, a “generic 
favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First 
Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no 
limiting principle.”204 Justice Kennedy apparently saw no alternative to 
leaving the ambassadorship to Luxembourg and much more up for grabs.  
The Supreme Court, however, often draws “unprincipled” lines of the 
sort Citizens United declined to draw. In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC,205 for example, the Court upheld Missouri’s low 
contribution limits,206 and then, in Randall v. Sorrell,207 it invalidated 
Vermont’s even lower limits.208 The Court has recognized that 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See infra app. D, “Executive Clemency.” 
 202. Laurence Tribe once posed the following thought experiment to his First Amendment 
class: Imagine a high-tech information filter that can reveal information to one audience while 
blocking it from another. Imagine further that the law mandates the use of this device to make 
the sources of campaign financing transparent to the public but anonymous to the benefitted 
candidates. Then consider how many contributors would still pour millions of dollars into 
campaigns. E-mail from Laurence Tribe to author (Sept. 29, 2012, 9:26 AM) (on file with 
author). For less hypothetical proposals to conceal the identity of donors from candidates, see 
BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN 
FINANCE 48–50, 102–04 (2002); Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating 
Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 852–55 
(1998). 
 203. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 204. Id. (alteration in original) (again quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 296 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 205. 528 U.S. 377 (2000).  
 206. Id. at 397–98.  
 207. 548 U.S. 230 (2006). 
 208. See id. at 262.  
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legislatures must make judgment calls and that courts charged with 
safeguarding the First Amendment must review the reasonableness of 
these calls.  
The distinction between the two audiences and the two different 
ways of persuading them has been lost on some Supreme Court Justices. 
The dissenters in Citizens United cited the scholarship of Zephyr 
Teachout—scholarship showing that the Framers of the Constitution 
“‘were obsessed with corruption,’ . . . which they understood to 
encompass the dependency of public officeholders on private 
interests.”209 In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Thomas and 
Alito, Justice Scalia objected that the Framers’ concept of corruption 
could not justify restricting speech: “[I]f speech can be prohibited 
because, in the view of Government, it leads to ‘moral decay’ or does 
not serve ‘public ends,’ then there is no limit to the Government’s 
censorship power.”210  
Limiting contributions and expenditures because the political 
messages they send could persuade viewers, listeners, and readers to 
favor selfish interests or because these messages might cause moral 
decay among their audiences certainly would offend the First 
Amendment. No one, however, has proposed limiting contributions and 
expenditures because the messages they send corrupt their audiences. 
Providing valued gifts to governmental officials to encourage them to 
disregard the public interest is not entitled to any First Amendment 
protection. 
                                                                                                                     
 209. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 452 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(quoting Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341, 348 
(2009)). 
Teachout’s scholarship sometimes produces a surprisingly uncomprehending response. 
Critics note the ubiquity of the kind of corruption she describes, the impossibility of eliminating 
this corruption, and the unfairness of calling every official who considers anything but the 
public good “corrupt.”  
Teachout, however, did not suggest that the Constitution allows Congress to prohibit all 
speech that creates conflicts of interest and that diverts officials from serving the public. She did 
not set forth a standard for separating protected from unprotected speech. She simply 
emphasized an interest to be weighed against the expressive value of speech and showed how 
important this interest was to the Framers of the Constitution. Moreover, Teachout would not 
call officials who fail to focus entirely on the public good dishonest; her point was that the word 
“corruption” sometimes refers, not to dishonesty, but to falling away from an Aristotelian ideal 
of public service. See Teachout, supra, at 374; see also ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN 
AMERICA: FROM BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 9, 38–41 (2014). 
Corruption in the sense most often invoked by the Framers is a matter of more or less, not yes or 
no.  
Teachout argued that the interest in minimizing conflicts of interest is sometimes strong 
enough to justify limiting speech. For an examination of where the contrary view would lead, 
see infra Part X. 
 210. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 391 (Scalia, J., concurring).   
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The plurality in McCutcheon also seemed oblivious to the difference 
between campaign contributions and speech that sends a message to 
only one audience. It wrote: 
Money in politics may at times seem repugnant to some, 
but so too does much of what the First Amendment 
vigorously protects. If the First Amendment protects flag 
burning, funeral protests, and Nazi parades—despite the 
profound offense such spectacles cause—it surely protects 
political campaign speech despite popular opposition.211  
The public, however, does not seek to suppress campaign 
contributions for the same reason legislators once sought to suppress 
flag burning and Nazi marches. Its quarrel is not with the content of the 
advertisements broadcast by Democrats and Republicans. What makes 
money in politics repugnant to many is the ability of backers of both 
Republicans and Democrats to secure official favors. The messages 
Republican and Democratic donors send the public differ, but the 
conflicts of interest created by their contributions look a lot alike. The 
McCutcheon majority seemed slow to recognize the difference between 
limiting conflicts of interest and censoring repugnant speech. It was too 
quick to claim the anticensorship mantle of Milton, Mill, Holmes, and 
Brandeis.  
The defenders of Citizens United and the critics of this decision 
sometimes have seemed like the blind men describing the elephant.212 
The defenders have failed to acknowledge the extent to which political 
contributions and expenditures differ from other funds used to bring 
speech to audiences. The critics, however, have seen these contributions 
as corrupting without acknowledging the crucial role they play in 
enabling speech. Both sides have been wrong and both right.213  
  
                                                                                                                     
 211. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 212. This Article is headed toward a record in the use of hackneyed metaphors. Readers are 
requested to envision an elephant in a stateroom on the Titanic unnoticed except by a group of 
blind passengers who describe it to an orphaned murderer in a deck chair after the ship has left 
the station.  
 213. Some critics’ concern about conflicting interests is mixed with concern about buying 
elections and distorting election results—a concern that does raise questions about censorship. 
See infra text accompanying notes 241–44. 
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B.  “Corporations Are Not People” 
1.  Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Wrong (Mostly): The First 
Amendment Affords Speakers the Same Right as Non-Speakers to Use 
the Corporate Form of Organization 
Some of the constitutional amendments proposed to “overrule” 
Citizens United declare, “The rights protected by the Constitution of the 
United States are the rights of natural persons only.”214 Justice Stevens 
wrote for the dissenters in Citizens United, “[The Framers] had little 
trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings, and when they 
constitutionalized the right to free speech in the First Amendment, it 
was the free speech of individual Americans that they had in mind.”215 
Delegates to the 2012 Democratic Convention cheered Elizabeth 
Warren when she told them, “[C]orporations are not people. People 
have hearts, they have kids, they get jobs, they get sick, they cry, they 
dance. They live, they love, and they die. And that matters. That matters 
because we don’t run this country for corporations, we run it for 
people.”216 
Even the motorists whose bumper stickers decry Citizens United, 
however, might not deny corporations all constitutional rights. One 
doubts, for example, that they would convict these entities of crimes 
without affording them the right to counsel and the right to jury trial.217 
At the same time, no one has proposed affording corporations the right 
to vote. It apparently is necessary to distinguish some constitutional 
rights from others, something that cannot be done on a bumper sticker.  
In 2011, Mitt Romney responded to an audience member’s repeated 
shouts of the word “corporations” by saying, “Corporations are people, 
my friend.”218 This answer prompted widespread ridicule. The 
                                                                                                                     
 214. See We the People Amendment, MOVE TO AMEND, https://movetoamend.org/sites/
default/files/mta-wethepeopleamendment.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) (favoring a 
constitutional amendment with the language quoted in text); accord S.J. Res. 18, 113th Cong. 
(2013), available at https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/sjres18/BILLS-113sjres18is.pdf 
(presenting the text of a constitutional amendment sponsored by Senators Jon Tester and Chris 
Murphy: “We the people who ordain and establish this Constitution intend the rights protected 
by this Constitution to be the rights of natural persons.”). 
 215. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part).  
 216.  See Elizabeth Warren, Speech at Democratic Nat’l Convention: The System is 
Rigged (Sept. 5, 2012), available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/ideo/2012/09/05/elizabeth
_warren_addresses_dnc_the_system_is_rigged.html. 
 217. Affording these rights to corporations seems uncontroversial. Nevertheless, “[f]or 
ever-shifting reasons, all of them bad, the Supreme Court has held the privilege against self-
incrimination inapplicable to corporations.” Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the 
Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1366 (2009). 
 218. See Philip Rucker, Mitt Romney Says “Corporations Are People,” WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 
2011), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-08-11/politics/35270239_1_romney-supporters-mit 
t-romney-private-sector-experience.  
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Chairperson of the Democratic National Committee called it a 
“shocking admission,”219 and a poster portrayed Romney as declaring, 
“Of course corporations are people. Some of my best friends are 
corporations!” 
People probably would not have seen Romney as ridiculous, 
however, if he had said, “baseball teams are people, my friend,” “church 
congregations are people,” or “labor unions are people.” Indeed, if 
Romney had seemed ridiculous after making one of these other 
comments, it might have been because he saw the need to verbalize 
something so obvious. 
Why might listeners have accepted descriptions of labor unions as 
people while rejecting similar descriptions of corporations? Was it just 
that some people consider corporations more beastly? Or does the 
statement that “unions are people” sound like an obvious truth—simply 
a recognition that members comprise these organizations—while the 
statement that “corporations are people” sounds like an obvious 
falsehood—a preposterous statement about corporate entities 
themselves? Romney probably meant only to remind his audience of the 
human beings who consider themselves part of corporate organizations 
and without whom these organizations would not exist, but some 
listeners heard him deny that a fictional entity was fictional.220  
The Citizens United majority and its critics appeared to make the 
same error. Both took a legal fiction seriously and envisioned a 
corporation owned by many people simply as a single entity. The 
majority insisted that this entity should be treated as though it were an 
individual speaker, while critics saw it as a nonhuman thing without 
rights. Analogizing a corporation to a single person or a single thing, 
however, is usually a mistake.221 What might be called the Romney 
move—piercing the corporate veil and focusing on the human beings 
behind it—sharpens the issues.222  
Agreeing that only human beings have First Amendment rights begs 
the question: What rights do they have? Does the Constitution guarantee 
them not only the right to speak as individuals but also the right to join 
with others for the purpose of speaking? And if the First Amendment 
entitles people to form “speech groups,” why should the groups they 
                                                                                                                     
 219. Id.  
 220. Romney had no hope of correcting the misunderstanding. Although Justice Brandeis 
famously declared that the remedy for falsehood and fallacies is “more speech,” Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), he never ran for office.  
 221. See Alschuler, supra note 217, at 1367, 1392 (arguing that blaming corporations for 
the crimes committed by their employees is comparable to blaming animals and inanimate 
objects and commenting, “The embarrassment of corporate criminal liability is that it punishes 
the innocent along with the guilty”). 
 222. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768 (2014) (“When 
rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect 
the rights of” the “people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated 
with [the] corporation in one way or another.”).  
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form be denied the benefits of corporate organization? Should only 
nonspeaking business entities be allowed to incorporate? Should these 
nonhuman (or, if you prefer, subhuman) organizations have special 
privileges denied to groups that speak?  
Just as the government may not prohibit using a bus to ride to a 
political rally, it should not be allowed to prohibit the use of a common 
and beneficial form of organization simply because organizers wish to 
engage in protected speech. A widely available organizational tool 
cannot constitutionally be denied to speakers alone. Like a bus, 
incorporation can help speakers get where they are going. It would be 
more precise to say that people have a right to use the corporate form 
when they speak than to say that corporations have a right to speak, but 
it is difficult to see an important difference between the two 
formulations.223 
Citizens United was not the first Supreme Court decision to 
recognize the right of speakers to employ the corporate form of 
organization. The Court cited no fewer than twenty-five earlier 
decisions in which it had recognized the First Amendment rights of 
incorporated groups.224  
In fact, the Supreme Court had decided a case very much like 
Citizens United twenty-four years earlier. In FEC v. Massachusetts 
Citizens for Life, Inc.,225 a nonprofit corporation sought to broadly 
distribute a newsletter headlined “EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO 
KNOW TO VOTE PRO-LIFE.”226 The Court recognized the group’s 
right to distribute this newsletter. In an opinion by Justice Brennan, it 
held that Congress’s prohibition of corporate expenditures “in 
connection with” federal election campaigns was unconstitutional as 
applied to nonprofit corporations formed for the sole purpose of 
expressing political ideas.227  
Citizens United differed from Massachusetts Citizens for Life in only 
one respect. The plaintiff in Citizens United, unlike the plaintiff in 
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, accepted donations from for-profit 
corporations.228 The Supreme Court, however, has recognized the First 
Amendment rights of for-profit as well as nonprofit corporations. As 
Michael McConnell observed, “The vast majority of the Court’s press 
                                                                                                                     
 223. Because the right ultimately belongs to individuals, the government should be allowed 
to take reasonable steps to ensure that they wish to exercise this right—in other words, to ensure 
that the people on the bus want to go where it’s going. 
 224. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010).   
 225. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).  
 226. Id. at 243.  
 227. See id. at 241.  
 228. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S at 319, with Mass. Citizens, 479 U.S. at 242.  
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cases involve for-profit corporations . . . and no one, even in dissent, has 
ever suggested that corporate status mattered in those cases.”229  
The Sierra Club is a nonprofit corporation, and the New York Times 
is a for-profit corporation. Unless the critics of Citizens United would 
deny the right to speak and publish to the Sierra Club and the Times, 
they cannot plausibly maintain that only “human beings, not 
corporations, are persons entitled to constitutional rights.”230 
Citizens United held Congress’s prohibition of independent electoral 
expenditures by unions and corporations unconstitutional sixty-four 
years after its enactment. One year after this prohibition’s enactment, 
however, Justices Rutledge, Black, Douglas, and Murphy declared in a 
concurring opinion that they would hold it unconstitutional.231 They did 
so in a case in which the majority found it unnecessary to reach the 
question but did say that it would have “the gravest doubt” about the 
prohibition’s constitutionality if it were construed to prevent internal 
distribution of a list of union endorsements.232 Nine years later, in 
another case in which the majority found it unnecessary to resolve the 
question,233 Chief Justice Warren joined a dissenting opinion in which 
Justices Douglas and Black reiterated their view that the prohibition was 
unconstitutional.234 
At the time when Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, 
Murphy, and Rutledge declared that they would hold Congress’s 
prohibition of independent expenditures by unions and corporations 
unconstitutional, Congress had enacted only token restrictions on 
contributions by individuals.235 When people were effectively free to 
give as much as they liked to whichever candidates they liked, there was 
no substantial reason to limit their ability to join others in making and 
coordinating contributions and expenditures—and no substantial reason 
to deny the groups they formed the benefits of corporate organization.  
Once Congress had limited individual contributions and the Supreme 
Court had recognized Congress’s power to do so, however, the 
appropriate analysis changed. The government then had a strong interest 
                                                                                                                     
 229. See McConnell, supra note 36, at 417. 
 230. MOVE TO AMEND, http://movetoamend.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 231. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 143 (1948) (Rutledge, J., concurring).  
 232. See id. at 121, 124 (majority opinion).   
 233. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 591 (1957). 
 234. Id. at 591 (Douglas, J., dissenting).   
 235. The Hatch Political Activity Act amendments of 1940 limited individual contributions 
to a federal candidate or political committee to $5000 per year. These amendments did not, 
however, prevent a donor from giving that amount to multiple committees working for the same 
candidate and coordinating their electoral efforts. See ch. 640, § 13, 54 Stat. 767, 770 (1940); 
THOMAS J. BALDINO & KYLE L. KREIDER, U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGNS: A DOCUMENTARY AND 
REFERENCE GUIDE 99 (2011) (“The inability of the Hatch amendments to restrict contributions 
was patently obvious.”).   
45
Alschuler: Limiting Political Contributions After <i> McCutcheon</i>, <i>Cit
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
434 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
in preventing the use of organizations to circumvent individual 
contribution limits. Neither the majority nor the dissenters in Citizens 
United seemed to notice the change.   
2.  Why the Bumper Sticker Gets It Right (Partly): The First 
Amendment Affords No Right to Make Corporate Contributions 
and Expenditures That Circumvent Valid Limits on Individual 
Contributions 
a.  Contributions 
One morning, Mr. Hyde donated the maximum allowable amount to 
Senator Claghorn’s reelection campaign.236 He said to the senator, “Of 
course there’s no quid pro quo, but I hope you’ll support subsidies for 
the widget industry, which would create thousands of jobs.” Mr. Hyde 
later donned dark glasses, a fedora, and a false mustache. That 
afternoon, he again contributed the maximum amount to Senator 
Claghorn’s campaign. “I am not Mr. Hyde,” he told the senator in a 
falsetto voice. “I am the Jeckyll Corporation, a leading manufacturer of 
widgets. Like my friend Hyde, however, I hope you’ll support 
enormous subsidies for our industry.” The case of Mr. Hyde and the 
Jeckyll Corporation prompts the following observations. 
i.  Corporate Entities Are Not People 
As noted above, every federal court of appeals to address the issue 
has held that Congress’s prohibition of corporate contributions to 
election campaigns survives Citizens United.237 If the lower courts had 
taken more seriously the Supreme Court’s declaration that “the 
Government cannot restrict political speech based on the speaker’s 
corporate identity,”238 however, they would have afforded corporations 
the same right as individuals to make political contributions. Every 
corporation then could donate $2700 per candidate per election during 
the 2015–2016 election cycle.239 
The number of corporations an individual can form is unlimited. If, 
after donating $2700 to Senator Claghorn himself, Mr. Hyde created 
100 corporations, each of these corporations could contribute $2700 to 
                                                                                                                     
 236. Senator Beauregard Claghorn, an invention of radio comedian Fred Allen, is 
remembered today, not for his legislative accomplishments, which were nonexistent, but for his 
devotion to the South—devotion so deep that he refused to wear a union suit or drive through 
the Lincoln Tunnel. See HAL ERICKSON, FROM RADIO TO THE BIG SCREEN: HOLLYWOOD FILMS 
FEATURING BROADCAST PERSONALITIES AND PROGRAMS 230 (2014). 
 237. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.  
 238. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 346 (2010).  
 239. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(A) (West 2014); Price Index Adjustments for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limitations and Lobbyist Bundling Disclosure Threshold, 78 Fed. Reg. 8530, 
8532 (Feb. 6, 2013). 
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the senator’s campaign. By making contributions through these 
corporations, Mr. Hyde would gain more clout than he should have—
101 times more. At the same time, Koch Industries, with 60,000 
employees and annual revenues of $115 billion,240 could contribute a 
total of $2700. The fearsome corporate mountain could give birth to a 
mouse. As the bumper sticker insists, analogizing corporate entities to 
individual speakers is misguided. The number of artificial legal entities 
people create should not affect what they can give.  
The people who own corporations are not artificial entities. In 
Elizabeth Warren’s words, they live, love, and die. The reason some 
corporate contributions are appropriately forbidden is not that 
corporations are subhuman, demonic entities entitled to no 
constitutional rights. Rather, the reason is the opposite: “Corporations 
are people, my friend.” The people who comprise a corporation are 
entitled to only their fair share of clout. Their contributions to particular 
candidates should be subject to effective limitation.  
ii.  Limiting and Equalizing Clout 
This Article maintains that campaign contributions are hybrids of 
protected speech and unprotected, influence-generating gifts to 
candidates. The limits on contributions upheld by Buckley v. Valeo 
mark the point at which the danger of conflicting interests appears to 
outweigh the benefits of electoral speech.  
When people aggregate small contributions, however, they can 
create large conflicts of interest. One thousand members of the National 
Widget Association, for example, might each contribute the maximum 
amount to Senator Claghorn’s campaign, and each might accompany his 
contribution with a note thanking the senator for his unwavering support 
of the right to bear widgets. Senator Claghorn later might vote against a 
proposed widget-control measure, not because he or most of his 
constituents disapproved of the measure, but because he hoped to keep 
the Widget Association members’ cash flowing. The persuasion 
achieved by these members’ contributions would not have been the kind 
the First Amendment protects, but no constitutional regime of 
campaign-finance regulation could have blocked it.  
This Article endorses a scheme of campaign-finance regulation in 
which organizations may bundle contributions and act as the 
contributors’ spending agents. A bundling group—call it a political 
action committee—could collect a large enough war chest that 
candidates might be wary of offending it.  
The situation obviously differs when Mr. Hyde, wearing 1000 
                                                                                                                     
 240. See America’s Largest Companies, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/largest-private-
companies/list/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
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disguises, has contributed 1000 times more than the law allows. 
Although the aggregate amount of improper influence he purchased 
might have been no different from that purchased by 1000 lawful 
contributions, Mr. Hyde would have gained an unfair advantage. He is 
entitled to no more than his fair share of clout. Even when limits on 
individual contributions do not block the creation of conflicts of 
interest, they limit people to their proportionate share of clout. 
The Supreme Court has rejected a different equalization claim—that 
the government may prevent the political contributions of the wealthy 
from “distorting” election results.241 Although Austin embraced a 
variation of this claim,242 Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon 
firmly repudiated it. In each of these cases, the Supreme Court observed 
that restricting the speech of some in order to equalize the speech of 
others is “wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”243  
The government could not block a wealthy person from writing and 
distributing a pamphlet on a political issue (or from publishing the 
pamphlet as a full-page advertisement in the New York Times) simply 
because opponents of his position were less wealthy and less able to 
disseminate their views. Equalizing electoral speech seems similarly 
objectionable. 
Equalizing clout differs, however, from equalizing speech and is not 
“foreign to the First Amendment.” Although the First Amendment 
guarantees a marketplace of ideas,244 it does not guarantee a 
marketplace in clout. The argument for equalizing clout does not focus 
at all on the advantage that wealth may provide in conveying messages 
to the public or on distorted election results. It focuses on a kind of 
influence the First Amendment does not protect.  
iii.  Anonymous Clout 
In McCutcheon, the plurality maintained that, even if funds donated 
to a group unassociated with a candidate might find their way into this 
candidate’s coffers, “it is hard to see how a candidate today could 
receive a massive amount[] of money that could be traced back to a 
particular contributor.”245 It observed that when “the chain of attribution 
                                                                                                                     
 241. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349–56.  
 242. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) 
(declaring that Congress may prevent “immense aggregations of [corporate] wealth” from 
distorting election results). 
 243. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per curiam); see also Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 349–50 (2010); McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014). 
 244. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of 
the market.”). 
 245. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1452 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
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grows longer, . . . any credit must be shared among the various actors 
along the way.”246 The plurality spoke of the hurdles election law poses 
“for a donor who seeks both to channel a large amount of money to a 
particular candidate and to ensure that he gets the credit for doing 
so.”247 It apparently assumed that a donor could have illegitimate 
influence only when the recipient knew his identity. 
When Mr. Hyde, disguised as the Jeckyll Corporation, contributed a 
second time to Senator Claghorn’s campaign, however, the influence he 
gained did not depend on Senator Claghorn’s ability to see through his 
disguise (that is, to pierce his corporate veil). In both of Mr. Hyde’s 
personae, he made Senator Claghorn aware of the amount of his 
contribution and what he wanted. When the amount contributed is large 
enough, these two conditions can create campaign-cash clout. Mr. Hyde 
believed that his two contributions together would reinforce the 
senator’s appreciation of the central role of widgets in our economy—
and not because they would persuade the senator of anything. Clout 
need not be personal clout; someone who remains anonymous but 
contributes to an influence-buying fund has clout too. To block 
improper influence, one must obscure both the identity and the 
objectives of a donor. 
b.  Expenditures 
All corporations—not just shell corporations, one-person 
corporations, and closely held corporations—offer paths around 
contribution limits. Moreover, corporate expenditures may provide a 
broader circumvention path than corporate contributions. 
Although no Fortune 500 company has yet accepted Citizens 
United’s invitation to make an independent expenditure to advocate a 
federal candidate’s election,248 suppose that one does. The massive 
Jeckyll Corporation spends $1 million to create and broadcast an 
advertisement urging Senator Claghorn’s reelection. Suppose that, prior 
to this expenditure, Mr. Hyde, the owner of 5% of the outstanding 
shares of Jeckyll Corporation, had contributed as much as the law 
allowed to Senator Claghorn’s campaign. The corporation’s 
independent expenditure on behalf of Senator Claghorn was not Mr. 
Hyde’s independent expenditure.  
When the Supreme Court first distinguished between contributions 
and expenditures, it explained, “[T]he transformation of contributions 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
                                                                                                                     
 246. Id.  
 247. Id. at 1446. 
 248. See text accompanying supra note 147. 
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contributor.”249 When one person funds another’s speech, the First 
Amendment protects his contribution less than the speech it finances. 
The distinction between contributions and expenditures may proceed 
from the same intuition that prompted the bumper sticker’s declaration 
that money is not speech: Writing checks is something less than 
speaking.250  
Although political contributors usually write checks, Mr. Hyde did 
less. Funds that he and others owned were already in the Jeckyll 
Corporation treasury for managers to use to promote the reelection of 
Senator Claghorn if they liked. Five percent of the corporation’s $1 
million expenditure ($50,000) was attributable to Mr. Hyde’s share of 
these funds. This cash bought Mr. Hyde more than his fair share of 
clout.251  
Perhaps one can presume an identity of interest between corporate 
managers and shareholders. If one cannot, protecting shareholders from 
the use of their funds to support candidates they oppose supplies a 
strong reason for forbidding political spending by corporations.252 The 
candidates backed by a corporation are likely to be the same candidates 
its shareholders support through their own contributions. Many 
shareholders are likely to give enough as individuals that allowing them 
to provide additional support through their corporations would put their 
total contributions beyond the limit.  
This Article proposes a mechanism for allowing political 
contributions and expenditures through corporations, unions, and other 
                                                                                                                     
 249. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam). 
 250. The Court’s distinction expresses this intuition in a considerably milder form than the 
bumper sticker. It treats the money a speaker uses to bring speech to an audience (the speaker’s 
own expenditures) like speech itself, and it treats writing a check to the speaker, not as 
nonspeech, but as low-value speech. The Court nevertheless agrees with its bumper-sticker 
critics that the First Amendment does not protect check writing as much as it protects full-
fledged speech. 
 251. For one thing, Mr. Hyde had more clout than his equally wealthy twin sister, a strong 
opponent of widget subsidies. Mr. Hyde’s sister had invested her wealth, not in a business 
corporation, but in art and precious metals. The law blocked her from contributing more than 
other individuals could contribute. 
 252. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 208 (1982) (recognizing the 
government’s interest in protecting “individuals who have paid money into a corporation or 
union for purposes other than the support of candidates from having that money used to support 
political candidates to whom they may be opposed”); FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 
(2003) (same). But see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010) (observing that the 
procedures of corporate democracy allow shareholders to protect their interests). Richard 
Briffault argues powerfully that political spending by corporations often advances the interests 
of managers rather than shareholders and that current law does not give shareholders an 
effective way to protect their interests. See Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the 
Corporate Contribution Ban 25–33 (July 25, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475908. 
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groups while ensuring individual compliance with contribution limits. If 
neither this mechanism nor an alternative seems workable, however, the 
bumper sticker’s bottom line begins to look good: corporate 
contributions and expenditures should be forbidden. If the answer must 
be either yes or no, it should be no.  
The reason the bumper sticker gets it partly right is again the 
opposite of the reason it gives. No principled objection to corporate 
electoral expenditures is persuasive. People should be allowed to 
contribute as much through unions and corporations as they can as 
individuals. But they should not be allowed to contribute more. 
Contributions and expenditures by corporations allow their shareholders 
to give when everyone else has been required to stop. Piercing the veil 
exposes the double counting. Mr. Hyde and the Jeckyll Corporation turn 
out to be the same person.253  
Neither the majority nor the dissenters in Citizens United mentioned 
the government interest in preventing the circumvention of individual 
contribution limits. The government’s briefs never asked the Court to 
consider this interest. Seven years before Citizens United, however, in 
FEC v. Beaumont,254 the Supreme Court relied in part on the anti-
circumvention interest when it upheld Congress’s prohibition of 
corporate campaign contributions.255 Although the Court spoke only of 
contributions and not expenditures, its analysis had implications for 
both:  
Quite aside from war-chest corruption and the interests of 
contributors and owners, . . . another reason for regulating 
corporate electoral involvement has emerged with 
restrictions on individual contributions, and recent cases 
have recognized that restricting contributions by various 
organizations hedges against their use as conduits for 
“circumvention of [valid] contribution limits.” To the 
degree that a corporation could contribute to political 
candidates, the individuals “who created it, who own it, or 
whom it employs,” could exceed the bounds on their own 
contributions by diverting money through the 
corporation.256 
                                                                                                                     
 253. Cf. L. FRANK BAUM, THE WONDERFUL WIZARD OF OZ 183 (1900) (“[T]hey saw, 
standing in just the spot the screen had hidden, a little old man, with a bald head and a wrinkled 
face, who seemed to be as much surprised as they were.”).  
 254. 539 U.S. 146 (2003). 
 255. See id. at 162–63.  
 256. Id. at 155 (second alteration in original) (internal citations omitted); see FEC v. Colo. 
Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001) (“[A]ll members of the Court 
agree that circumvention is a valid theory of corruption.”). 
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Citizens United should not be read as rejecting Beaumont’s analysis or 
as resolving an issue the Supreme Court did not discuss.  
c.  Other Regulations 
Just as corporate contributions and expenditures provide a way 
around contribution limits, they provide a way around other 
regulations—in particular, the BCRA’s disclosure requirements257 and 
its prohibition of contributions by foreign nationals.258  
Wealthy individuals responded to SpeechNow by forming shell 
corporations whose only purpose was to make multimillion dollar 
contributions to super PACs—contributions whose human sources these 
donors wished to conceal.259 And although federal law bars Kim Jong-
un, the Supreme Leader of North Korea, from contributing to Senator 
Claghorn’s reelection campaign, nothing blocks his investment in a 
corporation likely to use its funds to support the senator.260 If, like Mr. 
Hyde, the Supreme Leader owned 5% of the publically traded Jeckyll 
Corporation, he would effectively have contributed $50,000 to Senator 
Claghorn’s campaign.261 
Both the critics and the defenders of Citizens United again resemble 
the blind men describing the elephant. The critics fail to see the 
legitimate interests of the human beings behind the corporate veil while 
the defenders fail to see the ways in which the people behind this veil 
can use the corporate form to evade appropriate regulation. Once more, 
both sides have been wrong, and both have been right. 
                                                                                                                     
 257. See, e.g., 52 U.S.C.A. § 30104(b)(3) (West 2014). 
 258. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30121 (West 2014). 
 259. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. See generally Richard Briffault, 
Nonprofits and Disclosure in the Wake of Citizens United, 10 ELECTION L.J. 337 (2011).   
 260. Kim Jong-un could not himself participate in the “decision making process” that 
produced the corporation’s political expenditures. See 11 C.F.R. § 110.20(i) (2005). 
 261. Although Citizens United did not discuss using corporations to circumvent the 
BCRA’s base limits, it did note the possibility of circumventing the BCRA’s prohibition of 
contributions by foreign nationals:  
We need not reach the question whether the Government has a compelling 
interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from influencing our 
Nation’s political process. Section 441b is not limited to corporations or 
associations that were created in foreign countries or funded predominantly by 
foreign shareholders. Section 441b therefore would be overbroad even if we 
assumed, arguendo, that the Government has a compelling interest in limiting 
foreign influence over our political process. 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362 (2010) (internal citations omitted). The Court did not 
explain its apparent assumption that only corporations created in foreign countries or funded 
predominantly by foreign shareholders pose a risk of circumvention. If the Court would uphold 
§ 441b’s application to corporations funded in part by foreign shareholders, few if any 
publically traded corporations could make electoral expenditures. 
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V.  A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF 
CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REGULATIONS 
A.  John Hart Ely’s Variation on a Theme by O’Brien  
This Article has maintained that campaign contributions and 
expenditures combine valued speech and corrupting gifts in a single 
package. The Supreme Court’s leading decision on hybrids of protected 
speech and unprotected conduct is United States v. O’Brien,262 in which 
the Court upheld the convictions of war protestors for destroying their 
draft cards.263 It said: 
[W]hen “speech” and “nonspeech” elements are combined 
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important 
governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element 
can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms. . . . [A] government regulation is sufficiently 
justified if it is within the constitutional power of the 
Government; if it furthers an important or substantial 
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms 
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that 
interest.264 
As John Hart Ely observed, the distinction between speech and 
conduct does not fully capture what made O’Brien distinct from most 
other First Amendment cases.265 Arguments for limiting speech usually 
focus on the message a speaker delivers. They maintain that this 
message deceives, defames, persuades listeners to harm others, prompts 
violent retaliation, offends unwilling audiences, injures some audiences 
(particularly children), or generates long-range cultural harm.  
The First Amendment creates strong barriers to limiting speech 
because its message offends or injures. When the harm produced by 
speech does not proceed from its message, however, Ely maintained that 
a strong presumption against regulation is inappropriate.266 The 
important distinction is not between speech and conduct but between 
                                                                                                                     
 262. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  
 263. Id. at 385–86. 
 264. Id. at 376–77.  
 265. See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of 
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1491–
1502 (1975). Accord LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 829–30 (2d ed. 
1988); Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Metatheory of Free Speech, 10 SW. U. L. REV. 237, 242 
(1978). 
 266. See Ely, supra note 265, at 1488 n.26. 
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harms produced by a speaker’s message and harms that do not proceed 
from this message. The Supreme Court came closer to the mark when it 
spoke of a “governmental interest . . . unrelated to the suppression of 
free expression”267 than when it spoke of conduct that combines 
“speech” and “nonspeech” elements.268 The corrupting influence of 
campaign funds on a candidate does not depend on the message these 
funds send the public.269  
B.  Can Campaign Speeches Be Hybrids Too? 
As this Article has noted, conflicts of interest are ubiquitous. 
Conflicts can arise from any favor, including one that takes the form of 
verbal speech. A president’s campaign appearances with a candidate, for 
example, might create a stronger sense of indebtedness than a $50,000 
contribution to the candidate’s campaign.  
Although speeches endorsing a candidate can combine protected 
speech to the public with unprotected clout-seeking, endorsement 
speeches merit categorical protection.270 These speeches differ from 
campaign contributions and expenditures in several ways, and when 
balancing could not justify restriction, there is no reason to balance. 
First, forbidding an endorsement speech would require someone who 
favors a candidate to keep his thoughts secret and would deprive the 
public of important information.271 Campaign-finance regulation does 
not require anyone to conceal his thoughts or suppress relevant 
information. 
                                                                                                                     
 267. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.   
 268. Id. at 376.   
 269. Of course campaign contributions would have no value to a candidate if the messages 
they sent could not persuade a larger audience. That proposition would be true even of 
contributions given in return for explicit promises of favorable government action—
contributions that could lead to 15-year sentences for bribery. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2012); 
McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991). Hardly anyone would argue that the harm 
worked by a bribe given in the form of a campaign contribution proceeds from or has anything 
to do with the message to the public the bribe may be used to send. 
 270. The Supreme Court, however, has upheld a restriction of purely verbal political 
speech simply because this speech might prompt the sort of favoritism that campaign 
contributions generate. In United Public Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947), the 
Court upheld a provision of the Hatch Act that bars executive branch employees other than the 
President and other high-level officials from engaging in partisan political activity. Id. at 103. 
The challengers of this provision argued that the justifications offered for it did not extend to a 
federal employee who worked as a roller in the mint and neither interacted with the public nor 
determined policy. See id. at 101. The Court replied, “[I]f in free time he is engaged in political 
activity, Congress may have concluded that the activity may promote or retard his advancement 
or preferment with his superiors.” Id. 
 271. An endorsement speech supplies information about the speaker’s state of mind. Only 
the person who makes the endorsement can supply the information it provides. 
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Second, the only way to block the conflicts of interest created by 
endorsement speeches is to forbid them. The conflicts created by 
campaign contributions and expenditures can be controlled simply by 
limiting contributions and expenditures to reasonable amounts. 
Outlawing them altogether would be unconstitutional.  
Third, even on the implausible assumption that some conflicts of 
interest could justify forbidding endorsement speeches, no legislator or 
judge could be trusted to determine which speeches pose a sufficient 
danger. With campaign contributions and expenditures, no ad hoc 
evaluation is necessary. Lawgivers can use the metric provided by 
money to mark the point at which the likelihood of serious conflicts 
justifies limiting speech. They can draw a bright, workable line to 
separate the contributions and expenditures that merit protection from 
those that do not.  
Finally, the sense that gifts of money are more corrupting than other 
favors seems pervasive. This sentiment may inform both the bumper-
sticker declaration that money is not speech and the Supreme Court’s 
judgment that the First Amendment protects campaign contributions less 
than other speech.  
The law of bribery in fact distinguishes payments of cash (and of 
goods and services with ascertainable market value) from non-
monetizable personal and political favors. Offering cash to a legislator 
for his vote is bribery, and so is offering him free yard service for a year. 
But logrolling—offering to support a proposed bridge in exchange for a 
legislator’s support of widget subsidies—is not bribery. The statement, 
“I’ll contribute to your campaign if you agree to support widget 
subsidies,” is likely to send the speaker to prison.272 No one, however, 
has gone to prison for saying, “I’ll make public speeches on your behalf 
if you agree to support widget subsidies.”273  
C.  How Deeply Did Buckley Bury O’Brien? 
When the D.C. Circuit decided Buckley v. Valeo, it declared that 
O’Brien provided “the pertinent standard” for reviewing campaign-
                                                                                                                     
 272. See McCormick, 500 U.S. at 274. The supposed bribe that led to the imprisonment of 
Don Siegelman, a former governor of Alabama now serving a 6½-year prison term, consisted of 
a contribution to a group supporting a referendum he favored. Possibly pursuant to an 
understanding that preceded the contribution, the governor appointed the contributor to a state 
board. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1164–66 (11th Cir. 2011); Former 
Alabama Governor Going Back to Prison for Bribery, FOX NEWS (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/08/03/former-alabama-governor-going-back-to-prison-for-
bribery/.  
 273. Cf. United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1299, 1301–02 (10th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc) (holding that a prosecutor did not violate a federal bribery statute by offering leniency to a 
criminal defendant in return for his testimony against an alleged coconspirator). 
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finance regulations.274 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the D.C. 
Circuit and declared this standard inapplicable. 
The D.C. Circuit offered, and the Supreme Court considered, only 
one argument for applying O’Brien—“that the dependence of a 
communication on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce 
a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the 
First Amendment.”275 As the Supreme Court noted, this argument would 
have made O’Brien the relevant standard for judging a limitation of the 
funds that may be used to publish a newspaper. It would have afforded 
less protection to the spending needed to bring speech to an audience 
than to the speech itself.  
The Court failed to notice that campaign contributions and 
expenditures differ from the funds used to publish a newspaper. As this 
Article has observed more than a few times, these contributions and 
expenditures affect two audiences in two different ways, one of them 
beneficial and protected by the First Amendment and the other harmful 
and unprotected. Buckley should not be read as rejecting an argument the 
Court did not consider.   
I am not fond of the O’Brien standard. Just as some of the language 
of Citizens United might lead the Supreme Court to protect $10 million 
contributions,276 some of O’Brien’s language might allow legislatures to 
prohibit $200 contributions.277 When speech is combined with conduct 
(or, better, when it produces harms unrelated to the message it sends), 
an open, untilted balance would be better. Nevertheless, courts should 
                                                                                                                     
 274. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975), aff’d in part and rev’d in 
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).   
 275. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (per curiam). 
 276. See supra text accompanying notes 204–09. 
 277. The O’Brien standard has four parts. See 391 U.S. at 376–77.  
First, a regulation of speech–conduct must be “within the constitutional power of 
government.” Of course all legislation must be within the constitutional power of government. 
Whether a regulation falls within the limited powers granted the federal government is a 
different question from whether it violates the First Amendment. This portion of the test has no 
purpose except to sound grand. 
Second, the regulation must “further[] an important or substantial governmental interest.” 
Prohibiting a $200 campaign contribution does further a substantial governmental interest—the 
same interest that has led federal and state governments to prohibit $200 gratuities to public 
officials. 
Third, the government interest must be “unrelated to the suppression of free expression.” As 
argued in the text, it is. 
Fourth, the “incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms” must be “no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of [the government’s] interest.” The only way to 
eliminate conflicts of interest is to forbid conflicts of interest. 
Perhaps the O’Brien standard is flexible enough that a court could apply it differently. 
Especially as applied to campaign-finance regulation, however, this test seems insufficiently 
protective of expression.   
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recognize that large political contributions do combine speech with 
conduct or, in the better language proposed by John Hart Ely, that the 
harm these contributions produce is unrelated to the message they 
deliver.278  
O’Brien holds that acts combining “speech” and “nonspeech” 
elements are subject to restriction upon a showing of “an important or 
substantial governmental interest.”279 Under Buckley, the standard of 
justification for restricting campaign contributions is similar—a 
“sufficiently important interest.”280 Recognizing the relevance of 
O’Brien would be unlikely to affect the Supreme Court’s analysis of 
campaign contributions, but it might alter the Court’s analysis of 
independent electoral expenditures. 
This Article focuses on contributions. It proposes no restriction of 
independent expenditures. The remainder of this Article will consider 
only how best to apply the Supreme Court’s current standards.  
VI.  A PROPOSED SCHEME OF CAMPAIGN-FINANCE REGULATION 
This Part suggests a scheme for limiting political contributions that 
would comply with Citizens United and the Supreme Court’s other 
campaign-finance decisions. Although the prospect of enacting this 
scheme in the foreseeable future is no doubt miniscule,281 exploring its 
virtues, defects, and limitations may clarify a number of regulatory and 
constitutional issues. The proposed scheme would block the 
circumvention of contribution limits, but only by imposing burdensome 
accounting requirements. The challenges of implementing this scheme 
do not seem insuperable, but they might lead one to favor less precise 
and less speech-protective anti-circumvention measures, including the 
unqualified prohibition of electoral contributions and expenditures by 
unions, incorporated businesses, unincorporated businesses, churches, 
and other groups.  
  
                                                                                                                     
 278. As Buckley noted, one harm allegedly produced by large campaign contributions—the 
distortion of election results—may not be independent of the messages the contributions deliver. 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 17. With that possible harm set aside, however, the justification for limiting 
contributions does not focus on the messages they deliver.  
 279. See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376–77. 
 280. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.  
 281. Today’s polarized and largely immobilized Congress seems unwilling or unable to do 
much to improve America’s campaign-finance system. The Supreme Court’s campaign-finance 
decisions pose no obstacle, for example, to ending the ability of donors to conceal their 
identities by routing political contributions through § 501(c)(4) groups. See infra note 316. But 
Congress seems no more likely to block the evasion of the BCRA’s disclosure requirements 
than it does to abolish these requirements. The status quo seems both incoherent and frozen. 
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A.  Tracking Individual Contributions 
According to Buckley, a constitutional regime of campaign-finance 
regulation may not restrict independent expenditures by either 
individuals or groups. According to Citizens United, such a regime may 
not limit expenditures on the basis of corporate identity. According to 
McCutcheon, aggregate contribution limits are generally impermissible; 
an individual must be allowed to contribute the maximum amount to 
every candidate in every race.  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld limits on 
what an individual may contribute to particular candidates, and it has 
held that measures necessary to enforce these limits are valid as well. 
Justice Thomas would overrule these precedents, but, in McCutcheon, 
every other Justice proceeded on the assumption that base contribution 
limits and suitably tailored anti-circumvention measures remain valid.  
Campaign-finance regulations consistent with these principles would 
allow individuals and groups to make independent expenditures without 
restriction. These regulations, however, might limit the amount an 
individual could contribute to any entity in order to influence the 
outcome of a single election.282 Within this limit, the regulations might 
allow an individual to allocate his contributions as he liked among 
whatever groups he liked—campaign committees, party committees, 
PACs, super PACs, non-profit corporations, for-profit corporations, 
partnerships, unions, and even biker gangs and churches. 
An organization’s ability to accept contributions and make electoral 
expenditures would be subject to one limitation. It would be required to 
provide an accounting of which individuals had provided the funds it 
spent and how the funds each individual contributed had been allocated 
to particular races.  
An individual could authorize as many organizations as he liked to 
spend his funds, but he could not authorize them to spend more together 
to influence any race than the law allowed. His failure to limit the use of 
his funds to comply with contribution limits would be subject to 
sanction, and so would an organization’s failure to observe limits it had 
accepted on the use of a contributor’s funds. 
People whose total contributions would not exceed the limit for a 
single race (most people) would have no difficulty allocating their 
contributions among as many organizations as they liked. Their 
contributions could be unrestricted. Moreover, a wealthy donor who 
wished to contribute the maximum amount to, say, every Democratic 
candidate for federal office could do so, either by contributing this 
                                                                                                                     
 282. Unlike current election law, which limits the amount an individual may contribute to a 
group engaged in electioneering, the proposal would limit what an individual may contribute to 
influence the outcome of a particular election. 
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amount to every candidate himself or by making a large contribution to 
a party organization that would allocate his funds.283 
Other wealthy donors might make more elaborate arrangements. A 
donor, for example, might contribute the maximum amount to the 
candidates he most wished to support and then make an additional 
contribution to a party committee or other political group with 
instructions to use his funds to support any candidates other than those 
to whom he had already given. Or he might contribute to two political 
groups with instructions to each of them not to use his funds to give to 
any single candidate more than 50% of the maximum an individual 
might contribute. Conceivably he might instruct a group not to allocate 
any of his funds to a candidate without checking the public record of his 
contributions to be sure that this group’s allocation would not send his 
contributions beyond the limit when added to the allocations already 
made by other groups.284 A computer could flag unlawful allocations 
and contributions. 
Although the proposed scheme would not have been feasible prior to 
the computer era, it seems feasible today. Nevertheless, this scheme 
does pose administrative difficulties. The following Sections will 
discuss some of these difficulties as well as the need to exempt some 
communications and expenditures from the proposed regulations.  
B.  Tracking the Money Coming In 
Many organizations cannot trace expenditures from their general 
treasuries to particular funding sources. The ownership of a publically 
traded corporation, for example, changes day by day, and many of its 
shareholders are likely to be collective entities themselves. Moreover, if 
a publically traded corporation could determine which individuals 
owned it at the moment it made a particular electoral expenditure, it 
undoubtedly would find that some of these people had contributed the 
maximum amount to whatever candidate it supported.  
Should the managers of an organization like the Jeckyll Corporation 
be allowed to find shareholders who have not contributed to Senator 
Claghorn’s campaign and, with their permission, allocate the 
                                                                                                                     
 283. McCutcheon rejected the argument that a multi-million-dollar contribution to a party 
organization or other group supporting multiple candidates itself poses a danger of quid pro quo 
corruption. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014). The plurality called this 
argument a “new rationale” for aggregate limits and said that it “dangerously broadens the 
circumscribed definition of quid pro quo corruption articulated in our prior cases.” Id. at 1460. 
 284. The feasibility of this arrangement would depend on whether expenditures could be 
reported when they were made rather than at the conclusion of a reporting period. There is no 
apparent reason why a group making expenditures could not update the public record at the 
same time it updated its own. The public record then would provide a running tally of an 
individual’s contributions to particular candidates. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30104(a)(12)(A) (West 2014) 
(contemplating a computerized tally for contributions made directly to candidate committees).   
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corporation’s expenditure on the senator’s behalf to their allowances? 
The difficulty is that the corporation’s expenditure would not reduce 
these shareholders’ wealth by the amount of their supposed 
contribution. This expenditure would instead diminish the value of 
every share of the corporation—probably by a trivial amount.285 The 
corporation’s expenditure on Senator Claghorn’s behalf would proceed 
from all of its owners, many of whom might have reached their 
contribution limits.  
When the accounting required by the proposed scheme would 
disable an organization from making electoral expenditures from its 
general treasury, it could establish a separate political action committee 
to receive, spend, and account for individual contributions. An 
organization could pay the administrative expenses of its PAC and 
could control this PAC’s expenditures and contributions.  
Proposing the use of PACs may sound both familiar and 
unpromising. Citizens United held that the ability of corporations to 
establish PACs did not justify Congress’s prohibition of corporate 
speech. The Court noted that a PAC is distinct from its creator and 
added, “PACs are burdensome alternatives; they are expensive to 
administer and subject to extensive regulations.”286 The Court recited 
many of the regulations applicable to PACs without indicating what, if 
any, purpose they might serve.287  
The scheme proposed by this Article, however, differs from the one 
struck down in Citizens United. It would not prohibit speech on the 
basis of corporate identity. Any corporation that could comply with the 
scheme’s accounting requirements could make political expenditures 
from its treasury, and some business corporations (those that could in 
fact attribute expenditures to individual owners) might do so. In 
addition, most of the political organizations that tracked individual 
contributions undoubtedly would be organized as corporations. 
Moreover, the burdens imposed by this scheme’s accounting 
requirements would serve a clear and important purpose. They would 
provide a more straightforward anti-circumvention mechanism than the 
aggregate limits struck down in McCutcheon. These accounting 
requirements would, in fact, constitute the less restrictive alternative 
                                                                                                                     
 285. Of course, if Senator Claghorn were to win reelection and then vote for widget 
subsidies, the investment in his reelection might prove profitable—just as a contribution by an 
individual donor might prove profitable. The ultimate profitability or unprofitability of a 
contribution—whether the contribution ultimately turns out to be funded by us taxpayers—does 
not bear on who made it for purposes of election law. A contribution from the general treasury 
of a corporation should be seen as proceeding in proportional shares from each of the 
corporation’s human owners.  
 286. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010). 
 287. Id. at 337–39.  
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McCutcheon demanded. No more direct way of forbidding the 
circumvention of contribution limits can be imagined than forbidding 
the circumvention of contribution limits. A court could not strike down 
the proposed tracking requirements without abandoning the idea of 
enforceable contribution limits and without overruling decades of 
precedent.   
Although Citizens United permitted large corporations to make 
independent electoral expenditures from their general treasuries, they 
have shown no interest in doing so.288 The fact that this Article’s 
proposal would effectively require these corporations (along with 
churches and many other organizations that cannot trace expenditures to 
particular funding sources) to use separate PACs would not change 
much, but it might reassure Citizens United’s critics. 
The proposed scheme might reassure these critics in other ways as 
well. It would bring the demise of the alter-ego super PAC—a PAC 
formed simply to further a single candidacy. Such a PAC serves no 
purpose other than facilitating the evasion of contribution limits. Were 
these limits enforced, almost every donor would prefer to make his 
donation directly to a candidate. Similarly, the scheme would bring an 
end to the shadow-party super PAC (a PAC formed to further the 
interests of a particular party). Again almost everyone would prefer to 
make his contribution to the real thing.  
PACs furthering special interests like the Widget Rights Victory 
Fund would persist, but they would no longer enable a few wealthy 
people to pour millions of dollars into particular races. A special interest 
PAC could swamp its opposition in a particular race only if it received 
support from a large number of donors.  
While allaying the concerns of Citizens United’s critics, this 
proposal would satisfy all of the constitutional requirements articulated 
by the Supreme Court. Individuals would be allowed to make unlimited 
electoral expenditures,289 and group expenditures also would be 
unrestricted. As long as a group provided assurance that individual 
donors had adhered to their own limits, it could spend as much as it 
could collect. The proposal would not restrict speech on the basis of 
corporate identity, and it would not impose an aggregate limit on 
contributions. Anyone with sufficient wealth could contribute the 
maximum amount to every candidate.  
C.  Tracking the Money Going Out 
Under this proposal, a group that distributed an electoral 
communication urging voters to support multiple candidates in multiple 
                                                                                                                     
 288. See supra text accompanying note 147.  
 289. For a discussion of whether these expenditures would greatly reduce the value of the 
scheme, see infra Subsection VI.E.2.b. 
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races (“vote Republican” or “support these pro-widget candidates”) 
would be required to apportion the cost of producing and distributing 
this communication among the candidates. If the communication 
featured some candidates more prominently than others, the group 
might be required to apportion costs on the basis of the airtime or print 
space allocated to each.  
Apportioning a group’s general administrative expenses among the 
candidates it supported (and between the group’s electoral and 
nonelectoral activities) also might be necessary,290 but the effectiveness 
of the scheme would not be greatly diminished if these expenses were 
simply exempted from contribution limits and tracking requirements.  
D.  Exemptions 
The proposed regime of campaign-finance regulation would be 
unconstitutional without at least one exemption. Its restrictions should 
not apply to the funds used to produce and disseminate “any news story, 
commentary, or editorial distributed through the facilities of any 
broadcasting station, newspaper, magazine, or other periodical 
publication.”291 A newspaper publisher should be allowed to print an 
editorial endorsing a candidate without supplying an account of how 
much the publication cost and what each of the newspaper’s 
shareholders had contributed to this expenditure.  
The exemption of the institutional press from campaign-finance 
regulations would not rest on an interpretation of the First Amendment 
that afforded the press special privileges. It would rest instead on the 
factual differences between editorial endorsements and the electoral 
communications that warrant restriction.292  
                                                                                                                     
 290. The proration of general administrative expenses seems feasible. See Carey v. FEC, 
791 F. Supp. 2d 121, 136 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that a single group may operate as both a 
conventional PAC and a super PAC if it segregates the funds it uses for contributions to 
candidates from those it uses to place advertisements of its own and if it apportions 
administrative expenses between these two activities). 
 291. The suggested language comes from a statutory exemption to the regulations that 
Citizens United struck down. 52 U.S.C.A. § 30101(9)(B)(i) (West 2014). A publication owned 
or controlled by a political party, PAC, or candidate was not entitled to this exemption. Id. 
 292. Michael McConnell’s recent defense of the result in Citizens United consisted of two 
propositions: (1) The First Amendment affords a newspaper publisher the right to print an 
editorial endorsing a candidate; and (2) the First Amendment affords no greater right to the 
newspaper publisher than to the rest of us, including the plaintiff in Citizens United. McConnell, 
supra note 36, at 446. The Citizens United dissenters briefly questioned the second proposition. 
They wrote that when corporations “are part of the press,” they may be entitled to “special First 
Amendment status.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 431 n.57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The 
majority responded, “We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press 
has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.” Id. at 352 (quoting Austin v. 
Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 691 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
McConnell and the Citizens United majority had the better of this argument. The First 
Amendment affords all of us the right to speak and publish. It does not give the press special 
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Although electoral advocacy is what campaign committees and super 
PACs do, it is a small part of what most regularly published newspapers 
and television stations do. Because electoral advocacy is central to the 
mission of campaign committees and super PACs, wealthy people 
contribute to these organizations in the hope of gaining influence over 
elected officials. Wealthy people may sometimes buy newspapers or 
television stations to further their political agendas, but they rarely do so 
in order to gain clout by benefiting specific officials.  
Moreover, newspaper endorsements generally evaluate a candidate’s 
positions on many issues. They usually are unaccompanied by an 
indication of a personal or organizational interest they hope the favored 
candidate will support. A newspaper publisher is unlikely to follow an 
editorial endorsement with a request for a meeting so that it can urge the 
candidate it endorsed to take an action it favors. The publisher is also 
unlikely to hire a lobbyist. A newspaper’s endorsement differs greatly in 
both purpose and effect from the advertisements placed by campaign 
committees and super PACs. 
Feature films, books, and monographs (defined, perhaps, as written 
communications of more than 10,000 words or spoken and film 
communications of longer than one hour) also might be exempted from 
campaign-finance regulations. During the initial argument of Citizens 
United, a Deputy Solicitor General responded to questions from the 
bench by saying that a corporation could be prohibited from publishing 
a book if the book’s last sentence endorsed a candidate.293 This answer 
did not advance his cause.294  
Even without an exemption for books, films, and monographs, the 
regulatory scheme proposed in this Article would not prohibit anyone 
from publishing anything. It would merely limit how much an 
individual could contribute to a group for the purpose of publishing 
books and other things that qualified as electoral communications.  
There would be almost as little reason, however, to restrict the 
financing of books, feature films, and monographs as there is to restrict 
the publication of newspapers. The suggested scheme would remain 
effective if it reached only more familiar sorts of campaign 
                                                                                                                     
privileges. See Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938) (“The liberty of the press is 
not confined to newspapers and periodicals. . . . [It] comprehends every sort of publication 
which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.”); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the 
press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will 
as well as utter it.”).  
All speech, however, is subject to restriction when it poses a sufficient danger of corrupting 
public officials. Large contributions to candidates and super PACs pose a sufficient danger; 
newspaper editorials do not. 
 293. Toobin, supra note 99. 
 294. See id. (describing counsel’s argument as “an epic disaster”).   
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communications—broadcast and print advertisements, billboards and 
other signs, direct mailings, and pamphlets or recordings distributed on 
the street or door-to-door. Books, films, and monographs ordinarily are 
distributed to purchasers or others who have indicated an interest in 
receiving their messages. Because effective electioneering requires 
reaching less involved audiences, political campaigns rely almost 
entirely on other media.295  
E.  Independent Expenditures 
Daniel Ortiz has observed that the “distinction between contributions 
and independent expenditures [is the] most troubling [and most] often 
criticized” aspect of the Supreme Court’s campaign-finance 
jurisprudence.296 Michael McConnell has commented that this 
distinction “pleases no one.”297 Six Justices of the Supreme Court would 
in fact abandon the distinction. The distinction persists only because 
three of these Justices would abolish it by increasing the protections 
afforded contributions while three would abolish it by reducing the 
protections afforded expenditures.298  
Although the Supreme Court’s arguments for distinguishing 
contributions from expenditures may not convince many,299 the 
distinction expresses the common intuition that writing a check is less 
worthy of protection than actually speaking.300 It also highlights in a 
rough way where serious conflicts of interest are likely to arise. It is the 
check-writers, not the speakers or the spenders, who may have given 
America its intricate tax code, its sugar subsidies, its armaments 
approved by Congress despite opposition by the Pentagon, and a public 
health care system shaped to accommodate the interests of 
pharmaceutical and insurance companies as well as the public.301  
                                                                                                                     
 295. Other exemptions from the scheme might be designed to reduce its administrative 
burdens. For example, a group whose treasury included individual membership dues of no more 
than, say, $75 per year should not be required to include these dues in its account of individual 
contributions.  
 296. Daniel R. Ortiz, From Rights to Arrangements, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1217, 1223 
(1999).  
 297. McConnell, supra note 36, at 451.  
 298. McConnell makes this point. He cites Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 
409–10 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 410 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., dissenting); and Am. 
Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491–92 (2012) (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, & 
Kagan, JJ., dissenting). See McConnell, supra note 36, at 456 & nn. 184 & 185.   
 299. See infra Subsection VI.E.1 (reviewing these arguments and noting that all but one of 
them apply to super PAC contributions in the same way they apply to contributions to a 
candidate’s own campaign organization).  
 300. See supra Subsection IV.A.1. 
 301. The political operatives who collect and spend donated funds rarely seek more for 
themselves than new political jobs.  
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This Section will consider how to draw the line between 
contributions and expenditures. It then will consider whether 
independent expenditures would seriously diminish the effectiveness of 
the proposed regulatory scheme.  
1.  Drawing the Line 
The distinction between contributions and expenditures rests on the 
premise that financing speech differs from speaking. The financing may 
be restricted even when the speech may not. When Person A writes a 
check and Person B determines what speech the check will finance, 
Person A’s activity may be limited, but Person B’s may not. As the 
plurality opinion observed in California Medical Association v. FEC,302 
“‘[S]peech by proxy’ . . . is not the sort of political advocacy that this 
Court in Buckley found entitled to full First Amendment protection.”303 
The Supreme Court has not indicated how much separation between 
financier and speaker is necessary before the financier’s activity may be 
restricted. Under Buckley’s analysis, a wealthy person’s purchase of 
space in a newspaper to publish his own list of reasons for supporting a 
candidate would be a paradigmatic independent expenditure and would 
be fully protected by the First Amendment.304 Moreover, his expenditure 
would remain independent and protected if other people joined him in 
composing the list and buying the space. Something more than writing a 
check to a group is required, however, and the “something more” 
probably cannot be merely symbolic (something like filling out a 
questionnaire that super PAC managers might or might not take into 
account). When “the transformation of contributions into political debate 
involves speech by someone other than the contributor,” Buckley 
indicates the contributions may be limited.305  
Assessing the degree of separation between speaker and financier on 
a highly fact-specific basis would be impractical. A wealthy person 
might pay a veteran campaign operative to write and place 
advertisements supporting a candidate and might give this person funds 
to spend as he chose. If the financier did not supervise the work of this 
operative at all, he would look like a contributor rather than a speaker. 
He would have funded “speech by someone other than” himself. If, 
however, the campaign veteran served only as an advisor to the wealthy 
person, the wealthy person’s expenditures would remain independent. 
Drawing the line between contribution and expenditure by determining 
which person was the “real” speaker does not seem feasible. 
A more workable system would resolve the separation issue formally. 
                                                                                                                     
 302. 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (plurality opinion). 
 303. Id. at 196.  
 304. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam). 
 305. See id.  
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Under this regime, any use of a person or legal entity other than the 
financier himself to make an expenditure would put his spending in the 
“contribution” rather than the “expenditure” category. If the financier 
ultimately made the expenditures himself, he could hire as many people 
as he liked to help him prepare and disseminate his messages. The 
financier, however, would be required to take public responsibility for 
these messages: “I’m Pierpont Mogul, and I approved this message.”306  
2.  How Big Is the Loophole? 
a.  Groups 
If the amount individuals could contribute to organizations to 
influence the outcome of particular elections were effectively limited, 
capping expenditures by the organizations themselves would serve no 
important purpose. Even if it did not accept any contributions at all, the 
National Widget Association or its PAC could advise members to 
include reminders of their association membership when they sent their 
individual checks to candidates. It also could advise them where their 
contributions would be most likely to advance the cause of widget 
rights. Regulations forbidding the Association to accept, bundle, and 
spend its members’ contributions would merely make members who 
sought to coordinate their contributions less efficient in doing so.  
Limiting the Widget Association’s expenditures, moreover, would 
not notably impede its members’ ability to coordinate their contributions. 
It simply would lead to the formation of a second PAC to receive and 
spend the contributions the first PAC could not spend. Little would be 
gained by mandating the formation of two groups, the National Widget 
Association Political Action Committee and the Widget Rights Victory 
Fund.  
b.  Individuals 
Dissenting in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee307 eight years after Buckley, Justice Marshall confessed that 
he had erred in Buckley when he endorsed the distinction between 
contributions and expenditures. He wrote: 
It does not take great imagination . . . to see that, when the 
possibility for direct financial assistance is severely limited, 
as it is in light of Buckley’s decision to uphold the 
                                                                                                                     
 306. See id. at 68 (upholding disclosure requirements); Citizens United v. FEC, 358 U.S. 
310, 366–77 (2010) (same). Nothing would prevent a financier from acting jointly with others, 
but each of the joint actors would be required to take responsibility as an individual for the 
group’s message. If these actors were to form a distinct legal entity to make their expenditures, 
they would all become contributors, and their contributions would be subject to reasonable 
limitations.  
 307. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).  
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contribution limitation, . . . an individual [seeking favor] 
will find other ways to financially benefit the candidate’s 
campaign. It simply belies reality to say that a campaign 
will not reward massive financial assistance provided in the 
only way that is legally available.308  
The Supreme Court later observed in McConnell v. FEC, “Money, like 
water, will always find an outlet.”309 
Experience, however, has not validated the hydraulic hypothesis.310 
Justice Marshall provided no illustrations of clout-seeking individuals 
who had made “massive” individual expenditures to evade contribution 
limits, and illustrations are almost as rare today.311  
Two other ways around contribution limits, both predating Citizens 
United, might have made independent expenditures by individuals 
unnecessary. Unlike independent expenditures, donations to 527 and 
501(c)(4) groups demanded no more of a favor seeker than that he write 
a check.312 A check to one of these groups, however, was likely to be 
less effective than a check to an official campaign committee in 
producing clout.313 Before Citizens United, money given to either sort of 
group could not be used to advocate a candidate’s election directly.314 
The group was required to cast its advocacy as commentary on a 
political issue,315 and half of the money given to a 501(c)(4) group could 
                                                                                                                     
 308. Id. at 519 (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 309. 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).  
 310. But see Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign 
Finance Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1708 (1999) (“First, we think political money, like 
water, has to go somewhere. It never really disappears into thin air. Second, we think political 
money, like water, is part of a broader ecosystem.”). 
 311. Don Blankenship, the chairman and chief executive officer of the Massey Coal 
Company, did spend $500,000 from his own pocket to influence the outcome of a West Virginia 
judicial election, but he donated five times more—$2.5 million—to a PAC to influence the same 
election. See Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009); infra text 
accompanying notes 400–404. I am unaware of anyone other than Blankenship who has made a 
$500,000 independent expenditure to support a candidacy other than his own, and a candidate 
who uses his own wealth to advance his campaign does not corrupt himself. See Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 54 (1976) (per curiam) (striking down a statutory limit on independent 
expenditures by candidates).  
 312. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 527, 501(c)(4) (2012).  
 313. It was also likely to be less effective in persuading the public. 
 314. See, e.g., Cory G. Kalanick, Note, Blowing Up the Pipes: The Use of (c)(4) to 
Dismantle Campaign Finance Reform, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2254, 2263–64 (2011).   
 315. During John Kerry’s 2004 presidential campaign, Swift Boat Veterans for Truth 
registered as a 527 group. The FEC later concluded, however, that it did not qualify and had 
violated election laws by failing to observe contribution limits. See Press Release, Federal 
Election Commission, FEC Collects $630,000 in Civil Penalties from Three 527 Organizations 
(Dec. 16, 2006), available at http://www.fec.gov/press/press2006/20061213murs.html. Today, 
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not be used even for issue advertisements if they were intended to 
influence an election.316 
Citizens United and SpeechNow cast aside the limitations of earlier 
work-arounds. These decisions together created a new way of evading 
contribution limits that did not differ much from blowing up the limits 
altogether. And after SpeechNow came the deluge.  
The enormous increase in large individual contributions that followed 
SpeechNow revealed that campaign-finance law makes a difference.317 
The amount of political money devoted to influence buying is not fixed. 
Some loopholes are larger than others. Before Citizens United and 
SpeechNow, some cynics pointed to leakage and called the dam useless. 
They were proven to have exaggerated when SpeechNow demolished the 
dam.  
Independent expenditures are a particularly unlikely and unattractive 
work-around. Even someone willing to write a $10 million check to a 
super PAC probably would balk when invited to support a campaign by 
using the same funds to hire and manage a satellite campaign staff of his 
own and by taking personal responsibility for the messages it sent. If 
(remarkably) this financier did agree to make independent personal 
expenditures on behalf of a candidate, one of the dubious things Buckley 
said about these expenditures might become true: “Unlike 
contributions, . . . independent expenditures may well provide little 
assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove 
counterproductive.”318 Although independent expenditures provide a 
                                                                                                                     
following Citizens United and SpeechNow, there are no limits. A group like Swift Boat Veterans 
for Truth would have no reason to mask its electoral purpose even slightly. 
 316. Section 501(c)(4) or “dark money” groups are tax-exempt organizations whose 
earnings are devoted to charitable, educational, or recreational purposes. See 26 U.S.C. 
§ 501(c)(4) (2012). The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that these groups “may intervene in 
political campaigns as long as [their] primary activity is the promotion of social welfare.” IRM 
7.25.4.7 (Feb. 8, 1999). Like the super PACs that devote all of their efforts and funds to 
campaigning, 501(c)(4) groups may operate as “independent expenditure groups.” See ERIKA K. 
LUNDER & L. PAIGE WHITAKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL7-500, 501(C)(4)S AND CAMPAIGN 
ACTIVITY: ANALYSIS UNDER TAX AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 12–13 (2013), available at 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40183.pdf. When they do, SpeechNow allows them to collect and 
spend unlimited amounts supporting and opposing candidates. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 
F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). Unlike PACs and 527 groups, 501(c)(4) groups need 
not report publically the identity of their contributors. See James A. Kahl, Citizens United, 
Super PACs, and Corporate Spending on Political Campaigns: How Did We Get Here and 
Where Are We Going?, FED. LAW., June 2012, at 40, 44; Outside Spending: Frequently Asked 
Questions About 501(c)(4) Groups, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/
outsidespending/faq.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 317. See supra Part III. 
 318. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976) (per curiam). Living rooms in battleground 
states might resound with the voices of Sheldon Adelson, Charles and David Koch (in unison), 
and George Soros noting their approval of political advertisements. 
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path around individual contribution limits, few contributors would be 
likely to take it.  
VII.  CONCEPTS OF CORRUPTION319 
A.  Two-Part Typologies 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court noted that Buckley v. Valeo 
had treated only one interest as “sufficiently important” to justify a 
restriction of campaign contributions—“the prevention of corruption 
and the appearance of corruption.”320 The Court added, “When Buckley 
identified a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to 
quid pro quo corruption.”321  
The Court explained what quid pro quo corruption is not:  
“Ingratiation and access . . . are not corruption,”322 and “[t]he fact that 
speakers may have influence over or access to elected officials does not 
mean that these officials are corrupt.”323 The Court also offered a 
positive definition: “The practices Buckley noted would be covered by 
bribery laws if a quid pro quo arrangement were proved.”324 This 
statement indicated that quid pro quo corruption meant bribery and 
nothing else.  
Corruption in its classic sense describes something that has become 
impure or perverted. When people speak of corrupted computer files 
and corrupted chemical solutions, for example, they do not mean that 
the computer files and chemical solutions take bribes. 
Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers spoke of corrupted 
government in a similar way. Corruption meant departure from an 
imagined state of perfection. Corruption was a matter of degree, and 
                                                                                                                     
 319. The Supreme Court allows limitations of speech in order to reduce either corruption or 
the appearance of corruption, and the word “appearance” has myriad meanings. See Adam M. 
Samaha, Regulation for the Sake of Appearance, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1563, 1573 (2012). 
Presumably the appearance of corruption is not “anything that smells a bit like corruption”; it is 
instead “something that is believed or suspected to be corruption.” Moreover, the corruption that 
is suspected must be of the kind that justifies regulation, and an unreasonable belief or suspicion 
in the existence of this corruption probably cannot justify limiting speech. The appropriate 
remedy for an unfounded belief is usually “more speech.” Thus the “appearance of corruption” 
probably means “something that is reasonably believed or suspected to be corruption of the sort 
that justifies regulation” or “something that might in fact be corruption of the sort that justifies 
regulation.” 
 320. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 345 (2010) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 321. Id. at 359.  
 322. Id. at 360. 
 323. Id. at 359. 
 324. Id. at 356 (citation to 18 U.S.C. § 201, a federal bribery statute, omitted).  
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every real-world government was to some degree corrupt.325 Aristotle 
described the most common type of corruption: “The true forms of 
government . . . are those in which the one, or the few, or the many, 
govern with a view to the common interest; but governments which rule 
with a view to the private interest . . . are perversions.”326 On the 
assumption that a public official’s duty is to advance the public good,327 
everything that diverts him from serving the public—every conflict of 
interest—corrupts.  
As Zephyr Teachout has shown, the Framers of the Constitution 
often used the word “corruption” in its classic sense.328 They regarded 
limiting the corruption that arises from the private interests of both 
elected officials and the voters who choose them as one of their central 
missions.329  
Today’s dictionaries, however, do not place the classic definition 
first on their list. Their first definition of “corrupt” usually is: “guilty of 
dishonest practices, as bribery; without integrity, crooked: a corrupt 
judge.”330 
Scholars like Zephyr Teachout and Lawrence Lessig have regarded 
the Supreme Court’s distinction between quid pro quo corruption and 
                                                                                                                     
 325. Richard Mulgan nicely develops this point in Richard Mulgan, Aristotle on Legality 
and Corruption, in CORRUPTION 25, 31 (Manuhuia Barcham, Barry Hindess & Peter Lamour, 
eds., 2012).  
 326. ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS 114 (Benjamin Jowett, trans. 1920).  
 327. Sadly, some political theorists dismiss Aristotle’s concept of the public good. They 
not only embrace pluralism as a description of how American politics operates but also 
romanticize group greed. An influential early work encouraging this perspective is ARTHUR F. 
BENTLEY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (1908).   
 328. See Teachout, supra note 209, at 347.  
 329. Id. The Constitution structured the federal government to minimize the temptation and 
ability of officials to subvert the public good. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 345 (James 
Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (declaring that “the genius of the whole system” would 
limit “legal discriminations in favor of . . . a particular class of the society”); 4 THE DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 302 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1901) (remarks of Charles Pinckney) 
(“[C]orruption was more effectually guarded against, in the manner this government was 
constituted, than in any other that had ever been formed.”).  
In addition, the Constitution forbade a few specific conflicts of interest. It barred the 
appointment of present and former members of Congress to offices that had been created or 
whose compensation had been increased while they were in office, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 6, cl. 2, 
and it prohibited office holders from accepting gifts or titles “of any kind whatever” from kings, 
princes, and foreign governments without the consent of Congress. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8. 
The foreign emoluments clause has no exception for campaign contributions. 
 330. THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 302 (rev. ed. 1975); see also OXFORD 
DICTIONARIES ONLINE (U.S. ENGLISH), http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/american_
english/corrupt (defining corrupt as “having or showing a willingness to act dishonestly in 
return for money or personal gain”); LESSIG, supra note 80, at 226 (“The ordinary meaning of 
corruption—at least when we’re speaking of government officials, or public institutions—is 
clear enough. Corruption means bribery.”). 
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all other corruption as matching roughly the distinction between 
dishonest-conduct corruption and classic corruption.331 Further 
disaggregation, however, might be instructive. Quid pro quo corruption 
is less than classic corruption, but, despite a sentence in Citizens United 
that appears to say the contrary, it might encompass more than bribery.  
B.  Understanding Quid Pro Quo Corruption 
1.  A Four-Part Typology 
Consider four types of behavior that proponents of campaign-finance 
regulation might call corrupt: (1) the explicit exchange of favorable 
governmental action for campaign contributions (explicit agreement); 
(2) the implicit understanding that favorable action will follow 
contributions (implicit agreement); (3) the conscious taking of favorable 
action in response to contributions without any prior agreement or 
understanding (conscious favoritism); and (4) affording gratitude and 
access to contributors without consciously favoring them in making 
more substantial decisions (preferential access). 
Citizens United’s concept of quid pro quo corruption unmistakably 
includes explicit agreement and almost certainly includes implicit 
agreement as well. It unmistakably excludes preferential access. 
Whether it includes conscious favoritism, however, is problematic. 
Although the Court’s signals were conflicting, this Article argues that 
the Court’s concept of quid pro quo corruption should be understood to 
encompass this favoritism. A public official who deliberately provides a 
governmental benefit because he has received a private benefit should 
be seen as returning “this for that” (or quid pro quo) despite the absence 
of an earlier agreement to do so. Whether or not the payoff was 
arranged in advance, the deliberate use of public dollars to repay private 
favors is a kind of corruption that Congress may address through 
reasonable campaign-finance regulation.  
                                                                                                                     
 331. Lessig distinguishes dishonest-conduct corruption from what he calls “dependence 
corruption.” LESSIG, supra note 80, at 17. “Dependence corruption” looks a lot like classic 
corruption, but it may not encompass everything that diverts public officials from advancing the 
public good. It may refer only to substantial conflicts of interest that create long-term 
dependencies. Lessig argues that the Framers of the Constitution intended elected officials to be 
dependent only on the people. Id. at 231. Today, he says, candidates must survive a money 
primary, and they have become dependent on a narrow class of wealthy donors as well. Id. at 
244–45; see also Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to 
Mean, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1, 11 (2013); Teachout, supra note 209, at 388; Lawrence Lessig, 
“Corruption,” Originally, TUMBLR, http://ocorruption.tumblr.com (last visited Feb. 3, 2015) 
(“A blog collecting every use of the term ‘corruption’ among the records of the Framers. 
Submitted to the Supreme Court as an appendix to an amicus brief by Lawrence Lessig for the 
Constitutional Accountability Center.”).   
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2.  Preferential Access 
Selling access is not good government. Aristotle and the framers of 
the Constitution would not have balked at calling it corrupt. As 
Representative Romano Mazzoli observed, “Access is power. Access is 
clout.”332 Campaign contributors do not seek access simply because 
they enjoy chatting. They seek it because it produces outcomes they 
like. Officials cannot be persuaded by arguments they do not hear. 
Moreover, it is difficult for officials to refuse the requests of people who 
have placed them in office. Officials may strive earnestly to benefit the 
public, but unconscious favoritism is still favoritism. 
Affording special access to contributors is nevertheless a routine and 
acknowledged feature of American politics. Barack Obama wrote of the 
“people of means” he met at Democratic fundraisers, “As a rule, they 
were smart, interesting people . . . expecting nothing more than a 
hearing of their opinions in exchange for their checks.”333 An email sent 
by the Mitt Romney presidential campaign declared: 
The campaign is asking people who are able to make a 
$50,000 contribution to do so today and become a 
“Founding Member” of Romney Victory. These donors 
will be invited to a special retreat with Governor Romney 
in late June in California and will have preferred status at 
the first Presidential Inaugural retreat as well as yet to be 
determined access at the Republican National Convention 
in Tampa in August.334 
                                                                                                                     
 332. What Do Elected Officials Think About the Role of Money in Politics?, DEMOCRACY 
MATTERS, http://www.democracymatters.org/what-you-need-to-know-about-money-in-politics-2/ove 
rview/what-do-elected-officials-think-about-the-role-of-money-in-politics/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 333. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 113–14 (2006). 
 334. Jonathon M. Seidl, Report: Romney Already Selling Access to “Inaugural Retreat” 
for $50K, YAHOO! NEWS (Apr. 16, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/report-romney-
already-selling-access-inaugural-retreat-50k-154017057.html (reprinting the email in full); see 
also DEMOCRACY MATTERS, supra note 332 (reciting public acknowledgements by Members of 
Congress that they afford special access to contributors). 
In United States v. Carpenter, 961 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1992), the Ninth Circuit rejected the 
government’s claim that a state legislator violated the Hobbs Act by affording access in 
exchange for campaign contributions. It wrote: 
[T]here are several times as many lobbyists in Sacramento as there are state 
legislators. Elected officials must ration their time among those who seek 
access to them and they commonly consider campaign contributions when 
deciding how to ration their time. This practice “has long been thought to be 
well within the law [and] in a very real sense is unavoidable.” Accordingly, we 
hold that granting or denying access to lobbyists based on levels of campaign 
contributions is not an “official act” . . . and cannot, by itself, form the basis for 
a charge of extortion or attempted extortion under the Hobbs Act. 
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One need not applaud affording special access to contributors to 
conclude that this practice is now ingrained and that the interest in 
preventing it cannot justify any limitation of political contributions and 
expenditures. Citizens United’s position on the least troubling of the 
four types of corruption was clear and plausible. As the McCutcheon 
plurality reiterated, “[G]overnment regulation may not target the general 
gratitude a candidate may feel toward those who support him or his 
allies, or the political access such support may afford.”335 
3.  Explicit and Implicit Agreement 
An implicit understanding or agreement to trade campaign cash for 
government benefits does not constitute criminal bribery. The Supreme 
Court held in McCormick v. United States336 that, unlike other 
payments, campaign contributions may be treated as bribes only when 
“the payments are made in return for an explicit promise or undertaking 
by the official to perform or not to perform an official act.”337 Although 
the Eleventh Circuit has concluded (dubiously) that a later Supreme 
Court decision modified McCormick,338 at least six other courts of 
appeals insist that an explicit agreement remains necessary.339 If 
Citizens United’s statement that quid pro quo corruption means criminal 
bribery were to be taken literally, an implicit understanding that 
government favors would follow a campaign contribution would be 
insufficient.  
The majority opinion in Citizens United, however, included several 
statements that probably should not be read literally, and the declaration 
that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws if 
a quid pro quo arrangement were proved”340 is one of them.  
Justice Kennedy, the author of the Citizens United opinion, would in 
fact abandon McCormick as a measure of criminal bribery. In a 
concurring opinion one year after McCormick, he wrote that a public 
official and his benefactor “need not state the quid pro quo in express 
                                                                                                                     
Id. at 827 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McCormick v. United 
States, 500 U.S. 257, 272 (1991)).   
 335. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 336. 500 U.S. 257 (1991). 
 337. Id. at 273.  
 338. See United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1171 (11th Cir. 2011) (discussing 
Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 258 (1992)). 
 339. See United States v. Turner, 684 F.3d 244, 253–54, 258 (1st Cir. 2012); United States 
v. Abbey, 560 F.3d 513, 516–17 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Kincaid–Chauncey, 556 F.3d 
923, 936–37 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 142–43 (2d Cir. 2007); 
United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245, 256–57 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Giles, 246 F.3d 
966, 971–72 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 340. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010) (citation omitted). 
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terms, for otherwise the law’s effect could be frustrated by knowing 
winks and nods.”341 It seems unlikely that Citizens United meant to 
exclude from the category of quid pro quo corruption conduct that 
Justice Kennedy himself would treat as felonious.  
Moreover, the reasons for applying a special standard of bribery to 
campaign contributions do not apply to campaign-finance regulations. 
Whenever an elected official adheres to the positions that prompted 
voters and contributors to support him, he exhibits a pattern of 
favoritism for these supporters. This pattern may bespeak conviction, 
not corruption. Ambitious prosecutors and cynical jurors, however, can 
easily infer a corrupt agreement from the common pattern. When an 
official has supported widget subsidies after accepting large 
contributions from widget manufacturers, for example, prosecutors and 
jurors may infer that there must have been an implicit understanding. 
Allowing inferences of this sort whenever officials have acted to benefit 
contributors could make public life intolerable.342 As Justice Kennedy’s 
reference to winks and nods suggests, it grates that McCormick places a 
premium on indirection, but the alternative probably would be worse.  
When legislatures address the risk of corruption by enacting specific 
ex ante regulations rather than by inviting jurors to draw ex post 
inferences of unspoken agreement, the concerns that justify McCormick 
disappear. In the context of ex ante regulation, it is difficult to fathom 
any reason for excluding wink-and-nod agreements from the concept of 
quid pro quo corruption, and the Supreme Court probably did not mean 
to exclude them.  
4.  Conscious Favoritism 
Did the Court mean to exclude conscious favoritism? Again, the 
statement that quid pro quo corruption means bribery suggests that it 
did. Conscious favoritism does not constitute bribery even when the 
alleged bribe consists of something other than a campaign contribution. 
Bribery requires at least an implicit agreement at the time the alleged 
bribe is received.343  
                                                                                                                     
 341. Evans, 504 U.S. at 274 (Kennedy, J., concurring).   
 342. See Albert W. Alschuler, Criminal Corruption: Why Broad Definitions of Bribery 
Make Things Worse 20–21 (Chi. Pub. L. & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 502, 2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2555912 (suggesting that, 
absent McCormick’s narrow construction of federal bribery statutes, a prosecutor could convict 
Aristotle himself of violating these statutes if the incorruptible ancient philosopher were 
resurrected and elected Governor of New Jersey); Brief of Amici Curiae of Former Attorneys 
General in Support of Petitioner at 4–5, Siegelman v. United States, 561 U.S. 1040 (2010) (“The 
Eleventh Circuit’s implicit quid pro quo standard exposes every government official who acts to 
the benefit of a contributor, knowing that the contributor desired such an act to take place, to 
criminal prosecution.”).  
 343. See, e.g., Evans, 504 U.S. at 268 (“[T]he offense is completed at the time when the 
public official receives a payment in return for his agreement to perform specific official acts.”). 
74
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 463 
 
The Court reinforced the sense that conscious favoritism was “out” 
when it wrote, “[F]ew if any contributions to candidates will involve 
quid pro quo arrangements.”344 Favoritism, unlike bribery, requires no 
“arrangement” and does not appear to be rare.345 The Court also spoke 
directly of favoritism, declaring that “[f]avoritism and influence are 
not . . . avoidable in representative politics” and that a “generic 
favoritism or influence theory . . . is at odds with standard First 
Amendment analyses because it is unbounded and susceptible to no 
limiting principle.”346 These statements all indicated that deliberate 
favoritism for donors did not constitute the kind of corruption that could 
justify limiting campaign contributions and expenditures.  
Citizens United might have pointed in the other direction when it 
said, “If elected officials succumb to improper influences from 
independent expenditures; if they surrender their best judgment; and if 
they put expediency before principle, then surely there is cause for 
concern.”347 The import of this statement, however, was unclear. Did it 
indicate that reducing improper influence was an appropriate goal of 
campaign-finance regulation? Or did the Court merely say, “Be 
concerned about improper influence, but don’t imagine that you can do 
anything about it. The First Amendment as we understand it declares 
every cure for the favoritism produced by political contributions and 
expenditures worse than the disease”?348 After the Court acknowledged 
that concern was appropriate, it said, “The remedies enacted by law . . . 
must comply with the First Amendment; and, it is our law and our 
tradition that more speech, not less is the governing rule. An outright 
ban on corporate political speech during the critical preelection period is 
not a permissible remedy.”349 
If conscious favoritism is “out,” then not only bans of corporate 
speech but also all other remedies that limit contributions and 
                                                                                                                     
Bribery also includes what might be called attempted agreements—solicitations by a single 
party and transactions in which one party merely feigns agreement. Favoritism, however, is 
insufficient. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).   
 344. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357.   
 345. See infra apps. B–E.  
 346. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 296, 297 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 347. Id. at 361. 
 348. Or perhaps: “Don’t imagine that you can do anything about it except elect saints to 
office.” 
 349. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361. Note the Court’s failure to recognize the difference 
between the two sorts of persuasion emphasized by this Article. “More speech” is not a 
plausible remedy for the favoritism that political contributions and expenditures produce, for 
this harm is not produced by speech. In the absence of a governmental corrective, the only 
plausible remedy for the purchase of favoritism with cash is more cash.  
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expenditures are impermissible. The Court’s view is that only the 
actuality or appearance of quid pro quo corruption can justify any 
limitation of speech.350 Citizens United might have disabled Congress 
from addressing the favoritism generated by contributions and 
expenditures in the only appropriate way—through specific ex ante 
regulation. 
Definitions of bribery exclude conscious favoritism, not because the 
practice is legitimate, but because turning fifteen-year prison sentences 
on ex post assessments of motive would be frightening. Inferring 
favoritism is even easier than inferring unexpressed agreement. If an 
official were subject to lengthy imprisonment whenever a jury could be 
persuaded that he had acted deliberately to benefit a campaign 
contributor or other benefactor rather than the public, only a fool would 
take the job.  
But the judgment that favoritism should not be regulated through ex 
post judgments of motive does not imply that it should not be regulated 
at all. When ex ante campaign-finance regulation is forbidden, 
legislators, prosecutors, and lower federal courts may press for the 
expansion of less satisfactory criminal remedies. For example, they may 
widen the bribery net to include practices with ominous names that, as 
defined (or as left undefined), are likely to sweep in legitimate 
conduct—undisclosed conflicts of interest, deprivations of the 
intangible right to honest services, and undisclosed self-dealing.351 If 
precise ex ante regulations were to wane while ex post judgments of 
motive waxed, the law would get things backwards. 
Concluding that conscious favoritism does not qualify as quid pro 
quo corruption not only would block the most appropriate way of 
curbing this practice; it also would narrow the government’s regulatory 
interest to the point that it might not justify even the limits on 
contributions the Court left intact.  
The interest in combatting bribery cannot justify campaign-finance 
regulations because that’s not the way things are done. Campaign 
contributions rarely buy promises of favorable governmental action; they 
buy influence. Moreover, even the interest in preventing the appearance 
of bribery cannot justify campaign-finance regulations because everyone 
knows that’s not the way it’s done.  
The problem is not that donors and candidates fail to spell 
everything out. It is not that their agreements usually are left to winks, 
nods, and implication. The problem is that, with rare exceptions, there 
are no agreements, express or implied. Contributions are accompanied 
by hope but not by an understanding that a candidate will provide 
                                                                                                                     
 350. See id. at 356.   
 351. See Albert W. Alschuler, Terrible Tools for Prosecutors: Notes on Senator Leahy’s 
Proposal to “Fix” Skilling v. United States, 67 SMU L. REV. 501 (2014).  
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anything in return. The hope may turn out to be justified often enough 
to make the contributions good investments. Citizens United observed, 
“[F]ew if any contributions to candidates will involve quid pro quo 
arrangements.”352 Criminal “arrangements” are rare both because they 
are criminal and because they are unnecessary. A rare or nonexistent 
practice cannot justify a sweeping restriction of speech.353  
Even if bribery were more frequent than it is, campaign-finance 
regulations would do little to stop it. People willing to violate bribery 
laws are willing to violate campaign-finance regulations too. Enforcing 
the campaign-finance regulations is usually not much easier than 
enforcing the law against bribery.354 A small tail would wag a huge 
mastiff if reducing bribery were to become the only permissible reason 
for campaign-finance regulation. 
Excluding conscious favoritism from the realm of quid pro quo 
corruption not only might block the most appropriate form of regulation 
and narrow the government’s regulatory interest to the point that it 
could not justify anything; it also would depart from the common 
understanding of the words “corruption” and “quid pro quo.” When an 
official has deliberately used public dollars to return private favors, 
those words seem to fit. If, after attending a religious revival, a 
legislator were to confess to supporting widget subsidies simply to 
please major contributors to his campaign, just about everyone would 
conclude that he had confessed to giving a quid for a quo even if he had 
made no promise, explicit or implicit, in advance. Only a few people 
might dissent—all of them Justices of the Supreme Court. 
Perhaps, however, there would be no dissenters. Despite the contrary 
indications discussed above, conscious favoritism may be “in.” 
a.  The Significance of Buckley v. Valeo 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court emphasized that it drew its 
concept of corruption from Buckley. It wrote, “When Buckley identified 
a sufficiently important governmental interest in preventing corruption 
or the appearance of corruption, that interest was limited to quid pro 
quo corruption.”355 One should not interpret Citizens United in a way 
that would overrule Buckley rather than follow it, and Buckley clearly 
                                                                                                                     
 352. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357. 
 353. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“Broad prophylactic rules in the 
area of free expression are suspect.”).   
 354. To be sure, it sometimes is easier to prove that someone gave or accepted an 
unreported donation or a donation above the limit than to establish that he gave or accepted this 
payment as a bribe. Both the enforcement of campaign-finance regulations and the enforcement 
of bribery laws, however, typically require proof of what happened between consenting parties 
in private, and when officials can prove what happened between consenting parties in private, 
they might as well enforce the law against bribery.   
 355. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359. 
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regarded conscious favoritism as the kind of corruption that can justify 
campaign-finance regulation.356  
Immediately after declaring that preventing corruption provided a 
sufficient justification for limiting campaign contributions, the Court 
wrote in Buckley, “To the extent that large contributions are given to 
secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, 
the integrity of our system of representative democracy is 
undermined.”357 The Court used the words “quid pro quo” four more 
times in its opinion.358 Someone who noticed those words and nothing 
else might assume that the words meant in Buckley what they mean 
today in a different legal context. 
Today, when the Supreme Court uses the words “quid pro quo” in a 
bribery case, it refers to an actual or contemplated agreement: “[F]or 
bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to give or 
receive something of value in exchange for an official act.”359 Buckley’s 
use of these words, however, came fifteen years before the Court first 
used them in a bribery case.360 At the time Buckley was decided, its 
language did not track the definition of a crime, and the Court clearly 
used the term “quid pro quo” differently from the way it now uses this 
term in bribery cases. 
Buckley in fact rejected the argument that “contribution limitations 
must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn 
disclosure requirements constitute a less restrictive means of dealing 
with ‘proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements.’”361 The Court 
explained that “laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes 
deal with only the most blatant and specific attempts of those with 
money to influence governmental action.”362 In the Court’s view, 
campaign-contribution limits were appropriate, not because they 
prevented bribery that might be difficult to prove, but because they 
blocked influences less “blatant and specific” than bribes. The evil 
addressed by Congress was the “attempt[] of those with money to 
influence governmental action”363 by subtle as well as blatant means. 
The Court spoke repeatedly of “undue influence,”364 “improper 
influence,”365 and “post-election special favors.”366  
                                                                                                                     
 356. One could in fact make a plausible case that Buckley regarded even preferential access 
as “in.” 
 357. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976) (per curiam). 
 358. Id. at 27 (twice), 45, 47. 
 359. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999). 
 360. See McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 274 (1991). 
 361. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.  
 362. Id. at 27–28.   
 363. Id. at 28.  
 364. Id. at 53, 70, 76.  
 365. Id. at 29, 30, 45, 58, 96.  
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Buckley pointed to three illustrations of what it regarded as quid pro 
quo corruption, and these illustrations consisted of favoritism, not 
bribery. Immediately after noting that the integrity of “our system of 
representative democracy” can be undermined by large contributions 
“given to secure a political quid pro quo,” the Court observed, 
“Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably 
ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 
election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one.”367 It then 
cited the D.C. Circuit’s recitation of these examples in its own Buckley 
v. Valeo opinion.368  
The first of the practices described by the D.C. Circuit—the 
practices the Supreme Court called “deeply disturbing” and 
“pernicious”—was “the revelation [of] the extensive contributions by 
dairy organizations to Nixon fund raisers, in order to gain a meeting 
with White House officials on price supports.”369 Following this 
meeting, President Nixon approved higher price supports for milk 
producers, and the D.C. Circuit commented, “It is not material, for 
present purposes, to review . . . the controverted issue of whether the 
President’s decision was in fact, or was represented to be, conditioned 
upon or ‘linked’ to the reaffirmation of [a $2 million campaign] 
pledge.”370 If favoritism did not constitute quid pro quo corruption, 
however, and if only bribery counted, the resolution of this issue would 
have mattered.  
The D.C. Circuit’s second illustration consisted of “lavish 
contributions by groups or individuals with special interests to 
legislators from both parties, e.g., . . . by H. Ross Perot, whose company 
supplies data processing for Medicare and Medicaid programs, to 
members of the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance 
Committees.”371 Large contributions to incumbents of both parties by 
people affected by their decisions strongly suggest that the contributors 
hope to curry favor rather than persuade the public. People who do no 
more than contribute to incumbents of both parties in order to gain 
favor, however, are not guilty of bribery.  
The court’s final illustration was the appointment of campaign 
                                                                                                                     
 366. Id. at 67.  
 367. Id. at 26–27. 
 368. Id. at 27 n.28 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 839–40 & nn.36–38 (D.C. Cir. 
1975) (per curiam)). Surprisingly, Citizens United cited the same material to support its claim 
that “[t]he practices Buckley noted would be covered by bribery laws, if a quid pro quo 
arrangement were proved.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356–57 (2010) (citation 
omitted). This material in fact constituted the only support Citizens United offered. 
 369.  Buckley, 519 F.2d at 839 n.36.  
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 839 n.37. 
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contributors as ambassadors. Referring to a Senate committee report, 
the D.C. Circuit said, “As for ambassadorships, while the appointment 
of large contributors is not novel, the Committee’s Report exposed scale 
and volume, and the widespread understanding that such contributions 
were a means of obtaining the recognition needed to be actively 
considered.”372 Again, a practice that deeply disturbed the Buckley 
Court and that it cited as an example of a political quid pro quo was 
favoritism, not bribery.373 
b.  Decisions Following Buckley 
In 1985, in FEC v. National Conservative Political Action 
Committee,374 the Supreme Court used the term “quid pro quo” again: 
“The hallmark of corruption is the financial quid pro quo: dollars for 
political favors.”375 SpeechNow read this sentence as a statement that 
the legitimate goals of campaign-finance regulation did not include 
reducing undue influence.376 Like Buckley, however, National 
Conservative Political Action Committee preceded by several years the 
earliest of the Supreme Court decisions articulating the quid pro quo 
requirement in bribery cases, and the sentences immediately preceding 
the “hallmark” statement sounded a lot like Aristotle: “Corruption is a 
subversion of the political process. Elected officials are influenced to 
act contrary to their obligations of office by the prospect of financial 
gain to themselves or infusions of money into their campaigns.”377 
These sentences indicated that reducing undue influence was “in.” 
Supreme Court decisions following National Conservative Political 
Action Committee, moreover, were entirely unambiguous. In 2000, in 
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Political Action Committee,378 
the Court wrote that its concern was “not confined to bribery of public 
officials, but extend[ed] to the broader threat from politicians too 
compliant with the wishes of large contributors.”379 One year later in 
FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee,380 the 
Court declared that corruption must be “understood not only as quid pro 
quo agreements, but also as undue influence on an officeholder’s 
                                                                                                                     
 372. Id. at 840 n.38; see THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, S. REP. NO. 93-981, at 492–95 (1974). 
 373. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 27.   
 374. 470 U.S. 480 (1985). 
 375. Id. at 497. 
 376. See SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010). 
 377. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. at 497. 
 378. 528 U.S. 377 (2000). 
 379. Id. at 389. The Court added, “[T]here is little reason to doubt that sometimes large 
contributions will work actual corruption of our political system.” Id. at 395. 
 380. 533 U.S. 431 (2001).  
80
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 469 
 
judgment.”381 And in 2003, in a passage of McConnell v. FEC382 that 
Citizens United did not repudiate, the Court wrote, “Congress’ 
legitimate interest extends beyond preventing simple cash-for-votes 
corruption to curbing ‘undue influence.’”383 The Court noted that it was 
“not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful 
for . . . donations and that donors would seek to exploit that 
gratitude.”384 If Citizens United overruled any of these decisions, it did 
so sub silento.  
c.  McCutcheon 
The McCutcheon plurality, which included all but one of the 
members of the Citizens United majority, offered this explanation of 
why Buckley had upheld base contribution limits: “The propriety of 
large contributions to individual candidates turned on the subjective 
intent of donors, and the Court concluded that there was no way to tell 
which donors sought improper influence over legislators’ actions.”385 
McCutcheon thus reaffirmed that the propriety of a large 
contribution depended on the donor’s intent rather than the existence of 
a quid pro quo “arrangement.” It reiterated that seeking improper 
influence was the kind of corruption that, according to Buckley, could 
justify a limitation of speech. Because there was no practical way to 
determine when this intent existed, Congress could prohibit 
contributions large enough to pose a significant risk of this improper 
motivation.  
A better one-sentence explanation of why contribution limits are 
permissible than McCutcheon’s is difficult to imagine, and this 
explanation is flatly inconsistent with the suggestion that an explicit or 
implicit agreement is necessary. The Supreme Court’s conflicting 
signals suggest that Citizens United might not have focused clearly on 
the issue and that, despite some statements that seem to exclude 
conscious favoritism from the realm of quid pro quo corruption, the 
issue at least remains open.  
* * * * * 
Upholding campaign-finance regulations for a questionable reason—
because they are believed to reduce bribery—could make immaterial the 
Supreme Court’s rejection of a better reason—because they reduce 
deliberate favoritism. If the regulations remained in place, they could 
                                                                                                                     
 381. Id. at 441.  
 382. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 383. Id. at 150 (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. at 441).  
 384. Id. at 145.  
 385. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1447 (2014). 
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serve the appropriate purpose as well as the dubious one. Recognizing 
that deliberately using public dollars to repay private favors is corrupt, 
however, would make clear that large super PAC contributions are 
corrupting.386  
  
                                                                                                                     
 386. The Supreme Court has suggested that super PAC expenditures cannot be bribes—a 
proposition that might imply, at least to the D.C. Circuit, that contributions to super PACs also cannot be 
bribes. But see Indictment at 16–17, United States v. Menendez, No. 15 CR 155 (D.N.J. Apr. 1, 2015), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/04/01/menend 
ez_and_melgen_indictment.pdf (alleging that two $300,000 contributions to a super PAC were bribes 
given to a U.S. Senator). One year after Citizens United, in Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), the Court declared, “The separation 
between candidates and independent expenditure groups negates the possibility that independent 
expenditures will result in the sort of quid pro quo corruption with which our case law is 
concerned.” Id. at 2826–27. The Court actually said “negates the possibility.” Much more 
modestly, Buckley had said, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure 
with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid 
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 
(1976) (per curiam). 
The Court’s argument seemed to be that people who obey the rules forbidding 
prearrangement and coordination will have little opportunity to reach explicit and implicit 
agreements. If, however, it is appropriate to assume that people obey campaign-finance 
restrictions, it seems equally appropriate to assume that they obey the laws against bribery. 
Perhaps the Court’s assumption was that, while the laws against bribery are difficult to enforce, 
candidates and their benefactors will obey the rules requiring the separation of candidates from 
independent expenditure groups for the same reason that adventurers climb mountains—because 
they are there. Independent expenditures cannot be bribes, for if they were bribes, they would 
not be independent. As Thomas Reed Powell is said to have remarked, “If you can think about 
something which is attached to something else without thinking about what it is attached to, then 
you have what is called a legal mind.” Thurman W. Arnold, Criminal Attempts—The Rise and 
Fall of an Abstraction, 40 YALE L.J. 53, 58 (1930) (quoting an unpublished manuscript by 
Powell). 
The rules requiring the independence of independent expenditures do not bar the people 
who make them from having lunch with candidates or from sitting next to them at official 
campaign functions. There and elsewhere, they can whisper about coordinating expenditures, 
bribes, and, if they like, robbing banks. They also can pass thick envelopes under the table. Of 
course the candidates and their benefactors are rarely so criminal; there is no reason for them to 
be. But if bribery were the way things were done, the rules forbidding coordinated expenditures 
would not stop them.  
In fact, a sensible bribe taker does not speak directly to a bribe giver. He uses an 
intermediary called a bagman. The use of this intermediary makes it difficult for the bribe giver 
to implicate the bribe taker, and if the bagman himself attempts to incriminate the bribe taker, 
the bribe taker denies everything and accuses the bagman of defrauding the bribe giver of his 
money. Someone soliciting funds for either an independent expenditure group or an official 
election campaign might be an ideal bagman. 
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VIII.  WHY SPEECHNOW ERRED BY STRIKING DOWN LIMITS ON 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUPER PACS 
A.  An Inappropriate Premise 
When the D.C. Circuit struck down the BCRA’s limits on 
contributions to super PACs in SpeechNow.org v. FEC,387 its decision 
rested on the view that quid pro quo corruption included explicit and 
implicit agreements and nothing else.388 The court could not have 
claimed with a straight face that contributions to super PACs do not 
generate what Buckley called “post-election special favors.”389  
Even more clearly, SpeechNow rested on Citizens United’s 
declaration that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”390 The SpeechNow court 
reasoned that contributions to super PACs influence public officials 
only when they are spent, and if, as a matter of law, the money going 
out does not corrupt, the money coming in cannot corrupt either.391 The 
court said that the standard of review did not matter because 
“something . . . outweighs nothing every time.”392 The SpeechNow 
court’s analysis depended on the proposition that the government had 
no cognizable interest—none whatsoever—in limiting either 
expenditures by super PACs or contributions to these groups.393  
As an earlier Part of this Article explained, the statement upon which 
the D.C. Circuit relied was dictum and perhaps double dictum.394 
                                                                                                                     
 387. 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 388. See id. at 694 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court took a broader view of the 
government’s anticorruption interest in several prior cases but claiming that Citizens United 
repudiated this view). 
 389. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67.  
 390. SpeechNow, 599 F.3d at 694 (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 
(2010)).  
 391. Id. at 694–95.   
 392. Id. at 695 (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 
(D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 393. See id. The court did not discuss California Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 
(1981), in which the Supreme Court upheld a limit on contributions to a political action 
committee, id. at 184–85, and in which a four-Justice plurality opinion rejected the argument 
that “because the contributions here flow to a political committee, rather than to a candidate, the 
danger of actual or apparent corruption of the political process . . . is not present.” Id. at 195 
(plurality opinion). California Medical Ass’n was distinguishable from SpeechNow because the 
PAC in question contributed to candidates; it was not an independent expenditure group. But the 
argument that contributions cannot be corrupting unless they ultimately flow to the candidate 
himself (rather than to his mother, brother, or alter-ego super PAC) is silly. No one would 
contend that bribes cannot corrupt unless they ultimately reach the pocket of a public official 
himself. See, e.g., supra note 272 (describing the conviction of former Alabama Governor Don 
Siegelman).   
 394. See supra text accompanying notes 98–118. 
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Moreover, the ease with which the Supreme Court slipped from 
declaring the government’s regulatory interest insufficient395 to 
declaring this interest nonexistent suggested that the Court might not 
have noticed the crucial difference between its two formulations. 
Stopping with the Court’s narrower and more appropriate statement 
would have precluded the D.C. Circuit’s analysis in SpeechNow.396  
The sense that the Supreme Court might not have recognized the 
import of its dictum is reinforced by the Court’s failure to recognize the 
difference between this dictum and what Buckley had said thirty-four 
years earlier. Citizens United attributed its judgment that independent 
expenditures do not corrupt at all to Buckley: “This confirms Buckley’s 
reasoning that independent expenditures do not lead to, or create the 
appearance of, quid pro quo corruption.”397 But Buckley did not say 
that. It merely held the anticorruption interest insufficient to support 
expenditure limits: “We find that the governmental interest in 
preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to 
justify § 608(e)(1)’s ceiling on independent expenditures.”398  
A final indication that the Court might not have meant its dictum 
literally is that this statement, if taken literally, would be inconsistent 
with a ruling the Court had made less than a year earlier—one in which 
its opinion was written by Justice Kennedy, the same Justice who wrote 
the Court’s opinion in Citizens United.399 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal 
Co.400 examined the combined effect of campaign contributions, PAC 
contributions, and independent expenditures by the chairman and chief 
executive officer of the Massey Coal Company, Don Blankenship.401  
After a jury returned a $50 million verdict against Massey, 
Blankenship spent more than $3 million to prevent the reelection of a 
justice of the state supreme court that would hear Massey’s appeal. He 
                                                                                                                     
 395. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357 (“The anticorruption interest is not sufficient to 
displace the speech here in question.”). 
 396. See supra text accompanying notes 114–31. 
 397. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360. 
 398. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (per curiam) (emphasis added). The Court 
added, “[T]he independent advocacy restricted by the provision does not presently appear to 
pose dangers of real or apparent corruption comparable to those identified with large campaign 
contributions.” Id. at 46. The statement that independent advocacy did not appear to be as 
corrupting as large campaign contributions did not suggest that independent advocacy posed no 
danger of corruption at all.  
 399. Justice Kennedy was in fact the only Justice to join both 5–4 decisions. 
 400. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 401. The Court lumped all of Blankenship’s electoral efforts together and repeatedly called 
them “contributions.” See, e.g., id. at 873 (referring to “Blankenship’s $3 million in 
contributions”) & 885 (“Blankenship’s campaign contributions . . . had a significant and 
disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome.”). By disregarding the distinction between 
contributions and expenditures drawn by Buckley and other campaign-finance decisions, the 
Court made this distinction seem insubstantial. 
84
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 473 
 
contributed the maximum amount the law allowed to the campaign of 
this justice’s opponent—a meager $1000. He also contributed $2.5 
million to a PAC supporting the justice’s opponent and spent another 
$500,000 directly. The opponent won the election and provided the 
decisive vote for reversing the $50 million verdict against Massey.402  
The Supreme Court held that the newly elected justice’s refusal to 
recuse himself from Massey’s appeal violated the due process clause. 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, “We conclude that there is a 
serious risk of actual bias . . . when a person with a personal stake in a 
particular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in 
placing the judge on the case by raising funds . . . when the case was 
pending or imminent.”403 Citizens United declared Caperton irrelevant, 
noting that “Caperton’s holding was limited to the rule that the judge 
must be recused, not that the litigant’s political speech could be 
banned.”404  
Caperton concluded that a particular remedy for the “risk of actual 
bias”—recusal—was required by the Constitution. Citizens United 
concluded that another remedy—restricting independent expenditures—
was precluded by the Constitution. Citizens United observed correctly 
that these two remedies, the required one and the precluded one, 
differed. If Blankenship’s PAC contributions and independent 
expenditures did “not give rise to corruption or the appearance of 
corruption,” however, why was any remedy required?  
Caperton recognized the public interest in preventing the “serious 
risk of actual bias” posed by Blankenship’s expenditures. Does this 
interest differ from the public interest in preventing “the appearance of 
corruption”? Is it less weighty? Is this interest neither sufficiently 
“compelling” to justify a restriction of high-value speech nor 
sufficiently “important” to justify a restriction of low-value speech?  
Caperton holds that the public interest in limiting the effect of 
independent electoral expenditures on the decisions of public officials 
exists. Because this interest is more than “nothing,” “something” does 
not automatically trump it. A near army of commentators have 
concluded that Caperton’s holding is inconsistent with Citizens 
United’s dictum that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to 
corruption or the appearance of corruption.”405 
                                                                                                                     
 402. See id. at 872–74.  
 403. Id. at 884.  
 404. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010). 
 405. Id. at 357. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 90, at 659–60; Richard L. Hasen, Citizens 
United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109 MICH. L. REV. 581, 584 (2011); Larry Howell, Once 
Upon a Time in the West: Citizens United, Caperton, and the War of the Copper Kings, 73 
MONT. L. REV. 25, 54–57 (2012); Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 413, 437–38 (2012); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance 
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Speculating that the Supreme Court might not have meant this 
declaration quite the way it sounds does not flatter the Court, but the 
alternative hypothesis would be worse. Citizens United’s move from a 
declaration of inadequacy to a declaration of non-existence might have 
been carefully calculated—an effort by a five-Justice majority to resolve 
issues not presented by the case before the Court while the votes to 
resolve them the majority’s way were at hand. On this hypothesis, lower 
courts would have had even less reason to regard the Court’s dictum as 
controlling. 
B.  A Better Starting Place 
The D.C. Circuit should have emphasized a different statement of 
the Citizens United opinion: “[C]ontribution limits, unlike limits on 
independent expenditures, have been an accepted means of preventing 
quid pro quo corruption.”406 It should have focused on Buckley’s 
holding that limits on contributions to official election campaigns are 
permissible and should have asked whether limits on contributions to 
super PACs can reasonably be treated differently. That question would 
have been easy to answer.  
Buckley offered five reasons for upholding contribution limits while 
striking down expenditure limits. Three of them suggested that 
campaign contributions have less communicative value than 
expenditures. The other two suggested that contributions are more 
corrupting. The reasons the Supreme Court gave for treating 
contributions to official election campaigns as low-value speech all 
apply equally to super PAC contributions.  
First, the Court declared that a campaign contribution “serves as a 
general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does 
not communicate the underlying basis for the support.”407 Equally, a 
check written to a super PAC does not convey the underlying basis for 
the check-writer’s support.  
Second, the Court noted that “the transformation of contributions 
into political debate involves speech by someone other than the 
                                                                                                                     
Law, 98 VA. L. REV. 1, 45–47 (2012); Justin Levitt, Confronting the Impact of Citizens United, 
29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 217, 230 (2010); Adam Liptak, Foreword: Funding Justice, 52 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 203, 203 (2010); Burt Neuborne, Felix Frankfurter’s Revenge: An Accidental 
Democracy Built by Judges, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 602, 659–60 (2011); Alexander 
Polikoff, So How Did We Get into This Mess? Observations on the Legitimacy of Citizens 
United, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 203, 221–22 (2011); James Sample, Democracy at the 
Corner of First and Fourteenth: Judicial Campaign Spending and Equality, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 727, 772–73 (2011) . 
 406. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359 (citation omitted).  
 407. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).  
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contributor.”408 Transforming a check to a super PAC into political 
debate also “involves speech by someone other than the contributor.” 
Third, the Court said that limiting the amount of an individual’s 
contribution “permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a 
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s freedom 
to discuss candidates and issues.”409 Contributors might be surprised to 
learn that writing a check for the maximum permissible amount to a 
political campaign—a check for thousands of dollars—is merely 
“symbolic support.”410 If it is, however, so is writing a check for the 
same amount to a super PAC. Moreover, restricting super PAC 
contributions leaves a contributor free to communicate his views of 
candidates and issues in other ways—for example, by making truly 
“independent” expenditures to advocate the candidate’s election.411  
Super PAC contributions have no greater communicative value than 
campaign contributions. In addition, one of the two reasons Buckley 
offered for viewing independent expenditures as less corrupting than 
campaign contributions does not apply to super PAC contributions. The 
Court stated, “The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an 
expenditure with the candidate or his agent . . . alleviates the danger that 
expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments 
from the candidate.”412  
The rules forbidding the coordination of expenditures do not prevent 
a candidate from discussing anything at all with a contributor to a super 
PAC (although the contributor may not then act as an “agent” of the 
candidate by conveying talk of expenditures to those who will determine 
how the super PAC’s funds are spent413). If the candidate and the donor 
wish to speak improperly about how large a super PAC contribution will 
guarantee the donor’s appointment as ambassador to Belize, the rules 
against coordinating campaign expenditures do nothing whatever to stop 
them.414  
                                                                                                                     
 408. Id. 
 409. Id.  
 410. The Court’s characterization of campaign contributions as symbolic speech was 
unfortunate. It wrote, “The quantity of the communication by the contributor does not increase 
perceptibly with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing.” Id. Contributions deserve some First 
Amendment protection, however, not because check writing is a symbolic gesture, but because 
these contributions make political speech possible. The larger the contributions, the more speech 
(as well as the more illegitimate clout) they generate. 
 411. This Article discussed what it takes to make an expenditure independent in supra 
Section VI.E. 
 412. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47.  
 413. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.20(a), .21(a) (2014).  
 414. I have suggested that the laws forbidding prearrangement and coordination do not 
alleviate the danger of bribery in any situation. See supra note 386. But I have a power not 
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Buckley’s second reason for viewing independent expenditures as 
less corrupting than campaign contributions was that independent 
expenditures are of less value to a candidate. Experience in the years 
since Buckley has called this empirical judgment into question, but it 
remains endorsed by the Supreme Court.415 Unlike any of the Court’s 
other reasons for privileging expenditures over contributions, this reason 
may apply to contributions to super PACs. Super PAC contributions may 
also have less value to a candidate. 
Because campaign contributions and super PAC contributions can be 
distinguished on this ground, Buckley’s holding that Congress may limit 
campaign contributions did not control the decision in SpeechNow. The 
judgment that remained, however, would not have been difficult.  
A candidate might value a $3000 contribution to a super PAC less 
than a $3000 contribution to his campaign, but he would not value a $10 
million contribution to an “alter ego” super PAC less than a $3000 
contribution to his campaign. In McCutcheon, after reiterating that “[t]he 
absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the 
candidate or his agent . . . undermines the value of the expenditure to the 
                                                                                                                     
granted to the D.C. Circuit—the power to declare that Buckley’s analysis makes no sense. At 
this point in the text, the discussion does not question Buckley’s analysis. Like Buckley, it 
assumes that everyone will obey election laws simply because they are there. Even on this 
assumption—that the laws forbidding prearrangement and coordination will be fully observed—
they do nothing to prevent quid pro quo bargains between candidates and super PAC donors.   
 415. Buckley’s judgment that independent expenditures are of less value to a candidate was 
tentative. The Court observed, “Unlike contributions, . . . independent expenditures may well 
provide little assistance to the candidate’s campaign and indeed may prove counterproductive.” 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47. Note the use of the word may. The Court also stated that “independent 
advocacy . . . does not presently appear to pose dangers of real or apparent corruption 
comparable to those identified with large campaign contributions.” Id. at 46. Note the words 
does not presently appear. 
Post-Buckley experiences suggest that the Court’s provisional judgment was erroneous and 
perhaps backwards. All other things equal, a candidate might prefer to control expenditures 
himself, but there is a strong advantage to having messages sent on one’s behalf for which one 
need take no responsibility. See supra notes 28–36 and accompanying text. One lobbyist has 
testified, “An effective advertising campaign may have far more effect on a member [of 
Congress] than a direct campaign contribution.” See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 
555–56 (D.D.C. 2003) (opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (reciting “[t]he uncontroverted testimony 
of lobbyist Wright Andrews”). A former senator has noted, “Politicians especially love when a 
negative ‘issue ad’ airs against their opponents.” Id. at 556 (reciting the testimony of former 
U.S. Senator Dale Bumpers). 
Citizens United did not consider what America’s experience since Buckley has taught. 
Instead, it swept aside Buckley’s qualifications and hesitancy with the declaration, “Independent 
expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” Citizens United 
v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010). As explained above, this statement was dictum, but the 
Court’s reaffirmation of Buckley’s judgment that independent expenditures are insufficiently 
corrupting to warrant any limitation was arguably holding. At least it was not double dictum. 
The D.C. Circuit could not properly have undertaken a reassessment of the provisional empirical 
judgment Buckley had made thirty-four years earlier. 
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candidate,” the plurality acknowledged, “But probably not by 95 
percent.”416 A $10 million super PAC contribution produces in spades 
whatever corruption or appearance of corruption a $3000 campaign 
contribution can produce. If Congress may prohibit the campaign 
contribution (as it may and has), it should be allowed to prohibit the 
super PAC contribution as well. If Buckley still stands (and Citizens 
United says it does), SpeechNow was wrongly decided.  
IX.  SUPER PACS AND AGGREGATE CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 
Citizens United allowed large business organizations to use funds 
from their general treasuries to support the election of favored 
candidates, but most business organizations did not do it. SpeechNow 
permitted individuals to make five-, six-, seven-, and even eight-figure 
contributions to super PACs, and many individuals did. More than 
Citizens United, SpeechNow transformed American politics. It did so by 
drawing broad implications from a dictum in Citizens United, and it 
made no effort to reconcile its ruling with the decision on which Citizens 
United purported to rely, Buckley.   
If the Supreme Court were to reach a conclusion different from that 
of the D.C. Circuit in SpeechNow, its decision might not restore the 
situation that existed prior to SpeechNow. The Supreme Court’s 
intervening decision in McCutcheon might have changed the landscape. 
In 2012, as noted above, Sheldon and Miriam Adelson gave $30 
million to Restore Our Future, a super PAC supporting Mitt Romney’s 
presidential campaign.417 If the Supreme Court were to reject 
SpeechNow and uphold the BCRA’s limits on contributions to super 
PACs, the amount an individual could give to a group like Restore Our 
Future in a single year would be considerably less—$5000.418  
A candidate’s supporters, however, could create an unlimited number 
of super PACs, and a donor could give $5000 to each of these PACs. 
Moreover, although a super PAC may not coordinate its expenditures 
with those of a candidate, it may coordinate its expenditures with those 
of other super PACs.419 The many super PACs supporting one candidate 
might all have the same manager.  
Even if multiplying super PACs could provide a lawful way for a 
contributor to donate $30 million to support a single candidate, 
repudiating SpeechNow might not be an empty gesture. Enabling 
                                                                                                                     
 416. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1454 (2014) (plurality opinion) (alterations in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 417. See text at supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 418. See 52 U.S.C.A. § 30116(a)(1)(C) (West 2014). 
 419. See Jeremy W. Peters, Conservative “Super PACs” Synchronize Their Messages, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/25/us/politics/conservative-
super-pacs-sharpen-their-synchronized-message.html. 
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someone to contribute $30 million in $5000 portions would require the 
creation of 6000 super PACs, something that probably would not 
happen. Moreover, the risk of developing carpal tunnel syndrome could 
deter a contributor from writing 6000 checks.420 
Still, multiplying super PACs to receive the contributions that a 
single super PAC could not receive looks like an easy way to circumvent 
the $5000 base contribution limit. The regime of campaign-finance 
regulation proposed by this Article would address this difficulty by 
allowing an individual to contribute as much money to as many PACs as 
he liked while requiring him to take steps to ensure that no more of his 
funds were used to influence a single election than the law allowed.421  
The BCRA addressed the multi-PAC circumvention strategy in a 
different way by establishing aggregate contribution limits.422 An individual 
could contribute no more than $48,600 to all PACs during a two-year 
election cycle. The BCRA’s aggregate limit on contribution to PACs 
was distinct from its aggregate limits on contributions to candidates and 
national political parties.423 A court could uphold this limit while striking 
down the statute’s other aggregate limits. In other words, a court could 
strike down the provision that prevents an individual from contributing 
the maximum amount to as many candidates as he likes while upholding 
the provision that prevents an individual from giving $5000 to each of 
6000 alter ego super PACs all supporting the same candidate.  
The creation of multiple super PACs was not among the 
circumvention strategies the Supreme Court considered in McCutcheon. 
SpeechNow was unchallenged, and when an individual could donate $30 
million to a single group, cloning PACs would have been pointless. 
Rejecting SpeechNow and upholding the BCRA’s base limit on PAC 
contributions, however, would bring the multi-PAC circumvention 
strategy to the fore.  
In McCutcheon, the Supreme Court called the circumvention 
strategies that it considered “implausible”424 and “divorced from 
reality.”425 But there is nothing at all implausible about the prospect of 
cloning multiple PACs to enable donors to evade the limit on 
contributions to a single PAC. If the BCRA’s base limit on PAC 
                                                                                                                     
 420. See Donors Unchained, DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART (Apr. 3, 2014), 
http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/74yxyf/donors-unchained (“The last great hope of preserving 
our democracy from the corrupting influence of money is carpal tunnel syndrome.”). 
 421. See supra Section VI.A.   
 422. See 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 16:14.80 
(2014).  
 423. See id. (“For the 2013–2014 election cycle, the aggregate limits in BCRA permitted 
an individual to contribute a total of $48,600 to federal candidates and a total of $74,600 to 
other political committees. Of that $74,600, only $48,600 could be contributed to state or local 
party committees and PACs, as opposed to national party committees.”).   
 424. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1453 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 425. Id. at 1456. 
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contributions were upheld and the statute’s aggregate limit struck down, 
this cloning would happen. 
An aggregate contribution limit probably is not the least restrictive 
way of blocking the multi-PAC circumvention strategy. This Article has 
in fact proposed a less restrictive way. The tracking and accounting 
requirements proposed by this Article would be burdensome, however, 
and a critic could plausibly maintain that the proposed tracking would 
not be feasible at all. The McCutcheon plurality observed that a 
contribution limitation is sufficiently “closely drawn” when it supplies 
“a fit that is . . . reasonable; that represents not necessarily . . . the least 
restrictive means but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the 
desired objective.”426 
McCutcheon was a fact-specific decision premised on the 
assumption that measures truly necessary to prevent the circumvention 
of valid base limits are constitutional. If the Supreme Court were to 
uphold the BCRA’s base limit on PAC contributions, the statute’s 
aggregate limit might be judged necessary to prevent circumvention. 
McCutcheon did not resolve this issue. 
X.  STORY TIME: OTTO’S FRIENDS EXERCISE THEIR RIGHTS  
This Part presents a hypothetical case to show where the reasoning 
of SpeechNow might lead.  
Being a state legislator is a full-time job in only ten states,427 and the 
hypothetical state of Kenduckety is not among them. Otto, the President 
of the Kenduckety Senate, receives a small salary from the state, but he 
obtains most of his income from a used car dealership he owns and 
manages, Otto’s Autos. Kenduckety recently enacted a tough code of 
government ethics. Under this code, Libby, a registered lobbyist, may 
not buy an automobile from Otto’s Autos and may not hire Otto’s wife 
as her real estate agent. In fact, she may not even buy Otto a hamburger. 
One day, however, as Otto read the Kenduckety Clarion, he 
discovered an advertisement for Otto’s Autos he had not placed. This 
advertisement not only praised Otto’s but called the owner of a rival 
dealership a deadbeat dad. A note at the bottom of the advertisement 
revealed that Libby had approved the message and purchased the ad. A 
delighted Otto telephoned Libby and expressed his gratitude.  
Other people who were or wished to be friends of the President of 
the Kenduckety Senate followed Libby’s lead. Within weeks, countless 
billboards, direct mailings, and radio and television advertisements 
                                                                                                                     
 426. Id. at 1456–57 (third alteration in original) (quoting Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 
U.S. 469, 480 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 427. See Full- and Part-Time Legislatures, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES 
(June 1, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/full-and-part-time-legislatures
.aspx. 
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urged the public to buy autos from Otto’s and to loathe its competitors. 
A few weeks after the barrage began, Otto’s advertising manager 
resigned to form a PAC. This PAC was not a political action committee. 
It was a placement of advertising committee. A more conventional 
super PAC organized by one of Otto’s former campaign managers 
already supported his political efforts.  
The mission of the new PAC, Kenduckians Drive Forward, was to 
ensure that advertising purchased by the friends of Otto’s Autos would 
be distributed among appropriate media outlets and would remain on 
point and effective. With the establishment of this PAC, Libby made a 
large contribution and stopped placing advertisements on her own. 
Libby was confident that both her independent expenditures on behalf 
of Otto’s Autos and her contributions to the new PAC were 
constitutionally protected. Unlike the lunches at McDonald’s she could 
no longer buy Otto, these expenditures and contributions were speech.  
Libby in fact consulted a lawyer. At their first meeting, he cautioned 
Libby that she had engaged in commercial rather than political speech 
and that commercial speech usually is less protected. 
Libby then cast some of her favors in the form of political speech. 
Under Kenduckety’s new Code of Government Ethics, she could no 
longer give bottles of Scotch and fruit baskets as birthday presents to 
elected officials. She concluded, however, that the code could not block 
her from retaining high-priced political satirists to appear at their 
birthday parties. In accordance with a contract Libby then negotiated 
with Bill Maher’s agent, Maher knocked at the doors of progressive 
officials while their birthday parties were in progress and offered to 
deliver a monologue. Dennis Miller knocked at the doors of 
conservatives. Libby’s birthday gifts were a hit with everyone.428 
When Libby met her lawyer again, the lawyer reported that he had 
done some research. Commercial speech was indeed judged by a 
different standard than political speech, but in the lawyer’s view, even 
Libby’s commercial speech on behalf of Otto’s Autos was 
constitutionally protected.  
The lawyer explained that a limitation of commercial speech must 
advance a “substantial” governmental interest and be no more extensive 
than necessary to advance this interest.429 Similarly, he said a limit on 
political contributions must be “closely drawn to match a sufficiently 
important interest.”430 Unlike political speech, which is fully protected, 
both commercial speech and political contributions land one tier down. 
                                                                                                                     
 428. Libby kept her birthday presents a surprise and never coordinated her expenditures 
with anyone.   
 429. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); 
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002). 
 430. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 387–88 (2000) (quoting Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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Because the D.C. Circuit held in SpeechNow that super PAC 
contributions were protected, the lawyer concluded that Libby’s 
independent expenditures on behalf of Otto’s Autos must be protected 
as well.  
The lawyer was somewhat more troubled by Libby’s contributions to 
Kenduckians Drive Forward. These contributions were doubly devalued 
because they were (1) commercial rather than political and (2) 
contributions rather than independent expenditures. The lawyer 
suggested that these contributions might land, not one, but two tiers 
down on the protected-speech terrace.431 He noted, however, that when 
no interest at all supports a restriction of speech, the standard of review 
does not matter. If super PAC contributions do not create even the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption, neither do Libby’s, and quid pro 
quo corruption is the only kind that counts.  
The analysis that led Libby’s lawyer to conclude that Libby’s PAC 
contributions were constitutionally protected matched the analysis that 
led the D.C. Circuit to protect super PAC contributions. The lawyer 
began with Citizens United’s dictum, “[W]e now conclude that 
independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the 
appearance of corruption.”432 He then concluded that because a PAC’s 
expenditure of contributed funds does not corrupt, the contributions 
themselves cannot corrupt. In light of Citizens United’s “holding as a 
matter of law that independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the 
appearance of quid pro quo corruption,”433 the government simply had 
“no anti-corruption interest” in limiting Libby’s contributions.434 
According to Libby’s logical lawyer, the “task of weighing the First 
Amendment interests implicated by contributions . . . against the 
government’s interest in limiting such contributions” was easy. 
“[S]omething . . . outweighs nothing every time.”435   
The analysis of Libby’s lawyer was careful and compelling, but 
something seems wrong with it. Gifts intended to corrupt public 
officials should not become constitutionally protected simply because 
they also finance speech. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has considered what can be said for and against a 
bumper sticker’s declarations that money is not speech and that 
                                                                                                                     
 431. Before they land, the Supreme Court must construct the tier. Perhaps the Court should 
insist that legislative restrictions of twice devalued speech must advance a “sort of” important 
interest in a “pretty good” way.   
 432. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).   
 433. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 434. Id. at 695.  
 435. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 
F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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corporations are not people. It has proposed a framework for evaluating 
the constitutionality of campaign-finance regulations that differs from 
the standard currently employed by the Supreme Court. And it has 
proposed a legislative scheme of campaign-finance regulation that 
would effectively limit contributions while respecting the Supreme 
Court’s campaign-finance decisions.  
Mostly, however, this Article has focused on an issue the Supreme 
Court has not addressed—the validity of limiting contributions to super 
PACs. Prior to Citizens United, the FEC enforced a statute that limited a 
person’s contributions to one of these groups to $5000 per year, and 
Citizens United did not consider the validity of this statute. Emphasizing 
that the issue before it was one of expenditure limits, not contribution 
limits, the Court struck down a prohibition of independent political 
expenditures by labor unions and corporations. 
Contrary to widespread perception, the ruling in Citizens United did 
not lead to the domination of American politics by large business 
organizations. During the 2012 campaign, not one Fortune 500 
company exercised the right that Citizens United had recognized to 
make independent electoral expenditures. 
In SpeechNow, the en banc D.C. Circuit unanimously held 
Congress’s limit on donations to super PACs unconstitutional.436 The 
court said that one sentence in the Citizens United opinion compelled its 
result—the Supreme Court’s declaration that independent expenditures 
do not corrupt. The D.C. Circuit reasoned that, if independent 
expenditures do not corrupt, the contributions that make these 
expenditures possible cannot corrupt either.437 Several other courts of 
appeals made the same judgment.  
The SpeechNow ruling led to the proliferation of super PACs. As a 
result of the D.C. Circuit’s decision, these “attack dogs” could accept 
vastly larger contributions than the candidates’ own campaign 
organizations could accept. According to the D.C. Circuit (or the 
Supreme Court or the two courts together), the First Amendment 
required this bizarre result.  
Again large business corporations were generally uninterested in 
exercising the recently recognized right. In 2012, 490 of the Fortune 
500 companies made no super PAC contributions, and only one 
contributed more than $1 million.438 Wealthy individuals, however, 
noted the disappearance of the $5000 limit, and ninety-five individuals 
or couples contributed $1 million or more to super PACs in 2012.439  
                                                                                                                     
 436. SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 437. Id. at 692–93.  
 438. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text. 
 439. See 2012 Top Donors to Outside Spending Groups, OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecr 
ets.org/outsidespending/summ.php?cycle=2012&disp=D&type=V&superonly=N (last visited Feb. 
3, 2015). 
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As this Article has shown, the pronouncement on which the D.C. 
Circuit rested its decision was dictum, and the Supreme Court offered 
several indications that it did not mean this declaration quite the way it 
sounds. Moreover, SpeechNow rested on a narrow view of corruption—
one declaring in effect that the use of public dollars to repay private 
favors does not qualify as corruption unless the payoff was arranged in 
advance. Although some language in Citizens United seemed to support 
this view, the Supreme Court had endorsed a broader concept of 
corruption in prior decisions, and language later approved by most 
members of the Citizens United majority in McCutcheon was also 
incompatible with the position attributed to the Supreme Court by the 
SpeechNow decision.  
Starting from a different premise in SpeechNow would have 
produced a different result. The D.C. Circuit should have asked whether 
contributions to super PACs can sensibly be treated differently from 
contributions to official election campaigns, and the answer to that 
question would have been no. 
Whether Congress may limit super PAC contributions warrants the 
Supreme Court’s attention. The SpeechNow decision has driven 
American government toward what Aristotle called the “perverted” or 
“corrupted” form in which officials neglect the common good and “rule 
with a view to the private interest.”440  
                                                                                                                     
 440. ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS, supra note 326, at 114.   
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APPENDIX A 
HAVE CITIZENS UNITED AND SPEECHNOW ENDED THE GAME? 
This Article concluded by saying that whether Congress may limit 
super PAC contributions warrants the Supreme Court’s attention, but a 
court’s attention cannot be paid unless someone brings a lawsuit. This 
appendix considers whether, by halting the enforcement of restrictions 
on contributions to super PACs, Citizens United and SpeechNow have 
left no one with standing to raise the issue again. 
Justice Holmes described holding an act of Congress 
unconstitutional as “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is 
called on to perform.”1 Chief Justice Marshall said that a court should 
declare a statute unconstitutional only when “[t]he opposition between 
the constitution and the law [is] such that the judge feels a clear and 
strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other.”2 The law 
usually tilts the game board against litigants who challenge a statute’s 
constitutionality. The Supreme Court affords Congress’s action a 
“presumption of constitutionality.”3  
In one respect, however, the Supreme Court tilts the game board in 
the opposite direction. No matter how many victories the defenders of a 
statute’s constitutionality have won, new challengers may continue to 
attack the statute. Once any challenger scores a victory, however, the 
game is likely to be over. The game becomes one of sudden death, but 
only for one side. 
Rulings upholding statutes and regulations are always subject to 
reconsideration. A person or group subject to these regulations can 
challenge their enforcement and attempt to persuade a court to overrule 
the decisions sustaining them. Citizens United, which overruled two 
prior decisions, illustrates how new challengers may bring new lawsuits 
until victory is won. 
Because hardly anyone has standing to challenge the nonenforcement 
of statutes and regulations, however, even a five-to-four decision halting 
a statute’s enforcement may be invulnerable. In the years following the 
invalidation of a statute, circumstances may change, and the composition 
of the Supreme Court may change too. Because no one can raise the 
issue again, however, the declaration of unconstitutionality may last 
forever. The law of standing may effectively place decisions about the 
constitutionality of statutes on a one-way ratchet. 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).  
 2. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810).  
 3. See, e.g., O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257–58 
(1930).  
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After the rulings in Citizens United and SpeechNow, the FEC halted 
enforcement of the statute limiting contributions to super PACs.4 
Congress’s use of an administrative agency rather than the judiciary to 
enforce election law, however, bends the law of standing. The ratchet 
may not hold.  
The Supreme Court allows a litigant to challenge an agency’s non-
enforcement of a statute when Congress has specifically authorized this 
challenge and the litigant is suffering or is likely to suffer injury in fact.5 
And federal election law authorizes challenges to FEC inaction. It allows 
anyone who believes that an election-law violation has occurred to 
complain to the FEC,6 and it authorizes a party “aggrieved” by the 
FEC’s dismissal of a complaint to seek review in the courts.7 Some 
prospective plaintiffs probably could establish injury in fact. At least a 
candidate for federal office whose election was opposed by a super PAC 
that accepted contributions above the statutory limits could do so. 
The validity of a decision striking down a statute also could become a 
collateral issue in a lawsuit brought for a purpose other than challenging 
an agency’s failure to enforce it. For example, in a lawsuit brought to 
challenge a campaign-finance regulation that survived Citizens United, a 
defender of the regulation might argue that, even if Citizens United’s 
reasoning could lead to invalidating the regulation, Citizens United 
should be overruled.  
One cannot appropriately assume, however, that an opportunity to 
overrule Citizens United will inevitably arise or even that such an 
opportunity is likely to arise. Nor can one appropriately assume that the 
Supreme Court, which declined to review SpeechNow,8 will have any 
further opportunity to consider the issue presented by that case. While a 
                                                                                                                     
 4. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-11, http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/
AO%202010-11.pdf (Commonsense Ten); FED. ELECTION COMM’N, ADVISORY OPINION 2010-
09, http://saos.fec.gov/aodocs/AO%202010-09.pdf (Club for Growth). 
 5. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516–17, 521 (2007) (holding that the EPA’s 
refusal to regulate greenhouse gases presented a risk of harm to Massachusetts residents that 
was “actual or imminent”); FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 21 (1998) (holding that the FEC’s denial 
of information to which voters were entitled by statute constituted injury in fact). 
 6. 52 U.S.C.A. § 30109(a)(1) (West 2014). 
 7. See id. § 30109(a)(8)(A).  
 8. See Keating v. FEC, 562 U.S. 1003 (2010) (denying a writ of certiorari to review 
SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (en banc)). 
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ruling striking down a statute does not end the game entirely, it tilts the 
board substantially.9 
                                                                                                                     
 9. Even after Citizens United and SpeechNow, several states sought to enforce their own 
statutory limits on super PAC contributions. The federal courts of appeals, however, sustained 
challenges to the states’ enforcement efforts, and none of the states appear to have sought 
Supreme Court review. See Letter from Brian A. Sutherland, Assistant Solicitor General of the 
State of New York, to the Hon. Mae A. D’Agostino, United States District Court for the 
Northern District of New York (May 23, 2014) (on file with author); Email from Jonathan 
Mitchell, Solicitor General of the State of Texas, to the author (Dec. 21, 2013) (on file with 
author). 
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APPENDIX B 
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS I: STATISTICAL AND NON-
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE 
Citizens United declared, “[T]here is only scant evidence that 
independent expenditures even ingratiate.”1 Perhaps the Supreme Court 
meant in this statement to distinguish independent expenditures from 
contributions. Buckley and other decisions had held that campaign 
contributions not only ingratiate but corrupt so much so that Congress 
may restrict them, and Citizens United did not retreat from these 
holdings. If the Supreme Court meant only to distinguish contributions 
from expenditures, SpeechNow erred by declaring that contributions 
cannot influence candidates unless expenditures do too. Perhaps, 
however, the Supreme Court saw no reason to believe that either 
expenditures or contributions ingratiate.   
In support of its claim that independent expenditures had not been 
shown to ingratiate, the Court cited evidence that a federal district judge 
had assembled to show just the opposite. The Court cited a section of 
the separate opinion of Judge Kollar-Kotelly in McConnell v. FEC2—a 
section headed “Federal Candidates and Political Parties Know and 
Appreciate Who Runs Candidate-Centered Issue Advertisements in 
their Races.”3 This section recited testimony from campaign 
consultants, a lobbyist, and former office holders, all of which 
resembled the testimony of former U.S. Senator Dale Bumpers: 
“Candidates whose campaigns benefit from these ads greatly appreciate 
the help of these groups. In fact, Members will also be favorably 
disposed to those who finance these groups when they later seek access 
to discuss pending legislation.”4  
Judge Kollar-Kotelly observed, “Plaintiffs have put forth no contrary 
evidence.” She then recited testimony that “[a]n effective advertising 
campaign may have far more effect on a member than a direct campaign 
contribution,” that interest groups “apprise politicians of the 
advertisements that they run on their behalf,” and that politicians 
“demonstrate their appreciation” by raising money for the groups.5 
Citizens United’s citation of this material for the proposition that “there 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010).  
 2. 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 555–57 (D.D.C.) (separate opinion of Kollar-Kotelly, J.), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 540 U.S, 93 (2003). 
 3. Id. at 555. This section spoke of issue advertisements placed by groups more fettered 
than today’s super PACs. The expenditures of today’s super PACs would have as much 
influence or more. 
 4. Id. at 556. 
 5. Id. at 556–57. 
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is only scant evidence that independent expenditures even ingratiate”6 
was astonishing. Perhaps the Court considered the evidence “scant” 
simply because it consisted of the testimony of knowledgeable 
observers and was not quantitative or “scientific.” The misguided sense 
that only quantitative evidence matters has become commonplace. I 
have called this sense “the bottom-line collectivist-empirical 
mentality.”7 
Statistically-minded researchers have examined whether their 
methods can establish that campaign contributions influence legislators’ 
votes, and although their findings have been mixed,8 most have 
answered no.9 Because nearly all of this research preceded the explosion 
of contributions that followed Citizens United and SpeechNow, its 
continuing relevance is questionable. Moreover, there was little reason 
to give much weight to most of the researchers’ conclusions even prior 
to SpeechNow. Their methods foundered on a problem of covariance 
and would have been unlikely to reveal a strong effect even if one 
existed. 
A legislator who supports conservative measures usually is a 
conservative. He usually has received campaign contributions from 
conservative donors and has been elected by conservative voters. 
Separating the effects of campaign contributions on his votes from the 
effects of his personal views and those of his constituents is difficult 
and may be impossible. Statistical analysis cannot determine whether 
the chicken came before the egg or the egg before the chicken. 
Nevertheless, researchers have kept trying. 
Although some researchers have purported to control for legislators’ 
“ideology,” they could not do so. They could control only for the 
legislators’ past actions—actions that themselves might have been 
influenced by campaign contributions. The most frequently cited of the 
studies concluding that campaign contributions have no provable effect 
on legislative votes is one that Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de 
Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder Jr., published in 2003.10 This study 
                                                                                                                     
 6. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360.   
 7. See Albert W. Alschuler, “Close Enough for Government Work”: The Exclusionary 
Rule After Leon, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 346. 
 8. See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 394–95 (2000) (observing that 
some studies are “said to indicate that large contributions to public officials or candidates do not 
actually result in changes in candidates’ positions,” that other studies “point the other way,” and 
that “there is little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work actual 
corruption of our political system”).   
 9. See Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Why Is There So Little Money in U.S. Politics?, 17 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 105 (2003). This study reviewed the findings of thirty-six prior studies and noted 
that “in three out of four instances, campaign contributions had no statistically significant effects 
on legislation or had the ‘wrong’ sign—suggesting that more contributions lead to less support.” 
Id. at 113–14. 
 10. See id. at 112–14. 
100
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
2015] LIMITING POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 489 
 
focused on the scores that the U.S. Chamber of Commerce gives 
members of Congress each year on the basis of their “key business 
votes.”11 The study reported that these scores did not vary with the size 
of the business and labor contributions members had received.12  
If notable changes in the legislators’ scores had followed large 
changes in either business or labor contributions, one might have 
inferred that the contributions affected votes. But the absence of any 
discernable change provided little reason to conclude that conviction 
rather than cash drove votes.  
Consider a Democrat who recognized on his first run for Congress 
that labor union PACs were the largest contributors to Democrats in his 
district. Swallowing hard, this candidate might have endorsed the 
unions’ legislative agenda despite some personal reservations. If, 
following his election, this member continued to support the unions’ 
proposals and continued to collect their cash, neither an examination of 
his Chamber of Commerce scores nor any other quantitative study 
would reveal that his votes had been driven by contributions. Union 
contributions might have increased in some years (for example, when 
the member faced a tough election) and fallen in others, but his scores 
would have remained the same.13 One former member of Congress 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See How They Voted, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM., http://www.uschamber.com/report/how 
-they-voted (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
 12. Actually, when the Ansolabehere group controlled only for party affiliation and past 
constituent voting patterns (and when they employed a standard regression model rather than 
one with “legislator fixed effects”), they found that the correlation between business and labor 
contributions and Chamber of Commerce scores was positive and statistically significant. See 
Ansolabehere et al., supra note 9, at 114, 116–17. But the authors considered other statistical 
models more revealing. They ultimately concluded that “[l]egislators’ votes depend almost 
entirely on their own beliefs and the preferences of their voters and their party.” Id. at 116.  
 13. In some of its models, the Ansolabehere group treated “electoral competition” as an 
“instrumental variable” and explained that “the idea is that a close race increases an incumbent’s 
demand for PAC contributions, producing an exogenous shift in contributions via increase in the 
propensity to ‘sell’ services, including roll call votes.” Id. at 115. The authors’ hypothesis 
appeared to be: If members’ Chamber of Commerce scores became more pro-labor when they 
faced close elections and received increased contributions from union PACs, one could 
reasonably infer that they bent to their contributors’ desires. By the same token, if their scores 
remained the same, one could infer that they voted their consciences (or possibly their 
constituents’ desires).  
The second inference, however, would be unwarranted. Once a member had “sold out” to 
labor interests, one could expect a close election to bring increased contributions from union 
PACs without changing his Chamber of Commerce score. The purpose and effect of the 
increased union contributions would not have been to change the member’s already favorable 
votes but simply to enable him to retain his seat. Similarly, if a close election brought increases 
in both business and labor contributions, one would expect no change in a member’s score.  
The authors’ treatment of their second “instrumental” variable was similarly confusing. 
They sought to assess the effect of a member’s “power” by employing three variables—“a 
dummy variable indicating that a member is a party leader, a dummy variable indicating that the 
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acknowledged, “[I]t has got to be on your mind that a vote one way or 
other is going to affect the ability to raise money.”14 No social science 
research has called the honesty or accuracy of this statement into 
question. 
After finding that no effect of contributions on Chamber of 
Commerce scores could be proven, Ansolabehere and his coauthors 
concluded that “campaign contributing should not be viewed as an 
investment, but rather as a form of consumption.”15 Interest groups, 
however, may seek to advance their interests in either (or both) of two 
ways—by promoting the election of candidates who favor their 
positions or by persuading candidates inclined to oppose their positions 
or on the fence to move in a beneficial direction.16 Whether the 
contributions do one thing or the other, contributors hope for a return on 
their investments and are not simply buying a yacht. No quantitative 
research indicates that donations by interest groups should be regarded 
as a form of consumption rather than a form of investment. 
To be sure, the two forms of investment differ. Unlike giving money 
to a candidate to influence him to change his position, spending money 
to persuade the public to support a candidate is protected by First 
Amendment. But both things can happen at the same time. 
Some donations plainly are motivated by a desire to buy favor. Only 
the goal of obtaining special access or other favors can explain why 
corporate PACs “hedge” by giving to both candidates in the same race, 
why their contributions regularly favor the party in power, and why they 
donate generously to powerful incumbents in safe districts.17 
                                                                                                                     
member is a committee chair and a dummy variable indicating that the member served on either 
the Ways and Means or Energy and Commerce committees (probably the two most powerful 
committees with respect to business issues).” Id.  
Why powerful members attract more campaign contributions than others is unclear. They 
may do so because they have more “clout” than other members and their votes are especially 
valuable. On this hypothesis, the price of their votes should increase, and the effect of every 
dollar contributed should decline. An equally plausible hypothesis, however, is that powerful 
members attract large contributions because they can influence the decisions that precede roll 
call votes, including what language important bills contain. These members may receive large 
contributions for reasons that have little or nothing to do with changing their ultimate roll call 
votes. 
 14. Eric Lipton, For Freshmen in the House, Seats of Plenty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2013), http: 
//www.nytimes.com/2013/08/11/us/politics/for-freshmen-in-the-house-seats-of-plenty.html (quoting 
Brad Miller, a former Democratic representative from North Carolina).  
 15. See Ansolabehere et al., supra note 9, at 117. 
 16. Political scientists speak of two models of political giving—the “ideological (or 
‘position-induced’) model” and “the investor (or ‘service induced’) model.” See Adam Bonica, 
Avenues of Influence: On the Political Expenditures of Corporations and Their Directors and 
Executives 4 (June 20, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2313232. 
 17. See id. app. B; Jeffrey Milyo, David Primo & Timothy Groseclose, Corporate PAC 
Campaign Contributions in Perspective, 2 BUS. & POL. 75, 76 (2000) (“[I]t is well-established 
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One may reasonably suppose, however, that the other form of 
investment predominates. For the most part, even corporate PACs hope 
to advance their interests by persuading voters to elect candidates 
already disposed to favor these interests. Social science research may 
establish that the market for votes is not a spot market and that liberals 
do not become conservatives overnight.18 Still, campaign contributions 
can change votes sometimes, and sometimes may be enough to make 
the contributions worthwhile even apart from their effect in persuading 
voters.  
The Ansolabehere study notes that nearly “all research on donors’ 
influence in legislative politics examines the effects of contributions on 
roll call votes cast by members of Congress.”19 Roll call votes, 
however, are watched not only by the Chamber of Commerce but also 
by other interest groups, the media, and the public. Favoritism for 
donors may be more likely to affect less visible and less ideologically 
charged decisions.20 Daniel Lowenstein has remarked that some social 
science researchers resemble “the fabled inebriate who searched for a 
lost key at night at the opposite end of the block from where he dropped 
it because the light was better there.”21 
Party leaders, committee chairpersons, and the members of key 
committees are in a position to influence the important decisions that 
precede roll call votes. They can determine what a bill says and whether 
                                                                                                                     
that PAC contributions flow disproportionately to incumbent office holders, majority party 
members, members of powerful committees and to members on committees with jurisdictions 
relevant to the PAC sponsor.”); Lloyd N. Cutler, Can the Parties Regulate Campaign 
Financing?, 486 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 115, 116 (1986) (quoting the statement of 
former Senate Majority Leader and presidential nominee Bob Dole that “when these political 
action committees give money they expect something in return other than good government”).    
 18. This research appears to supply a sufficient answer to the “public choice” economists 
who see contributors simply as buying legislators’ votes. William Landes and Richard Posner 
describe what appears to be a common view among economists and taxi drivers: 
In the economists’ version of the interest-group theory of government, 
legislation is supplied to groups or coalitions that outbid rival seekers of 
favorable legislation. . . . Payment takes the form of campaign contributions, 
votes, implicit promises of future favors, and sometimes outright bribes. In 
short, legislation is “sold” by the legislature and “bought” by the beneficiaries 
of the legislation. 
William W. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group 
Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975). 
 19. Ansolabehere et al., supra note 9, at 112. 
 20. See Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying Time: Moneyed Interests and the 
Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 797, 813–14 (1990) 
(concluding that political favors are likely to take a less visible form than roll call votes).  
 21. Daniel Hays Lowenstein, On Campaign Finance Reform: The Root of All Evil is 
Deeply Rooted, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 301, 314–15 (1989). 
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it will come to a vote at all.22 These legislators receive contributions in 
considerably larger amounts than other legislators,23 and no study 
suggests that donors are mistaken in thinking that their contributions to 
powerful legislators pay dividends. Returns can take the form of phone 
calls, phrasing, and procedure rather than altered roll call votes.24   
The three appendices that follow review some nonquantitative 
evidence on the effects of campaign cash. As Yogi Berra explained, 
“You can observe a lot by watching.”25  
                                                                                                                     
 22. The New York Times recently noted that the House Financial Services Committee is 
sometimes called “the cash committee” because its members receive more donations than those 
of any other committee. “With so many lawmakers clamoring to be on the Financial Services 
Committee, it has grown to 61 members from 44 since 1980, forcing the installation of four 
tiered rows of seats in the Rayburn House Office Building.” Lipton, supra note 14. 
 23. See, e.g., Stephen Ansolabehere & James M. Snyder Jr., Money and Institutional 
Power, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1673, 1689–98 (1999).  
 24. See, e.g., James V. Grimaldi & Susan Schmidt, Lawmaker from Ohio Subpoenaed in 
Abramoff Case, WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2005/11/04/AR2005110401197.html (“As chairman of the powerful House 
Administration Committee, [Representative Robert] Ney promised to add language to a bill to 
reopen a casino for a Texas Indian Tribe that [lobbyist Jack] Abramoff represented. After Ney 
agreed to prepare the legislation, Abramoff directed tribal officials to make three contributions 
totaling $32,000 to Ney’s campaign and political action committees.”). 
 25. See ALLEN BARRA, YOGI BERRA: ETERNAL YANKEE 278 (2009); YOGI BERRA WITH 
DAVE KAPLAN, YOU CAN OBSERVE A LOT BY WATCHING (2008).  
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APPENDIX C 
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS II: THE GENEROSITY OF SHELDON 
ADELSON 
This Article has noted that, in 2012, Sheldon Adelson, a Las Vegas 
casino owner, and his wife Miriam donated $30 million to Restore Our 
Future, a super PAC supporting the election of Mitt Romney as 
President.1 The couple apparently donated $140 million or more to 
electoral efforts that year.2 Prior to their initial $10 million contribution 
to Restore Our Future, Sheldon Adelson met with Romney in Las Vegas 
and reportedly sought “assurance that Romney would support Israel 
more strongly than President Obama has.”3 
Romney was not Sheldon Adelson’s first choice for the 2012 
Republican presidential nomination. Before contributing to the Romney 
campaign, he and his family donated $21 million to a PAC supporting 
the campaign of former Speaker Newt Gingrich.4 Adelson in fact 
financed a multi-million-dollar campaign of negative advertisements 
about Romney,5 and he complained publicly that Romney waffled on 
the issues.6  
Romney’s support for Israel did not waver following the Adelsons’ 
initial $10 million contribution. In the month after this contribution, 
Romney accused President Obama of deriding Israel’s leaders and of 
“shabby treatment of one of our finest friends.”7 Shortly after making 
these remarks, Romney traveled to Israel where he offered an 
                                                                                                                     
 1. See supra notes 14–17 of this Article and accompanying text; Restore Our Future, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/pacgave2.php?cmte=c00490045&cycle
=2012 (last visited Feb. 3, 2015). 
 2. Theodoric Meyer, How Much Did Sheldon Adelson Really Spend on Campaign 
2012?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 20, 2012, 12:47 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/how-much-
did-sheldon-adelson-really-spend-on-campaign-2012. 
 3. See Callum Borchers, Adelson Reportedly Gives $10m to Pro-Romney Super PAC, BOS. 
GLOBE (June 13, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2012/06/13/sheldon-adelson-
donates-million-super-pac-backing-mitt-romney/kmYCnXf8qOMDbglsUYi1PL/story.html.  
 4. See Alicia Mundy & Sara Murray, Adelson Gives $10 Million to Pro-Romney Super PAC, 
WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2012, 10:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/06/13/adelson-gives-
10-million-to-pro-romney-super-pac/. 
 5. See Trip Gabriel & Nicholas Confessore, PAC Ads to Attack Romney as Predatory 
Capitalist, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/us/politics/pro-
gingrich-pac-plans-tv-ads-against-romney.html. 
 6. See Peter H. Stone, Sheldon Adelson Spent Far More on Campaign Than Previously 
Known, HUFFINGTON POST, (Dec. 3, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12
/03/sheldon-adelson-2012-election_n_2223589.html.  
 7. Richard A. Oppel Jr., Romney Blasts Security Leaks as a Betrayal, N.Y. Times 
(July 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/25/us/politics/romney-blasts-security-
leaks-as-an-obama-betrayal.html. 
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explanation of why Israel’s per capita GDP vastly exceeds the 
Palestinians’: “Culture makes all the difference.”8  
Adelson was a member of the audience that stood and cheered 
Romney’s remarks.9 He later was seated next to Romney at a $50,000-
per-couple breakfast in Jerusalem for American campaign donors.10 No 
one—perhaps not even Romney himself—can remember whether the 
chicken came before the egg at this breakfast.  
A presidential candidate might bend his rhetoric on a major foreign 
policy issue to bring cheers and cash from large contributors, and his 
rhetoric might shape his policies once elected. Social science researchers 
could never prove it, however, and neither could anyone else. 
Although Adelson’s contributions seem to have been prompted 
primarily by his concept of the public good,11 his private interests might 
have played a part as well. For one thing, Adelson’s extensive business 
interests abroad receive favorable tax treatment that the incumbent 
President he opposed had sought unsuccessfully to end.12 For another, 
Chinese currency restrictions that Governor Romney pledged to oppose 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Philip Rucker & Joel Greenberg, Romney Faces Palestinian Criticism for 
Jerusalem Remarks as He Heads to Poland, WASH. POST, (July 30, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/text-of-romneys-remarks-about-culture-israel-and-the-palest 
inians/2012/07/31/gJQAjmsrNX_story.html; Ashley Parker, Romney Comments on Palestinians 
Draw Criticism, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/ 
30/romney-comments-on-palestinians-draw-criticism/. 
 9. See Kasie Hunt, In Israel, Romney Declares Jerusalem to Be Capital, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS (July 29, 2012, 5:17 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/romney-builds-ties-israel-woos-
voters-home. 
 10. See Thomas L. Friedman, Why Not in Vegas?, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/01/opinion/friedman-why-not-in-vegas.html; Kevin Liptak, 
Romney Raises More Than $1 million in Jerusalem, CNN (July 30, 2012, 8:20 AM), http://politi 
calticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/30/romney-raises-more-than-1-million-in-jerusalem/.  
 11. Adelson not only criticized the Obama administration’s foreign policy but also said, 
“What scares me is the continuation of the socialist-style economy we’ve been experiencing for 
the past four years.” Steven Bertoni, Billionaire Sheldon Adelson Says He Might Give $100M to 
Newt Gingrich or Other Republican, FORBES (Feb. 21, 2012, 12:04 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenbertoni/2012/02/21/billionaire-sheldon-adelson-says-he-might-gi 
ve-100m-to-newt-gingrich-or-other-republican/. But Adelson does not oppose all forms of 
socialism. Although he condemns Obamacare, he favors the sort of “socialized medicine” (his 
term) found in Israel. See Alicia Mundy, Sheldon Adelson: “I’m Basically a Social Liberal,” 
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 5, 2012, 6:53 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/12/05/sheldon-
adelson-im-basically-a-social-liberal/. 
 12. According to the New York Times, 90% of the earnings of Adelson’s company come 
from hotel and casino properties in Singapore and Macau. As a result, “the company now has a 
United States corporate tax rate of 9.8 percent, compared with the statutory rate of 35 percent.” 
What Sheldon Adelson Wants, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/what-sheldon-adelson-wants.html. The Times did not indicate what 
taxes the company paid abroad but did note that the income tax rate in Macau was zero. Id. 
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were damaging Adelson’s foreign interests.13 In addition, both the 
Securities Exchange Commission and the Department of Justice were 
investigating Adelson’s company, the Las Vegas Sands Corporation, for 
violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.14 The Justice Department 
was investigating the company for money laundering as well.15  
Adelson told an interviewer that the accusations against his company 
were unfounded and that officials had targeted him because of his 
political activity.16 When he listed several reasons for contributing to the 
Romney campaign, his concern that President Obama’s reelection would 
bring further “vilification” not only of Adelson himself but also of other 
Obama opponents topped the list.17  
Second on the list was the fact that (in the interviewer’s words) “[i]f 
Romney were elected, Adelson would have a powerful ally on the two 
issues he cares most about: the security and prosperity of Israel, and 
opposition to unions, including the so-called card-check proposal that 
                                                                                                                     
 13. On the assumption that half the patrons of Macau casinos are Chinese, a five percent 
appreciation in the value of the yuan probably would increase Adelson’s company’s earnings in 
that city by $73.8 million per year. See Alison Fitzgerald & Julie Bykowicz, Donors Invest 
Millions in Romney for Billions in Returns, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ne 
ws/2012-08-29/donors-invest-millions-in-romney-for-billions-in-returns.html. Governor Romney 
promised to call the Chinese government a currency manipulator, something President Obama had 
not done. See id.  
 14. See Thomas B. Edsall, Embracing Sheldon Adelson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012, 12:56 
AM), http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/embracing-sheldon-adelson/.  
 15. See Kate O’Keeffe et al., Sands Probed in Money Moves, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2012, 
7:24 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044432070457756680352
1121134. The money laundering investigation ended on August 27, 2013, when Las Vegas 
Sands entered an agreement with the U.S. Attorneys’ Office in Los Angeles to pay $47 million 
to the federal government. See Michael Luo, Las Vegas Casino Settles in Money-Laundering 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/28/us/las-vegas-casino-
settles-in-money-laundering-inquiry.html.  
In 2001, Adelson was concerned that a congressional resolution opposing China’s bid to 
host the 2008 Olympics would harm his business interests. He therefore telephoned a recipient 
of his campaign contributions, House Majority Whip Tom Delay. After investigating, Delay 
assured Adelson that the resolution was tied up in House procedures and would “never see the 
light of day.” See In Thrall to Sheldon Adelson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/opinion/in-thrall-to-sheldon-adelson.html; Connie Bruck, 
The Brass Ring: A Multibillionaire’s Relentless Quest for Global Influence, NEW YORKER (June 
30, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2008/06/30/080630fa_fact_bruck?currentPage
=all. 
 16. Mike Allen, Sheldon Adelson: Inside the Mind of the Mega-Donor, POLITICO (Sept. 
23, 2012, 9:12 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/81588.html.  
 17. Id. Adelson noted that someone—probably a government official—had leaked the fact 
that his company was under investigation only after he and his family had become heavily 
involved in the 2012 election. He believed the objective was “making [him] toxic so that they 
can make the argument to Republicans, ‘This guy is toxic. Don’t do business with him.’” Id.  
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would make it easier for workers to organize.”18 Las Vegas Sands owns 
the only non-union hotels and casinos on the Las Vegas strip.19 
In addition, Adelson has begun a lobbying campaign for federal 
legislation to prohibit internet gambling.20 He opposes this gambling for 
“moral” reasons and also says that online gambling would be “suicidal” 
for the U.S. casino industry.21 Adelson told an interviewer that he is 
“willing to spend whatever it takes” to see the practice outlawed.22 
Adelson does not believe his political contributions should be 
constitutionally protected or even legal. “I’m against very wealthy 
people attempting to or influencing elections,” he told an interviewer. 
“But as long as it’s doable I’m going to do it.”23 
Governor Romney lost the 2012 presidential election, and all but one 
of the other seven candidates Adelson supported in the 2012 general 
election lost too.24 Adelson, however, did not seem discouraged. He 
announced that he was prepared to double his donations the next time 
around and explained, “I happen to be in a unique business where 
winning and losing is the basis of the entire business . . . . So I don’t cry 
when I lose. There’s always a new hand coming up.”25  
Three days after Mitt Romney announced his choice of Paul Ryan as 
his running mate, Ryan called on Adelson and other donors at 
Adelson’s Venetian Hotel in Las Vegas.26 One week after the Romney–
Ryan ticket lost the general election, three Republicans then regarded as 
possible 2016 presidential contenders—Governors Jindal of Louisiana, 
Kasich of Ohio, and McDonnell of Virginia—met privately with 
Adelson at the Venetian.27 On August 1, 2013, Adelson hosted a 
fundraiser at another of his Las Vegas resorts for the gubernatorial 
                                                                                                                     
 18. Id.  
 19. Dana Spitzer, Billionaire Casino Owner Adelson Takes Aim at Unions, PEOPLE’S 
WORLD (Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.peoplesworld.org/billionaire-casino-owner-adelson-takes-
aim-at-unions/. 
 20. Nathan Vardi, Sheldon Adelson Says He Is “Willing to Spend Whatever it Takes” to Stop 
Online Gambling, FORBES (Nov. 22, 2013, 9:08 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/nathanvardi/
2013/11/22/sheldon-adelson-says-he-is-willing-to-spend-whatever-it-takes-to-stop-online-gambling/. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Bertoni, supra note 11. 
 24. Alicia Mundy & Alexandra Berzon, Casino Mogul Adelson Loses Most Election Bets, 
WALL ST. J. (Nov. 9, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/11/09/adelsons-
loses-most-election-bets/.  
 25. Alicia Mundy, Adelson to Keep Betting on the GOP, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 4, 2012, 11:01 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323717004578159570568104706.html.  
 26. Trip Gabriel, A Quiet Introduction to Big Money Donors, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2012), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9803E0DD123BF935A2575BC0A9649D8B63. 
 27. Kenneth P. Vogel, 2016 Contenders Court Mega-Donors, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2012, 
4:29 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/2016-contenders-courting-mega-donors-
84497.html. 
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reelection of a fourth 2016 presidential possibility, Governor Christie of 
New Jersey.28  
In March 2014, Adelson hosted a group called the Republican 
Jewish Coalition in Las Vegas.29 The gathering began with a dinner for 
another presidential prospect, former Governor Bush of Florida.30 Three 
possible 2016 presidential contenders, Governor Walker of Wisconsin 
and Governors Kasich and Christie, also addressed the group.31 Christie 
offended some listeners by referring to the West Bank as the “occupied 
territories”—a term also used on occasion by the U.S. State Department 
and Israeli officials—but the governor met privately with Adelson to 
say that he “misspoke.”32 Some members of the press referred to the 
event as the “Sheldon primary.”33  
                                                                                                                     
 28. See Maggie Haberman, Chris Christie at Sheldon Adelson Fundraiser in Las Vegas, 
POLITICO (Aug. 1, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/chris-christie-
sheldon-adelson-fundraiser-95085.html.  
 29. See Richard Miniter, Did Chris Christie “Bully” Sheldon Adelson’s Friend?, Forbes 
(Apr. 1, 2014, 5:12 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/richardminiter/2014/04/01/is-chris-
christie-actually-electable/.  
 30. Philip Rucker, Sheldon Adelson Plans VIP Dinner for Jeb Bush at GOP Gathering in 
Vegas, WASH. POST (March 22, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/
2014/03/22/sheldon-adelson-plans-vip-dinner-for-jeb-bush-at-gop-gathering-in-vegas/.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Miniter, supra note 29.  
 33. Dan Balz, “Sheldon Primary” is One Reason Americans Distrust the Political System, 
WASH. POST (March 28, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-sheldon-primary-is-one-
reason-why-americans-distrust-the-political-system/2014/03/28/765fbfdc-b67e-11e3-a7c6-70cf2db17 
781_story.html. 
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APPENDIX D 
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS III: EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY 
An outcry followed President Clinton’s grant of 177 pardons and 
commutations on his last day in office, and this outcry “focused 
particularly on the pardons he granted Marc Rich and his business 
partner Pincus Green.”1 Rich and Green had been indicted on charges of 
trading with the enemy—conspiring to purchase more than six million 
barrels of oil from Iran while that nation was holding fifty-two U.S. 
hostages2—and tax evasion—“the biggest tax fraud case in the history 
of the United States,” according to the chief prosecuting attorney.3 
“Both had been fugitives and had lived in Switzerland since their 
indictments.”4 
The Justice Department’s rules barred the consideration of a 
fugitive’s clemency application through ordinary channels,5 and White 
House Counsel Beth Nolan, Deputy Counsel Bruce Lindsey, and all the 
other lawyers in the White House Counsel’s office opposed clemency. 
White House Chief of Staff John Podesta advised the President against 
clemency as well.6  
Denise Rich, however, Marc Rich’s former wife, had written two 
letters to the President requesting a pardon: “I am writing as a friend 
and admirer of yours to add my voice to the chorus of those who urge 
you to grant my former husband, Marc Rich, a pardon for the offenses 
unjustly alleged and so aggressively pursued.”7 Her earlier financial 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Albert W. Alschuler, Bill Clinton’s Parting Pardon Party, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY, 1131, 1136–37 (2012). 
 2. Eric Lichtblau & Davan Maharaj, Clinton Pardon of Rich a Saga of Power, Money 
and Influence, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2001), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/feb/18/news/mn-27173; see also Eric N. Berg, Marc 
Rich Indicted in Vast Tax Evasion Case, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 1983), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1983/09/20/business/marc-rich-indicted-in-vast-tax-evasion-case.html.  
 3. The Controversial Pardon of International Fugitive Marc Rich: Hearings Before the 
H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 88 (2001) (statement of Morris “Sandy” Weinberg Jr., 
former assistant U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York). 
 4. Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1137.  
 5. See 28 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2012).  
 6. See Excerpts from Testimony on Pardon, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/02/us/excerpts-from-testimony-on-pardon.html 
(reciting Podesta’s testimony that he and the entire staff of the White House Counsel’s 
Office opposed the pardon); In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated Mar. 9, 2001, 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 270, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Rich’s representatives also contacted White House 
Chief of Staff John D. Podesta, White House Counsel Beth Nolan, and Deputy White 
House Counsel Bruce Lindsey to enlist their support. Podesta, Nolan, and Lindsey, 
however, . . . opposed [the pardon] . . . .”). 
 7. See Alison Leigh Cowan, Rich Cashed in a World of Chits to Win Pardon, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/11/us/plotting-a-pardon-rich-cashed-
in-a-world-of-chits-to-win-pardon.html. 
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contributions had included “more than $1 million to the Democratic 
Party and its candidates, $450,000 to Clinton’s library fund, $100,000 to 
a fund to help Hillary Clinton’s Senate campaign, $10,000 to the 
President’s defense fund, and $7375 worth of furniture to the 
Clintons.”8 
Denise Rich pressed for an invitation to a White House dinner where 
she sought a private moment with the President. According to Jack 
Quinn, a former Clinton White House Counsel then representing Marc 
Rich, Denise Rich said simply, “I know you got my letter, and it means 
a great deal to me.”9 
Beth Dozoretz also made a personal appeal to Clinton. She was a 
prominent Democratic fundraiser, a former finance chair of the 
Democratic National Committee, and a friend of Denise Rich.10 
President Clinton later wrote, “The suggestion that I granted the pardons 
because Mr. Rich’s former wife, Denise, made political contributions 
and contributed to the Clinton library foundation is utterly false. There 
was absolutely no quid pro quo.”11 
A less familiar tale of Clinton’s magnanimity on his last day in 
office is almost as revealing. Carlos Vignali had served six years of a 
fifteen-year prison term when Clinton commuted his sentence to the 
time already served.12 According to the judge who sentenced Vignali, 
he “played a major role in the financing, transport, and procurement of 
drugs” for a large Minneapolis drug conspiracy.13  
Vignali’s father, Horacio Vignali, had given $160,000 in political 
contributions since his son’s conviction, most of it to California 
Democrats.14 Horacio encouraged the recipients of these contributions 
                                                                                                                     
 8. James V. Grimaldi & Dan Eggen, House Panel Expands Probe of Rich Pardon; 3 
Former Clinton Aides Subpoenaed, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2001, at A3.  
 9. Cowan, supra note 7. 
 10. See Melinda Henneberger, Pardon Puts New Spotlight on a Clinton Fund-Raiser, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/17/us/pardon-puts-new-spotlight-
on-a-clinton-fund-raiser.html; In re Grand Jury Subpoenas dated Mar. 9, 2001, 179 F. Supp. 2d 
270, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (describing Dozoretz as a close friend of Denise Rich and a good 
friend of Clinton).  
 11. William Jefferson Clinton, My Reasons for the Pardons, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2001), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/opinion/my-reasons-for-the-pardons.html. For a fuller 
description of the history of the Marc Rich and Pincus Green pardons, see Alschuler, supra note 
1, at 1137–42. 
 12. See Politics: Criminal Probe of Rich Pardon Opened; Other Developments, FACTS ON 
FILE WORD NEWS DIG., Feb. 14, 2001, at 100A2 [hereinafter Criminal Probe of Rich]. 
 13.  See David S. Doty, Clemency: A View from the Bench of Two Commutations—
Vignali and Willis, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 161–62 (2000–2001). Judge Doty, who had 
written letters supporting the successful clemency applications of two other drug dealers he had 
sentenced, was “aghast” at the Vignali commutation. See id.; Criminal Probe of Rich, supra 
note 12.  
 14. Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, Working the American System, L.A. TIMES 
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and other prominent figures to endorse clemency for Carlos. He 
obtained letters or favorable phone calls from two members of 
Congress, two California State Assembly speakers, a cardinal of the 
Catholic Church, the Los Angeles County sheriff, a Los Angeles 
County Supervisor, a city councilman, and the United States Attorney in 
Los Angeles.15 Carlos’s clout-less coconspirators collected no 
commutations, and several of them remained in custody when Carlos 
went home.16 
John Catsimatidis, the owner of a supermarket chain, had been a 
contributor to both Democratic and Republican candidates and had been 
particularly supportive of the Clintons. He also had pledged to raise $1 
million for the Clinton Presidential Library.17 Catsimatidis wrote letters 
supporting the successful clemency applications of Edward Downe Jr.,18 
a former financial executive who had pleaded guilty to insider trading, 
and William Fugazy, the “limo king of New York” who had pleaded 
guilty to perjury.19 Catsimatidis then telephoned Clinton’s Chief of 
Staff, John Podesta, to ask him to bring the letters to the President’s 
attention.20 Catsimatidis told the press, “In the last 50 years, I don’t 
know of anyone who’s gotten a pardon who hadn’t paid a lot of money 
to a lawyer or hasn’t known somebody. . . . How do you create a pardon 
other than talking to people?”21 
Both Republican and Democratic Presidents may have taken note of 
campaign contributions in deciding whether to grant clemency. 
Clinton’s predecessor, George H. W. Bush, approved clemency at a far 
                                                                                                                     
(Apr. 29, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/29/magazine/tm-57153.   
 15. Id. The U.S. Attorney in Minneapolis, the district where Carlos was convicted, 
opposed clemency. See Margaret Colgate Love, The Pardon Paradox: Lessons of Clinton’s Last 
Pardons, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 185, 211 (2003); see also Alschuler, supra note 1, at 1143 (noting 
that Horatio Vignali paid fees of $204,280 to Hugh Rodham, a Florida attorney and Hillary 
Clinton’s brother, to promote Carlos’s cause in the White House and that Rodham returned the 
money at the behest of President and Mrs. Clinton after the press publicized the fees).  
 16. Richard A. Serrano & Stephen Braun, In Many Drug Cases, Normal Clemency Process 
Bypassed, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2001), http://articles.latimes.com/2001/mar/05/news/mn-33657 
(reporting that Todd Hopson, a Vignali co-defendant serving eighteen years, “more closely fits the 
model that Clinton, FAMM [Families Against Mandatory Minimums] and others have spoken 
of—a first-time offender, a minor role in the drug crime, and someone who does not have the 
money or connections to get out of prison early”).  
 17. Greg B. Smith, Clinton Library Fundraiser Helped Perjurer Get Pardon, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 4, 2001, at A02. 
 18. See Mark Hosenball, A Library Link?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 9, 2001), 
http://www.newsweek.com/library-link-149021. Downe himself had contributed $21,500 to 
Democratic candidates since 1991 and had given $1000 to Hillary Clinton’s U.S. Senate 
campaign, InsidePolitics, Would You Pardon Them?, CNN (Feb. 19, 2001, 2:36 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/time/2001/02/26/pardon.html.  
 19. InsidePolitics, supra note 18; Hosenball, supra note 18. 
 20. Hosenball, supra note 18.   
 21. Smith, supra note 17.  
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lower rate than any other twentieth-century President,22 but he did 
pardon Armand Hammer, the Chairman of Occidental Petroleum, who 
recently had given more than $100,000 to Republican state committees 
and another $100,000 to the Bush–Quayle Inaugural Committee.23 In 
1976, Hammer had pleaded guilty to making an illegal contribution to 
President Nixon’s reelection campaign.24  
Bush also pardoned Edwin L. Cox Jr., who had served a short prison 
sentence for bank fraud.25 After Bush’s loss to Clinton in the 1992 
presidential election, former Texas governor Bill Clements called 
Bush’s chief of staff, James Baker, to seek a pardon for Cox.26 Baker 
passed along Clements’s request to the White House Counsel’s office 
with a note reporting that Cox’s father was “a longtime supporter of the 
President’s.”27 He also sent a copy of his note to President Bush. After 
Bush approved the pardon, Cox’s father continued his support by 
donating at least $100,000 to the Bush Presidential Library, $125,000 to 
Republican campaign committees, and $30,000 to the gubernatorial 
campaign of President Bush’s son, George W. Bush.28 Edwin Cox Jr. 
would have been ineligible for a pardon under the rules applicable to 
people without White House connections.  
                                                                                                                     
 22. See Office of the Pardon Attorney, Clemency Statistics, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 23. Marc Lacey, Political Memo; Resurrecting Ghosts of Pardons Past, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
4, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/04/us/political-memo-resurrecting-ghosts-of-
pardons-past.html.    
 24. Eric Pace, Armand Hammer Dies at 92; Executive Forged Soviet Ties, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 11, 1990), http://www.nytimes.com/1990/12/11/obituaries/armand-hammer-dies-at-92-
executive-forged-soviet-ties.html; David Rampe, Armand Hammer Pardoned by Bush, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 15, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/15/us/armand-hammer-pardoned-by-
bush.html.  
 25. Michael Weisskopf, A Pardon, a Presidential Library, a Big Donation, TIME (Mar. 6, 
2001), http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,101652,00.html. 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id.   
 28. Id.  
113
Alschuler: Limiting Political Contributions After <i> McCutcheon</i>, <i>Cit
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
502 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67 
 
APPENDIX E 
THE EFFECT OF CAMPAIGN DOLLARS IV: THE APPOINTMENT OF 
AMBASSADORS 
In recently released post-Watergate testimony, former President 
Richard Nixon acknowledged that he reserved many ambassadorships 
for campaign contributors. “I did give top consideration to major 
financial contributors,” he declared.1 “[I]t was not vitally 
important . . . to have . . . an individual whose qualifications were 
extraordinary” in positions like the U.S. ambassadorships to 
“Luxembourg or El Salvador or Trinidad et cetera.”2 “[T]here was a lot 
of in-fighting within the Administration . . . as to . . . how many posts 
would be available to financial contributors . . . .”3 
The former President pointed to tradition:  
[I]n every presidency that I know of contributors have been 
appointed to non-career posts in considerable 
numbers . . . . Bill Bullitt, for example, was probably the 
best ambassador to Russia and the best ambassador to 
France we have had in a generation. Now he didn’t get his 
job because he happened to shave the top of his head. He 
got his job because he contributed a half million dollars to 
Mr. Roosevelt’s campaign. . . . Pearl Mesta wasn’t sent to 
Luxembourg because she had big bosoms. Pearl Mesta 
went to Luxembourg because she made a good 
contribution.4 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Deposition of Richard M. Nixon at 34–35, United States v. Doe, 418 U.S. 683 (1975) 
(No. 73-1766) [hereinafter Nixon Deposition], available at http://media.nara.gov/research/nixon-
grand-jury/9-16a/9-16a-testimony-nixon-6-23-1975-Part1.pdf.  
 2. Id. at 18.  
 3. Id. at 32. 
 4. Id. at 21, 25–26. Perle Mesta, a famed Washington hostess and Harry Truman’s 
ambassador to Luxembourg, inspired the Irving Berlin musical “Call Me Madam.” She was 
portrayed on stage and screen by Ethel Merman. Frank Rich, Journal; Calling Perle Mesta, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/18/opinion/journal-calling-perle-
mesta.html.  
Mesta’s name was almost never mentioned without the tag line “the hostess with the mostest,” 
see id., and William Bullitt might have been the host with the most. His career was even more 
colorful than Mesta’s. He coauthored a psycho-biography of Woodrow Wilson with Sigmund Freud 
(who had personally psychoanalyzed Bullitt). See Erik H. Erikson, The Strange Case of Freud, Bullitt, 
and Woodrow Wilson: I, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 1967, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articl 
es/archives/1967/feb/09/the-strange-case-of-freud-bullitt-and-woodrow-wils/ (reviewing SIGMUND 
FREUD & WILLIAM C. BULLITT, WOODROW WILSON: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY (1967)). In 
addition, he served as the first American ambassador to the Soviet Union, conducted a back-
door campaign to have Sumner Welles dismissed from the State Department because Welles 
had solicited gay sex from railroad porters, and hosted at his Moscow residence “the Spring Ball 
of the Full Moon”—a 1935 party at which more than 100 zebra finches flew throughout the 
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White House tapes that became public after Nixon testified show 
that he said to his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, “My point is that 
anybody who wants to be an ambassador must at least give $250,000.”5 
He said of Raymond Guest, who had expressed an interest in becoming 
ambassador to Belgium, “Uh, he’s fine. His wife speaks French, he 
speaks French, uh, uh, but the cost is uh, a quarter of a million.”6 On 
being told of a press report that Cornelius Vanderbilt Whitney would be 
named ambassador to Spain (something that Nixon apparently did not 
know), he declared, “Hell, if we did it, it was a great sale . . . . He gave a 
quarter of a million dollars.”7  
The custom of giving campaign contributors a large leg up in 
obtaining ambassadorships has not faded in the years since the Nixon 
administration. In the administration of President Barack Obama, as in 
those of his predecessors George W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George H. W. 
Bush, Ronald Reagan, and Jimmy Carter, slightly more than 30% of all 
                                                                                                                     
house and a baby bear got drunk on champagne fed to it by Communist leader Karl Radek. 
William Christian Bullitt Jr., Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_
Christian_Bullitt,_Jr. (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
 5. George Lardner Jr. & Walter Pincus, Nixon Set Minimum Contribution for Choice 
Diplomatic Posts, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/
national/longterm/nixon/103097envoy.htm.   
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. After Thomas Pappas raised funds that Nixon knew would be paid to the 
Watergate burglars for their silence, Nixon agreed to Pappas’s request that he not replace the 
ambassador to Greece. “Let him stay,” the President said of the ambassador. “Let him stay. No 
problem. Pappas has raised the money we need for this other activity.” George Lardner Jr. & 
Walter Pincus, Contributor Got Oval Office Thank-You for Watergate Funds, WASH. POST (Oct. 
30, 1997), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/nixon/103097pappas.htm.  
Nixon acknowledged that “the making of an absolute commitment for ambassadorships” 
would be illegal. See Nixon Deposition, supra note 1, at 37. Prosecutors sought his testimony 
because some of his aides apparently had made such absolute commitments. Notably, two 
campaign contributors who had obtained ambassadorships in Nixon’s first term apparently had 
been promised that he would appoint them to better (i.e., European) ambassadorships if each 
gave $100,000 to his reelection campaign. Nixon’s personal lawyer, Herbert Kalmbach, in fact 
went to prison for making this arrangement with the ambassador to Trinidad and Tobago, Fife 
Symington Jr. See Bob Woodward & Carl Bernstein, Haldeman Role in Envoy Deal Told: 
Haldeman Linked to Envoy Deal, WASH. POST, June 26, 1974, at A1; Buckley v. Valeo, 519 
F.2d. 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (“On February 25, 1974, Herbert Kalmbach, a principal fund 
raiser, pleaded guilty to a charge of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 600, in having promised, in 1971, a 
more prestigious post to Ambassador (to Trinidad) J. Fife Symington, in return for a $100,000 
contribution to be split between 1970 senatorial candidates designated by the White House and 
Mr. Nixon’s 1972 campaign.”); S. REP. NO. 93–981, at 492–510 (1974) (compiling extensive 
evidence of the influence of campaign contributions on President Nixon’s ambassadorial 
appointments).  
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ambassadors have been political appointees.8 The cost of a top 
ambassadorship apparently has increased from $250,000 to $1 million.9 
                                                                                                                     
 8. See Al Kamen, Embassy Openings for Open Wallets, WASH. POST (Jan. 19, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/pb/national/embassy-openings-for-open-wallets/2011/01/18/A 
BYmMkD_story.html; see also Brandon Conradis, Obama Selects Key Donor as Ambassador to 
Hungary, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/11/obama-
selects-key-donor-as-ambassad.html; Michael Beckel, Big Donors & Bundlers Among Obama’s 
Ambassador Picks, OPENSECRETS (May 28, 2009), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/
2009/05/big-donors-bundlers-among-obam.html; Michael Beckel, Obama’s New Ambassador 
Nominees Gave Big—and Bundled Bigger, OPENSECRETS.ORG (June 18, 2009), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/06/obamas-new-ambassador-nominees.html. 
 9. See Kamen, supra note 8. 
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APPENDIX F 
PARTISAN ADVANTAGE AND INCUMBENT PROTECTION 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the plurality in McCutcheon, 
“[T]hose who govern should be the last people to help decide who 
should govern.”1 The last people who should have a job, however, may 
be the ones to whom the Constitution assigns it. Sadly perhaps, 
legislators are the only people who can supply election laws. Under the 
“rule of necessity,” even a judge with a financial interest in the outcome 
of a case may hear it when no disinterested judge can replace him.2 
When legislators enact campaign-finance regulations, they influence 
the outcome of elections, and when judges strike down campaign-
finance regulations, they do too. Because members of Congress must 
stand for reelection, there is good reason for mistrusting their decisions. 
The Supreme Court’s partisan division on the validity of campaign-
finance regulations raises eyebrows too.3  
Considerable discussion has focused on whether contribution limits 
are beneficial to incumbents (because challengers can overcome the 
greater name recognition and other electoral advantages of incumbents 
only by raising large amounts of money) or whether these limits benefit 
challengers (because incumbents can more easily raise large amounts of 
money).4 In Randall v. Sorrell,5 the Supreme Court saw low 
contribution limits as a form of incumbent protection. It invalidated 
Vermont’s extremely low limits partly because they threatened to “harm 
the electoral process by preventing challengers from mounting effective 
campaigns against incumbent officeholders.”6 But the Court apparently 
got it backwards. Recent empirical studies have concluded that “[i]n 
real-world elections, the benefits of low contribution limits largely 
redound to challengers.”7 
                                                                                                                     
 1. McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1441–42 (2014) (plurality opinion). 
 2. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213, 217 (1980).  
 3. Moreover, Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), still casts a shadow. Three of the five 
Justices in the majority in Bush v. Gore were also part of the five-Justice majorities in Citizens 
United and McCutcheon. Some cynical Democrats do not consider it a coincidence that the 
rulings in all of these cases advanced the electoral interests of Republicans. 
 4. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, Do Low Contribution Limits Insulate Incumbents from 
Competition?, 9 ELECTION L.J. 125, 127 (2010) (discussing campaign-finance models that 
predict whether contribution limits protect incumbents or challengers).  
 5. 548 U.S. 230 (2006).  
 6. Id. at 248–49 (plurality opinion).  
 7. CIARA TORRES-SPELLISCY ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
AND LOW CONTRIBUTION LIMITS 2 (2009), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/
default/files/legacy/publications/Electoral.Competition.pdf; see Stratmann, supra note 4, at 126–
27 (describing prior studies and offering further findings that “[t]he tighter the [contribution] 
limits, the more competitive the election”).   
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Generalizations on this subject are of dubious value. Contribution 
limits plainly benefit some incumbents and plainly disadvantage others. 
An incumbent from a “swing” district who expects wealthy donors to 
target him at the next election would be likely support contribution limits 
with enthusiasm. An incumbent who has been reelected repeatedly from 
a safe district, however, would be likely to oppose them. This member’s 
seniority and the power accompanying it could enable him to fill a large 
war chest, which he would not need to use to wage war. Whether 
progressive or conservative, this incumbent might use most of the funds 
he collected to aid other politicians and to pay the expenses of 
campaigning and office holding—including expenses he might incur at 
the National Democratic Club or the Capitol Hill Club and at five-star 
resorts. This member would have little to gain by voting to limit 
contributions.8  
A less discussed, more easily answered, and probably more relevant 
question is which political party benefits from contribution limits. When 
one party tends to attract small donors and the other large donors, 
capping contributions is likely to benefit the party that disproportionately 
attracts small donors. Today, the party that benefits politically from 
contribution limits is almost certainly the Democratic Party.9 
                                                                                                                     
 8. Since 1989, federal law has prohibited federal office holders, former office holders, 
and current candidates from using campaign funds to pay personal living expenses. See U.S. S. 
SELECT COMM. ON ETHICS, 108th Cong., S. ETHICS MANUAL 154 & n.428 (2003). However, 
candidates and former candidates may donate these funds to charities without limit, to political 
parties without limit, and to political campaigns other than their own within limits. Id. at 154. 
They also may use campaign funds to pay legal expenses if charged with official misconduct, to 
buy furniture and art for their offices, and to pay other expenses of campaigning and office 
holding. Id. at 116–17, 155. Officials have used these funds to enable their spouses to 
accompany them on work-related travel and to host extended fundraising gatherings at resorts in 
places like Vail, Park City, Puerto Rico, Las Vegas, South Florida, and Bermuda. Eric Lipton, A 
Loophole Allows Lawmakers to Reel in Trips and Donations, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/20/uspolitics/a-loophole-allows-lawmakers-to-reel-in-trips-and-don 
ations.html. One member of Congress even has used campaign funds to pay herself 18% interest 
on loans from herself to her campaign. Steve Kroft, 60 Minutes: Washington’s Open Secret: 
Profitable PACs, CBS NEWS (Oct. 21, 2013), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560_162-
57608255/washingtons-open-secret-profitable-pacs/ (describing the interest charges of the 
“worst offender,” Grace Napolitano); see also Thomas J. Cole, Lawmakers Use Campaign 
Funds for Expenses, ALBUQUERQUE J. (Feb. 15, 2012, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/8 
8006/news/lawmakers-use-campaign-funds-for-expenses.html; Dave Mann & Abby Rapoport, 
Lifestyles of the Corrupt and Elected, TEX. OBSERVER (Jan. 16, 2011, 8:19 AM), http://www.tex 
asobserver.org/cover-story/lifestyles-of-the-corrupt-and-elected; Adam Schwartzman, Joe 
Bruno, Other Pols Use Campaign Funds to Pay Legal Expenses, VILLAGE VOICE BLOGS (Sep. 3, 
2010, 2:00 PM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/2010/09/joe_bruno_other.php; Ken 
Silverstein, Beltway Bacchanal: Congress Lives High on the Contributor’s Dime, HARPER’S 
MAG. (Mar. 2008), http://harpers.org/archive/2008/03/beltway-bacchanal/.  
 9. In 2012, the Barack Obama presidential campaign raised three times more cash from 
“small individual contributors” than the Mitt Romney presidential campaign. It raised only 1.3 
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It may not be a coincidence that the five Justices in the majority in 
both Citizens United and McCutcheon were appointed by Republican 
presidents while three of the four dissenters in Citizens United and all of 
the dissenters in McCutcheon were appointed by Democrats. To explain 
this alignment, one need not embrace the cynical view that Republican 
Justices strive to get Republicans elected. Instead, Republican-appointed 
Justices might simply have been more suspicious than Democrat-
appointed Justices of legislators whose approval of campaign-finance 
limitations could have furthered their own partisan interests. Without 
seeking to tilt the game board in favor of their party, these Justices might 
have sought to block Democratic legislators from tilting it in favor of 
theirs.10 
                                                                                                                     
times more cash from “large individual contributors.” See 2012 Presidential Race, 
OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/index.php (last visited Feb. 3, 2015).  
In the 2010 midterm elections, conservative super PACs outspent liberal super PACs by 25 
percent. See Michael Beckel, Led by Karl Rove-Linked Groups, “Super PACs” and Nonprofits 
Significantly Aid GOP in Election 2010, OPENSECRETS (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/11/led-by-karl-rove-linked-groups-nonp.html. 
According to the New York Times:  
About two dozen individuals, couples or corporations gave $1 million or more 
to Republican super PACs [in the beginning of 2012]. . . . Collectively, their 
contributions totaled more than $50 million this cycle, making them easily the 
most influential and powerful political donors in politics today. They have 
relatively few Democratic counterparts so far . . . .  
Nicholas Confessore et al., In Republican Race, a New Breed of Superdonor, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/us/politics/in-republican-race-a-new-breed-of-
superdonor.html.  
A Times update in late September 2012 reported: 
While Democratic super PACs have begun to attract a growing number of 
donors giving six- and seven-figure checks, they remain far behind their 
Republican equivalents in terms of fund-raising. The four top Democratic 
groups had together raised less through the beginning of September than 
Restore Our Future, which is backing Mitt Romney. 
Nicholas Confessore, Reversing Course, Soros to Give $1 Million to a Pro-Obama “Super 
PAC,” N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2012, 3:32 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/27/soros-g 
ives-1-million-to-democratic-super-pac/?src=recg.  
 10. Recall, however, that public opinion strongly favors campaign-finance regulation. See Dan
Eggen, Poll: Large Majority Opposes Supreme Court’s Decision on Campaign Financing, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2010, 4:38 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/0 
2/17/AR2010021701151.html; Lydia Saad, Half in U.S. Support Publicly Financed Federal 
Campaigns: Vast Majority Supports Limiting Campaign Spending and Contributions, GALLUP 
(June 24, 2013), http://www.gallup.com/poll/163208/half-support-publicly-financed-federal-
campaigns.aspx. The legislators who oppose campaign-finance regulation appear to be the ones 
most likely to be subordinating their constituents’ desires to their own political interests. 
Moreover, in 2011, the Supreme Court struck down by a vote of five-to-four a scheme of public 
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Undoubtedly, legislators of both parties do consider the electoral 
consequences of campaign-finance restrictions, and their efforts to gain 
electoral advantage should lead judges to be wary. Wariness goes too 
far, however, when it causes judges to turn a blind eye to the 
contributions that make deliberate favoritism in awarding government 
benefits likely. 
                                                                                                                     
financing of election campaigns approved by voter initiative. Although the self-interest of 
incumbent legislators could not have motivated this scheme, the Justices in the majority were 
the same those who formed the majorities in Citizens United and McCutcheon. Ariz. Free Enter. 
Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).  
120
Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 1
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss2/1
